President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) recent proposals concerning a possible cross-strait peace accord and his suggestion that such an accord should be put to a public referendum have opened up one of the most central issues in the presidential election campaign — the question of how we define ourselves as a nation.
The pan-blue and pan-green camps hitherto packaged their positions on this issue using various slogans, such as Ma’s “three noes” (no unification, no independence and no use of force) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) “Taiwan consensus.”
The DPP’s way of defining Taiwan within the context of cross-strait relations is that there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait and that relations between the two sides are state-to-state relations, while the definition used by Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is that both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is “one China, with each side having its own interpretation,” and that relations between the two sides are not state-to-state relations.
The interesting thing is that both camps frequently accuse their rivals of being vague, while insisting that they have made their own position very clear. How can one explain this difference in perception?
The reason might have to do with the fact that the two sides have not touched on the real questions of how we define ourselves as a nation. Looking at the characteristics of Taiwanese society, one finds that there are multiple values and forms of identity.
On environmental issues, we wish we were a north European country. On human rights, we would like to be the US. When it comes to preoccupations of the postmodern era, such as gay and lesbian rights, we would like to be west Europeans. On development issues, we would like to be a developing country. With regard to trade issues, we dream of becoming a commercial hub.
When it comes to agriculture, we would like our country to have a solid farming sector. With regard to taxation, we wish to be a free-market economy. On social security issues, we would like to be a socialist country.
We aspire to be a frontrunner of globalization, but at the same time we want to protect weaker manufacturers and sunset industries. We want everyone to receive education and training — the more, the better — but at the same time we criticize the education system for stifling creativity. Similarly, we would like to be on friendly terms with China, but on the other hand we do not want to get too close.
This multitude of ideas is an extension of the multiple values and forms of identity that shape the way Taiwanese think.
Probably some readers will already have remarked that, while all these values are laudable, there is no existing model to follow if we want to achieve all these values simultaneously. Few if any governments throughout history have ever achieved such a thing, so all these positions just show how strongly people hope to achieve these various values.
In other words, this kind of “postmodern national identity” is essentially pluralistic in nature and has penetrated into all levels of the collective consciousness. When everything is acceptable, nothing is acceptable.
Another, and still more interesting, aspect is that a particular individual might think that something is fine at one point in time, only to reject it the next. In other words, looking at the collection of viewpoints held by a certain individual throughout the course of their life, some will be quite consistent, but sometimes there will be views that contradict each other.
While this is a true reflection of pluralistic values, such viewpoints lack centrality. This lack of centrality is perhaps, on a psychological level, an intentional result of a social backlash against the preceding generation. However, it is also expressed as insensibility and anxiety among people in general, especially the young. This in turn has created a generation that lacks aspirations, beliefs and a sense of achievement.
How, then is a nation defined? In Taiwan’s case, although the cross-strait issue is the elephant in the room, it is crucial to transcend the cross-strait question.
Should Taiwan be neutral and peaceful, like Switzerland? Should it be well planned and orderly like Singapore or free and multicultural like the US? Should it emphasize welfare and care for the environment like Finland or go for industrial transformation and a competitive edge like South Korea?
Maybe we should model ourselves on Hong Kong or Japan, or any number of other territories or countries. Future leaders must come up with answers to this question and Taiwanese must arrive at their own choices as well.
Shao Hsuanlei is an adjunct professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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