China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier group today began live-fire exercises in the Bohai Sea, which are to continue until Wednesday next week.
The sea’s similarity to conditions in the Taiwan Strait means that it is used by China’s military to test tactics and war-game an invasion of Taiwan.
It follows live-fire exercises in the South and East China seas by the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 73rd and 74th groups, confirmed yesterday by Chinese state media. Both army groups, garrisoned in China’s Fujian and Guangdong provinces respectively, are believed to be tasked with preparing for an invasion of Taiwan.
While a potential Chinese invasion is understandably at the forefront of the minds of Taiwan’s politicians and military planners, an alternative, yet equally existential threat — a sea and air blockade of Taiwan proper — is given far less attention.
Events in the past few years suggest that it is time for the government to re-elevate the national security threat posed by a blockade.
The PLA in past decades has stepped up combined air and sea encirclement drills around Taiwan. While they are certainly intended as psychological warfare — the exercises usually stop abruptly around important elections — no mistake should be made, the exercises are also in preparation for a blockade.
In such a case, PLA Navy surface ships and submarines would ensure commercial shipping is unable to deliver vital supplies to Taiwan. In addition to enforcing a no-fly zone to protect its ships, China would probably also try to prevent a Berlin-style airlift operation from Japan.
After World War II, Allied forces mounted a round-the-clock operation to airlift food and supplies to West Berlin after Soviet forces imposed a blockade, which was an attempt to coerce Allied forces to abandon their half of the German capital.
The Ministry of National Defense on May 4 confirmed that China plans to set up an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, which would require all civilian aircraft to identify themselves and announce their location. This follows the announcement of such a zone in the East China Sea in 2013.
Another warning sign came last month when Japan’s Kyodo news agency reported that the PLA is planning to hold a large-scale beach landing exercise in the South China Sea close to the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島) in August.
Capturing the islands would make it easier for China to enforce a blockade on Taiwan. While Beijing has sought to play down the report as merely “routine exercises,” Taipei is concerned and the military has moved to bolster its defense on the islands, as well as on nearby Itu Aba (Taiping Island, 太平島).
The US Department of Defense’s annual report to the US Congress last year said that the PLA has formulated plans for a “joint blockade campaign” that would allow China to slowly force Taiwan’s government into submission as the nation gradually ran out of food and other vital supplies.
A blockade would also be considerably easier for China’s military to execute than a full-scale invasion. It would carry far less political risk for Beijing, because if an invasion failed, the Chinese Communist Party would likely never recover.
A blockade could carry less international risk too: Would the US and other nations be willing to intervene in the event of a blockade? Foreign nations including the US might seek a diplomatic solution, rather than commit troops to break the blockade.
The government should consider elevating the threat posed by a blockade in its national security planning, and explore ways to increase the nation’s food, fuel and energy resiliency.
As Sun Tzu (孫子) wrote in The Art of War: “The greatest victory is that which requires no battle.”
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