In October 2017, at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party enshrined in its constitution a new political doctrine: “Xi Jinping (習近平) Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era.”
At a time when a rapidly modernizing China is a leading global player, it is tempting to dismiss this doctrine as anachronistic “party-speak” from a bygone age.
We succumb to that temptation at our peril.
Five months after the constitutional change, the Chinese congress abolished the presidential term limit, meaning that, barring a political earthquake, Xi — who, at age 65, remains healthy and vigorous — could remain president for perhaps another 20 years. His eponymous doctrine will therefore shape China’s development and global engagement for decades to come, and perhaps longer.
In a sense, the inclusion of Xi’s name and thought in the CCP constitution delivered to him the exalted status of the People’s Republic’s founding father, Mao Zedong (毛澤東), as well as the architect of China’s modernization, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) — the only two other leaders mentioned in the document.
That, together with the removal of term limits, has led many to argue that Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao.
However, even if true, this does not mean that Xi is attempting to restore Maoist totalitarianism. While Xi has a much more positive view of China’s Maoist past than any other leader since Deng, he is no Maoist.
Instead, Xi’s approach to governance closely resembles that of China’s first president under Mao, Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇), a devoted Leninist who selectively adapted Confucian ideas to build a Sinicized party-state.
For Liu, the party was pivotal; for Mao, by contrast, it was ultimately dispensable, as the Cultural Revolution — of which Liu himself was a casualty — demonstrated.
Unlike Mao, who found chaos exhilarating, Xi shares Liu’s longing to exercise control through the CCP, which he expects to take the lead — and apply “Xi Jinping Thought” — in all policy areas: political, military, civilian and academic.
The contrast with Deng is even sharper. Deng’s reforms were defined by pragmatism and experimentation, aimed at identifying the most effective approach to modernization.
In the 1980s, Deng even briefly considered the radical possibility of separating the CCP from the state, though he abandoned the idea after the pro-democracy Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.
Nonetheless, Deng and his successors — Jiang Zemin (江澤民) and Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) — continued to open China to the West, and remained willing to tolerate the spread, within limits, of some liberal ideas.
This is not the case with Xi, whose repeated commitment to deepening reform is muddied by his redefinition of what that should entail.
Xi sees no place for political experimentation or liberal values in China, and regards democratization, civil society and universal human rights as anathema.
Deepening reform means solidifying control over the CCP, via his “anti-corruption campaign,” and over the population, including through the use of advanced technologies enabled by artificial intelligence.
Such digital authoritarianism will, Xi hopes, prevent liberal or democratic ideas from taking root and spreading, even as China remains connected to the rest of the world.
Chinese citizens may enjoy freedom as consumers and investors, but not as participants in civil society or civic discourse.
Managing this tension between international openness and state control is vital for Xi to achieve another key goal of his doctrine to “make China great again.”
On the one hand, this entails instilling a party-centric nationalism, so that citizens embrace the primacy of the CCP and of Xi himself. Those who are slower to meet this expectation might find themselves under surveillance and even sent to so-called re-education camps, like those in Xinjiang, where hundreds of thousands (or more) Muslim Uighurs are detained.
On the other hand, making China great again means projecting power and leadership on the world stage. After decades of adhering to Deng’s injunction that China should “hide its strength and bide its time,” the country’s moment, Xi believes, has come.
One way Xi hopes to boost China’s global standing is by ensuring that it is on the frontier of technology. To that end, the state is offering its full support to national champions in cutting-edge sectors, as stipulated in the government’s Made in China 2025 strategy, which competitors, especially the US, decry as unfair.
It is no coincidence that the US has been targeting Huawei Technologies, which has received as much state support as any company in any country in modern times.
Canada’s decision to heed the US’ request to detain Huawei (華為) chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟) for alleged fraud and violations of US sanctions against Iran amounted, in Xi’s eyes, to a failure to respect China’s standing and interests, and thus merited retaliation.
China soon detained two Canadians on allegations of “engaging in activities that endanger [China’s] national security,” and resentenced a Canadian convicted of drug smuggling, imposing the death penalty.
The goal of Xi Jinping Thought is not to launch a Cold War with the West, or to export China’s political model. Rather, Xi wants to shore up the authority of the party-state — and his own brand of authoritarianism — within China, including by ensuring that Chinese are not exposed to liberal-democratic ideas.
Understanding this is vital to enable the world to engage effectively with an increasingly formidable China.
Steve Tsang is director of the School of Oriental and African Studies’ China Institute at the University of London.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
During the “426 rally” organized by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party under the slogan “fight green communism, resist dictatorship,” leaders from the two opposition parties framed it as a battle against an allegedly authoritarian administration led by President William Lai (賴清德). While criticism of the government can be a healthy expression of a vibrant, pluralistic society, and protests are quite common in Taiwan, the discourse of the 426 rally nonetheless betrayed troubling signs of collective amnesia. Specifically, the KMT, which imposed 38 years of martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, has never fully faced its
When a recall campaign targeting the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators was launched, something rather disturbing happened. According to reports, Hualien County Government officials visited several people to verify their signatures. Local authorities allegedly used routine or harmless reasons as an excuse to enter people’s house for investigation. The KMT launched its own recall campaigns, targeting Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmakers, and began to collect signatures. It has been found that some of the KMT-headed counties and cities have allegedly been mobilizing municipal machinery. In Keelung, the director of the Department of Civil Affairs used the household registration system
RSS