For many years, the UK stood blissfully unaware of the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In fact, some of our politicians, former British prime minister David Cameron chief among them, appeared positively nonchalant about the matter.
Those of us raising concerns were in the minority. While the British public on the whole remained indifferent.
However, this time last year, one thing which united all Britons was our total ignorance of the oncoming COVID-19 crisis. We sure know all about it now — and as a consequence, we all appear a little more China-savvy too.
As noted by British Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak, the UK’s borrowing has surpassed peacetime records, while GDP is forecast to experience the steepest drop in 300 years.
The UK is not alone. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development projects a sharp contraction in the world economy, with our fellow G7 states similarly emerging from this year severely bruised.
China less so. At least economically, as it bucks the trend with a projected GDP growth, albeit to a reduced figure of 1.8 percent.
Where China has taken a greater hit is in its global reputation. According to research conducted by the Pew Research Center this summer, negative attitudes toward China have hit historic highs in many advanced economies.
In Britain, just under three-quarters see China in a negative light. This is up 19 percentage points from last year, and from Canada to South Korea, a similar picture emerges. Negative views of China increased most in Australia, which is unsurprising, considering this year’s events.
While public attitudes toward China were already souring in many of these countries prior to this year, it could still be argued that recent changes in opinion have been driven by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Indeed, Pew data suggest that disapproval of how China handled COVID-19 tends to correspond with views of the country and its leader, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
However, this is not the case for the world leaders who have also had a serious rethink about China’s rise.
Their changing approach has not been simplistically driven by the fact that the virus originated in China. Even evidence of negligence and a cover-up on the part of Chinese officials is ultimately insignificant. Rather the pandemic has revealed Beijing’s behavior at its worst as it has harshly responded to perfectly reasonable requests for transparency.
In March, after Canberra called for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19, Beijing quickly banned imports from key Australian abattoirs and slapped harsh tariffs on the country’s barley.
Relations fractured further from there. Imports of copper, sugar, lobsters, timber and coal were stopped or sanctioned. Beijing’s man in Canberra, Chinese Ambassador to Australia Cheng Jingye (成競業), warned of (or rather threatened) Chinese consumer boycotts against Australian wine and beef.
Recently, Chinese Internet troll Zhao Lijian (趙立堅), who also serves as Deputy Director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, inflamed tensions further when he tweeted a doctored image of an Australian soldier holding a knife to a child’s neck.
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison hit back, and shortly afterward, Beijing whacked 200 percent tariffs on bottled Australian wine.
Subsequent efforts by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China to encourage consumers in the free world to treat themselves to a bottle of Australian red to, as they say, defend democracy, valiant as they are, can only ease this major blow the country’s wine industry.
It is not just those Down Under feeling the pressure. This summer, during a visit, ostensibly designed to persuade Europe to steer clear of the US’ “cold war,” Europeans felt the ire of Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅), who scolded Czech politicians for visiting Taiwan, warned Norway not to give a peace prize to the Hong Kong protesters and batted away criticism of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang.
Given all this, it is no surprise that governments across the free world, and their citizens, have concluded that Beijing’s ambitions might not be so benign, admittedly rather belatedly. So much, that some countries are keen to reduce their reliance on the PRC in years ahead.
Indeed, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who began his term vowing to keep Britain as the most open place for Chinese investment in Europe, now looks set to conclude a foreign policy review that would likely aim to get the country “off the trajectory of ever-increasing dependence.”
Whether this actually manifests remains to be seen, but this year certainly seems to be a consequential turning point in relations between the free world, particularly Britain, and China.
However, next year will be the real test. It is, after all, 100 years since the founding of the CCP — a key milestone for achieving Xi’s great rejuvenating “Chinese Dream.”
Leaders of the free world should not expect Beijing to retreat inward anytime soon. As for now, all we can do is follow the lead of the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by ordering a couple of bottles of Australian plonk to see in the new year.
Gray Sergeant is a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and chair of Hong Kong Watch.
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