Since 1992, the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University has studied the pro-unification and pro-independence issue, national identity and political party preferences among Taiwanese. In the latest survey, which was completed at the end of last year, the number of respondents identifying as Taiwanese and the number of respondents supporting Taiwanese independence were higher than in all past surveys.
The figures give us an interesting reference for understanding many political phenomena in Taiwan. Perhaps we can make the bold assumption that, post-democratization, Taiwanese are growing more confident, and political and economic pressure from China is becoming an important factor in Taiwan’s consolidation of a collective identity. This development has moved from being a quantitative change to a qualitative change.
“Identity” involves the simple question: “Who am I?” This includes an individual identity and a collective identity. The former distinguishes oneself from other individuals, while the latter is an acknowledgment and recognition of a group, in which one sees oneself.
National identity is such an example. A collective identity can be formed as the result of emotions, as exemplified by numerous events in history. When people fight the same enemy or pursue the same goal, a sense of collective identity can form within a group.
Sometimes people also make identity choices in cases of unequal rights, such as when a group of people are colonized or cannot be recognized internationally, and therefore find themselves in a disadvantageous position. It is even more likely to be a rational decision made as a result of interests or for reasons of survival. The factors are very complicated, which makes the matter of identity an interesting one.
Using these concepts, we can make sense of Chengchi University’s survey results and see some interesting and noteworthy signs in some political events in Taiwan and their impact on Taiwanese identity.
In early 1992, the year when the slogan “one China, with different interpretations” (一中各表) was created, the number of people who identified both as Taiwanese and as Chinese was the highest, accounting for more than 46 percent of respondents. Twenty-five percent identified as Chinese, while the lowest proportion, 17 percent, identified as Taiwanese.
The first change took place during Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996, when the number respondents identifying only as Chinese dropped, falling behind the other two categories.
In 2000, when the first transfer of government power took place, the number of respondents reporting a dual identity fell, and began to level with the number of respondents only identifying as Taiwanese.
In 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was elected president following the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) eight years in power, the number of respondents identifying as Taiwanese rose over those with a dual identity by a 5 percent margin.
Last year, when Ma had been in power for six years, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) suffered a great defeat in municipal elections, and those identifying as Taiwanese broke through 60 percent, while those with a dual identity dropped to 32 percent.
There are various reasons for the rise in Taiwanese identity during the presidencies of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁): Localized education, Taiwan-born presidents, Lee’s policy of “no hurry, be patient” and the policy to separate economics and politics.
However, one has to wonder why, after Ma — a Mainlander with a dream about a Greater China — came to power and quickly started pushing for a common agreement for a political “one China” concept, cross-strait economic integration and full-scale civil exchanges, only 3.5 percent of respondents see themselves as Chinese. The government has made full use of the state apparatus to promote Chinese identity, but it has backfired
Furthermore, the survey also shows that respondents who are pro-independence, and those who want independence to be actualized as soon as possible, account for 23.9 percent. Meanwhile, those who support unification and those who want faster unification account for less than 10 percent, the lowest number ever.
The matter of independence or unification has been a false question for years. Taiwan is not free to decide its identity because of international politics and China’s power on the world stage. This is why maintaining the so-called “status quo” has been a popular choice for respondents.
The US’ constant monitoring and suppression, best exhibited recently during the Republic of China flag raising incident at Twin Oaks Estate, and the USslong-standing interventions in Taiwan’s presidential elections, are also troublesome. However, the conservative US magazine The National Review cited Cuba as a precedent to urge US President Barack Obama’s administration to “rerecognize” Taiwan. This proposal is certainly not the current mainstream opinion in the US. However, it is necessary that the US should rerecognize Taiwan.
One has to ask then, why do pro-independence numbers continue to grow despite Chinese military threats, economic bribes and emotional appeals. To find the answer, we must look at the revelation Ma’s KMT government has brought to the Taiwanese over the past six years, and how much Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) government has made the public realize what China is about.
If we do that, we will find out if Taiwanese are getting increasingly confident and whether collective identity is getting stronger.
Translated by Ethan Zhan
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