In late 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) proposed the “One Belt, One Road” initiatives as a new global vision, pushing for a multilateral world and integrating neighboring states into a China-centered economic system.
Appropriating the well-known historical metaphor, the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) refers to an integrated network of continental railroads and highways, petroleum and natural gas pipelines, and various infrastructure projects that would spread from Xian to the Gobi and Central Asia, and eventually reach Russia and western Europe.
As a seaborne equivalent, the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) includes a web of planned trading ports and coastal infrastructures that would extend from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to east Africa and the Mediterranean region.
The “Belt, Road” initiatives constitute the cornerstone of China’s 13th five-year plan, a strategy of national development from this year to 2020.
The world has come to grips with China’s geopolitical ambitions and some commentators have even gone so far as to characterize the “Belt, Road” initiatives as laying the ground for a Chinese Monroe Doctrine.
At a macro level, the initiatives pose a new challenge to the US-controlled international order since the end of the Cold War. As a rising power, Beijing favors a global system that relies on the mechanisms of diplomatic negotiation to deal with intra and inter-state conflicts as opposed to the US’ preference for an order predominantly based on coercive diplomacy and military action.
China is no longer a middle power alternating between the US and Russia. It has emerged as a dominant player in the Asia-Pacific region even though its leadership prefers to focus on domestic reforms. This development is in line with China’s rhetoric about its peaceful rise, meaning that a powerful and prosperous China will not threaten its neighbors as the West had done in the age of imperialism.
However, the projection of Chinese power along the Silk Road has amplified not only geopolitical concerns, but also the public’s worries about China’s enormous energies and influences worldwide.
As well as security concerns about the spread of Muslim extremism into the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the Chinese expansion into Central Asia is driven by the need to diversify energy supplies for modernization.
For decades, China has depended on the Persian Gulf for most of its oil. As the second-largest oil consumer in the world, China has not yet established a strong navy to protect its oil tankers sailing through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. China still relies on the US to protect these ocean lanes.
Yet China’s pursuit of energy security can be in conflict with the US military interest in the Middle East. The only feasible option for Beijing is to diversify its energy supply system. Seen from this perspective, the newly established oil and natural gas pipelines between China, Russia and Kazakhstan constitute a new Silk Road for oil and gas. These overland pipelines should deepen Chinese economic ties with Central Asia.
China’s growing presence in Central Asia has transformed the socioeconomic landscape of Xinjiang. In Kashgar, car owners and bus drivers have used natural gas rather than petroleum. Natural gas is widely used in areas along the border with Russia and Central Asia. There is indeed a strong determination to diversify China’s energy supply at all levels.
Moreover, Xinjiang is always crowded with Central Asian, Persian, Afghan and Pakistani merchants, tourists, religious pilgrims, students and government officials. Beijing has positioned its Muslim frontier as a land of opportunities for people across Eurasia. Whatever China is doing now in Central Asia is based on a combination of economic, strategic and ideological concerns.
Faced with the challenge of US President Barack Obama’s administration launching a vast free-trade zone under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China has founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and struck bilateral trade agreements with many East and Southeast Asian nations.
With its huge market, Beijing is keen to create a “win-win” situation for neighboring states. This economic development is a reminder of the intra-Asian trading networks which had dominated the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean prior to the arrival of Western imperialism.
Most maritime countries in Southeast Asia had a long history of trading with the Middle Kingdom. Whether the current development will lay the foundation for a Chinese economic union in Asia and whether China’s influence will decline during the recent slowdown are debatable. However, China has been limiting the US’ influence through its efforts to build a new regional economic order.
Another key to the success of “Belt, Road” initiatives is the growth of Sino-African trade. Since the 1990s, Beijing has adopted a pragmatic mercantilist policy that combines diplomatic and economic activities.
Africa is now a reliable resource supplier and a modest consumer for Chinese manufacturing goods. The Sino-African trade has expanded at a staggering rate even though it makes up a tiny proportion of China’s foreign trade. In 2011, the African trade rose to US$166 billion, and in 2014, the figure was more than US$200 billion.
Xi last month pledged to offer US$60 million over three years to support infrastructure development in Africa. These policies are part of China’s consistent efforts to co-opt the African continent, biding for oil deals and seeking new markets for its products.
The challenge for many African leaders is how to accommodate a rising Middle Kingdom without alienating the US. Evidently, many ruling elites are as calculative and pragmatic as their Chinese counterparts. They will simply align with China for immediate gains and maintain a collegial relationship with the US.
China’s active engagement with Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa is a reminder of the Maoist strategy of guerrilla warfare, “encircling the city from the countryside,” which in this case is to forge alliances with the developing world against the West.
Whether the “Belt, Road” initiatives will enable China to manipulate regional systems and build its sphere of influence has yet to be seen. The reasoning behind this global vision reflects a sense of pragmatism and opportunism in Chinese strategic thinking. If China’s influence continues to rise, this expansion will propel the country toward its goals of achieving dominance and becoming one of the global powers in the 21st century.
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee is a professor of history and codirector of the bachelor’s degree program in global Asia studies at Pace University in New York City.
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