The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has torn itself apart in recent months. In a normal state of affairs, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should reap the rewards and win the seven-in-one local elections in November as well as the presidential and legislative elections in 2016. However, polls suggest that the public still has misgivings about the DPP. What can the opposition do to improve its standing with voters?
After the 2008 presidential and legislative elections, the DPP reached a low point in its history. During two terms as DPP chair, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) brought the party back to where it became an important political force again, yet her leadership style and her 2012 presidential election campaign revealed significant shortcomings. If the DPP is to lead the nation again, she will need to correct these shortcomings during her next term as the party’s chair.
The key problem facing the DPP is that the public perceive it to be a group of factions, each led by its own leader. Unfortunately, each of the leaders appears to work for their own benefit rather than for the party as a whole.
In the past, party chairs completely changed the employees at the DPP headquarters. To some extent, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) has reappointed people from Tsai’s two terms. This retention of people must be continued and expanded. DPP employees need to be judged on what they do for the party, not on the basis of what they do for individual leaders.
Tsai will need to improve her leadership style. Historically, she has relied on a few subordinates to advise her. Democratic leaders require a wide range of ideas and inputs. This requires a much broader range of advisers who are able to speak frankly without fear that the leader will get rid of them should their advice be unwelcome.
For example, no adviser felt that they had the ability to tell Tsai she needed to rehearse for her April 25, 2010, Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement television debate with President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
The result was a disaster as Ma comprehensively defeated Tsai in the nationally televised debate. Tsai tried to make points when the debate had already progressed, but also her eyes repeatedly moved left and right making her appear “shifty” and untrustworthy. Rehearsals could have prevented such simple errors. US presidential candidates rehearse their debates, and it was arrogant of Tsai to believe that she did not need any practice.
Too often I have been in meetings where several juniors who support Tsai urge a senior person to talk to her about various issues. In almost every case, the senior person refuses. This suggests that Tsai does not welcome ideas from senior people, but it also means that she does not get a sufficiently wide range of advice. This led, for example, to the disastrous China policy of a “Taiwan consensus” (台灣共識) in the 2012 presidential election. People quite properly asked what “Taiwan consensus” meant and they quite correctly criticized the policy as “empty words.”
In the 2012 presidential election, the Taiwan consensus did not win any votes for the DPP, while Ma’s “1992 consensus” convinced voters that he had a viable policy.
On Jan. 9, after many meetings, the DPP finally approved a new China policy document, the China Policy Review: Summary Report (對中政策檢討機要). This document covers many areas and says that: “Our party’s fundamental positions have been accepted by most of the people of Taiwan.”
The review should be made the basis for the 2016 presidential campaign as it is intelligible, concrete and readily understood by voters.
On Aug. 29, 2008, I had a long discussion Tsai. We know each other reasonably well, and I asked her about her relationship with Su. She said her relationship with Su was excellent and reminded me that he was premier when she was vice-premier. However, their relationship obviously does have serious problems.
Su has by far the best administrative record in the party, serving not only as the best DPP premier, but also winning election as Pingtung County and Taipei County executive.
In recent years Su has sacrificed his own interests three times to promote party unity. First in his competition with Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) for the DPP presidential nomination in 2007, then in his competition with Tsai for the presidential nomination in 2011 and finally this year when he withdrew his bid for the chairman’s role in favor of Tsai. It is important for the future of the party that the relationship between Tsai and Su be mended. They are important for the party’s future.
The DPP has the potential to win the forthcoming elections, but to do so, it must genuinely unify and its leadership must be open to a wide variety of policy inputs.
Bruce Jacobs is emeritus professor of Asian languages and studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.
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