Fri, Aug 21, 2020 page8

• Clarity in the US’ Taiwan strategy

  • By Lin Tai-ho 林泰和
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  In a speech titled “Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan Security” at a Rotary Club meeting in Taipei on Monday last week, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said that if the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to attack Taiwan, “the first battle would quickly become the last.”

  The statement sparked controversy.

  Coincidentally, John Mearsheimer, a US political scientist and international relations academic who proposed the theory of “offensive realism,” recently said that the US could eventually become unable to protect Taiwan in the face of the continuous rise of China’s military power.

  Ultimately, Taiwan must rely on itself, Mearsheimer said in a telephone interview with Japan’s Asahi Shimbun.

  A different perspective on the issue can be found in two recent Taiwan-friendly pieces of legislation proposed by members of the US Congress. If the bills pass, Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan would shift to one of strategic clarity, which would help deter a PLA invasion.

  Section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) stipulates that the US “president is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The president and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”

  The key passage in this section is: “any danger to the interests of the US,” which is a prerequisite for the US to determine whether it should intervene in a cross-strait conflict.

  Another key phrase is the “appropriate action” to be determined by Washington in response to such danger, which exemplifies the strategic ambiguity in its Taiwan policy.

  “Appropriate action” could mean everything from verbal condemnation, economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation to the mobilization of the US Navy and Air Force, and eventually ground troops.

  A draft Taiwan Defense Act aims to ensure that the US can continue fulfilling its obligations under the TRA and requires the US Department of Defense to maintain the capability to defeat a Chinese offensive — and especially a Chinese fait accompli — against Taiwan.

  The term “fait accompli” as defined in the draft means “the strategy of the People’s Republic of China designed to allow the People’s Republic of China to use military force to seize control of Taiwan before the United States armed forces are able to respond effectively.”

  Simply put, the bill aims to prevent the scenario of “the first battle being the last” from happening and to preclude China from accomplishing the whole undertaking of unifying Taiwan with China whether by political or military means.

  The draft even includes an assessment of the role of US nuclear forces in deterring an invasion. This implies incorporating Taiwan into the US’ nuclear umbrella.

  Another bill — the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, introduced by US Representative Ted Yoho on July 29 — would require China to renounce the use or threat of military force to invade Taiwan and authorize the US president to respond with military force to protect Taiwan under three conditions: If China were to use military force against Taiwan; if China intended to seize Taiwan-controlled areas, including Penghu, Kinmen and Lienchiang counties; and if the lives of Taiwanese, including military personnel, were threatened.

  Most importantly, the bill extends Taiwan’s boundary from “Taiwan [proper] and the Pescadores,” as defined in the now-defunct Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and subsequently in the TRA, to “Kinmen and Lienchiang counties,” and, by extension, the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島) and the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島), over which Taiwan has effective control.

  Both bills would adjust the US’ strategic ambiguity of providing military support to Taiwan in accordance with the TRA to strategic clarity. While the Taiwan Defense Act would focus on deterring the PLA in advance, the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act would provide a foundation for protecting Taiwan if deterrence were to fail.

  While strategic ambiguity provides more flexible policy options for the US, it might deliver a false signal to the enemy. Strategic clarity, on the other hand, is more effective in deterring the enemy, because the message is clear and definite, even though this policy puts the US at the risk of fulfilling its commitments to protect Taiwan.

  Whether the US would help protect Taiwan depends on how it defines its national security and interests.

  For Taiwan, it is important to remember the Latin saying: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” — “If you want peace, prepare for war.”

  Lin Tai-ho is a professor at National Chung Cheng University’s Institute of Strategic and International Affairs.

  Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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