On May 26, one day before running a 3,000m race with a group of soldiers, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) proposed the South China Sea peace initiative. The five-point initiative calls on all parties to put aside sovereignty disputes, respect the spirit of the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, handle conflict through dialogue and peaceful means and include all parties in the establishment of a cooperation mechanism and code of conduct.
Although the initiative advocates peace, it avoids mentioning Taiwan’s own position on the South China Sea issue based on the Law of the Sea, nor does it mention the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea or the core issue behind the confrontations in the waters in recent years. At most, the initiative will have a short-lived publicity effect, but it does nothing to enhance Taiwan’s national interests.
The sovereignty disputes among the six countries surrounding the South China Sea mainly concern the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島). Among the six parties to the conflict, Taiwan and China are the only ones that have sovereignty dispute claims with the four ASEAN member states involved due to Taiwan’s U-shaped line and China’s “nine-dash line” which claim almost 90 percent of the South China Sea region as their territorial waters.
The sovereignty disputes in the areas apart from the Spratly Islands are mainly a matter between China and the four ASEAN countries, which have little disagreement among themselves. In the past, there have even been examples of these countries shelving disputes in favor of cooperation.
In other words, without the “China factor,” the disputes among the four ASEAN countries would be insignificant and even less serious than the dispute between South Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima.
The problem is that Taiwan’s South China Sea claim is similar to China’s, although it does not bully the other parties like China does. When Ma promotes respect for the Law of the Sea without mentioning Taiwan’s U-shaped line, the genuineness of his respect for the law is immediately put in question.
The conduct declaration was first proposed in 2002 to handle the South China Sea dispute, but China has always been reluctant to complete the negotiation process and Taiwan was excluded altogether.
By proposing the peace initiative while ignoring the conduct declaration and not using the opportunity to propose that Taiwan be included in it, the initiative will run parallel to ASEAN and might even create the impression that Taiwan is trying to help China bypass the conduct declaration by changing the situation which is a matter of ASEAN versus China. Such doubts would only serve to destroy trust between Taiwan and ASEAN.
If Taiwan wants to secure Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) in the controversial waters of the Spratly Islands, the nation must encourage increased US presence in the region and cooperate with Washington to prevent the situation from deteriorating.
By doing so, it could maintain the balance under pressure from China as well as some ASEAN countries that covet the island.
This implies that Taiwan would need to adjust its U-shaped line, which contradicts freedom the seas and the Law of the Sea. If Ma does not do so, the so-called peace initiative will be empty in all but name, and such a proposal would not help Taiwan’s national interests.
Lai I-chung is the vice chief executive officer of the Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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