Last month, Hon Hai Group chairman Terry Gou (郭台銘) said that arms procurement should not involve buying weaponry “just for the sake of it” and that “Taiwan should stop purchasing arms from the US.”
The remarks by Gou, who is contesting the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential primary, evoke memories of attempts by the KMT and the People First Party during former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) administration to sabotage purchases of military equipment.
The main slogan the pan-blue camp used at the time was: “Oppose wasteful arms procurement.” It encouraged people to protest, even employing nonsensical slogans such as: “Oppose arms procurement, tackle unemployment,” “oppose arms procurement, help credit card slaves” and “oppose arms procurement, help prevent suicides.”
The administration of then-US president George W. Bush was willing to sell Taiwan three important types of military equipment: eight diesel-electric submarines, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile batteries and Lockheed P-3C Orion aircraft. If the KMT had not blocked that purchase, Taiwan would have received the first submarine in 2013 and the final vessel this year.
When discussing submarines in 2015, then-president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said that “the US has agreed to sell us submarines, but we have heard nothing in 14 years. It is really too much” — as if he were not aware that the only obstacle to the sale was the reticence of KMT legislators.
Ironically, with Ma in office, the KMT resubmitted a similar arms purchase agreement, selectively proposing less controversial items that would not create a Chinese backlash, but a lot of time had already been wasted.
When Ma boasted that Taiwan had never spent more money on arms purchases from the US, he did not mention that he was benefiting from the letter of request, with the pricing and availability of weapons the nation needed, submitted by Chen’s administration.
The request for submarines — which are critical for defending the Taiwan Strait frontline — remains up in the air, but when President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office, it launched an indigenous submarine program.
The KMT has long bragged about its special relationship with China, but the party has been too China-friendly in terms of cross-strait relations and too prone to wishful thinking, which has led to unavoidable conflict with its claim to be the protector of the Republic of China.
This is why the party is always questioned and scrutinized when it talks about national defense capabilities and its own determination, regardless of how many superstars, such as Gou or Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), it has on its side.
Gou said on Facebook: “I dare declare peace! I will insist on democracy! I will defend the nation! What about you?”
When did it become necessary to say that you want to protect democracy and Taiwan? These are the most fundamental demands. Apart from hinting at the incongruence between the KMT’s statements and actions, these comments are meaningless.
Chen Kuan-fu is a research student at National Taipei University’s Department of Law.
Translated by Edward Jones and Perry Svensson
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS