After winning the Indian general election, former Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has become the country’s new prime minister, ending a decade of Congress Party rule. The BJP’s decisive victory in the national poll confounded all predictions.
The emergence of the fiercely nationalist Modi as India’s new leader has strong ramifications for Asia and the predicament in which Taiwan finds itself.
The win hinged on two major factors: His own success as chief minister of Gujarat — widely perceived to have been responsible for the “Gujarat Miracle” — and disillusionment in the Gandhi political dynasty. The former is related to the overall stagnation in India’s economy over the past two or three years, which has created a lot of dissatisfaction within Indian society; the latter is due to the emergence of a middle class following two decades of economic development in India. The members of this new class, together with the young generation, want to see a change in politics.
Therefore, despite deep reservations concerning Modi’s appointment among the Muslim community in the country, there are expectations for change in Indian politics.
Although Modi’s victory owes little to his foreign policy credentials, his uncompromising stance on issues relating to China and the US was a main factor in his ability to secure a huge majority, as well as the reason he is often referred to as “India’s Abe” — after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — by commentators.
Just as Abe’s particular brand of economics has come to be termed “Abenomics,” it is likely that Modi’s will be known as “Modinomics.” Modi is one of only three people that Abe follows on Twitter and immediately following the election in India, Japan suggested a meeting between the two prime ministers. If the proposed Abe-Modi meeting does take place, it will be interesting to see what kind of fireworks fly between the two leaders.
Japan and India are both major geopolitical players. Any strategic cooperation, or even alliance, between the two will have a huge impact on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, to a degree which is comparable only to the rise of China.
Not only will this mean that China is less likely to dominate the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, it will also have implications for US-China cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australia, Philippines and Indonesia may opt into joining this new cooperative relationship, creating a third force reluctant to be subservient to China and willing to stand up to the influence of the US, which has strong ties with China.
This new force could even form a new regional bloc in Asia similar to that of the EU in Europe.
Modi has visited Taiwan, three years after the establishment of representative offices in the two countries. He also sent his deputy minister to the nation on many occasions when the Democratic Progressive Party was in power. He clearly has a positive impression of Taiwan.
If Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is thought of as being more familiar with Taiwan affairs than most of his colleagues, then surely Modi should also be considered as a possible friend to Taiwan.
Together with Abe, who himself is very familiar with Taiwanese affairs, this new triumvirate of relations between Japan, India and China holds all kinds of strategic possibilities for the nation.
No longer should it be concerned with letting these opportunities fall by the wayside due to worries about being branded as being opposed to all things China for the sake of it.
Lai I-chung is an executive committee member of the Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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