The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have been defending their respective “1992 consensus” and “Taiwan consensus” in the media. Listening to their arguments over which is better and the invective they hurl at their opponents, both sides seem to have lost any patience for rational dialogue. To remind the two parties that they should promote national interests, we propose the following views:
First, the KMT’s so-called “1992 consensus” is an international consensus, while the DPP’s “Taiwan consensus” is a domestic consensus, and as such, they cannot be compared directly. The former is an international (or cross-strait) consensus reached by the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. A clear cross-strait consensus had not taken shape during the DPP’s eight-year rule. The “Taiwan consensus” would be a domestic consensus aimed at including voters, the legislature, the executive branch, political parties and vested-interest groups. Since one is international and the other domestic, the level and participants are different. Hence, they cannot be compared to each other.
Second, whether international or domestic, consensuses evolve with time and changing conditions. In particular, a cross-strait consensus will change as the strengths of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait rise and fall or participants change.
Take the KMT, for example. Its interpretations of the “1992 consensus” back in 1992 and after President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came to power in 2008 have been slightly ambiguous and different. Meanwhile, the DPP might be unable to reach a cross-strait consensus at the moment, but that does not mean it could not reach a consensus in the future. As for domestic consensuses, they normally vary according to whether the ruling party enjoys an absolute legislative majority. Therefore, a “Taiwan consensus” would change depending on the results of presidential and legislative elections.
Third, regardless of whether we’re talking about an international or a domestic consensus, there should never be only one consensus. There should be several consensuses based on the different topics at hand. For example, in terms of domestic consensuses, in addition to a democratic consensus, there are consensuses regarding national defense, environmental protection, health insurance and social welfare.
As for a cross-strait consensus, in addition to the political issue, there are also consensuses on trade, communications, finance, healthcare and many other aspects. The advantage of issue-oriented, multilayered consensuses is that a lack of agreement on one of the aspects would not affect the formation of agreement on another.
Fourth, national interests exist on the common ground shared by international and domestic consensuses. Therefore, taking an international consensus into consideration while ignoring a domestic consensus falls short of domestic expectations and might damage the national interest. On the contrary, putting too much focus on a domestic consensus while ignoring an international consensus might hurt a country’s chances of boosting the overall national interest because of excessively high domestic expectations.
The KMT and the DPP need to realize that, in the face of China’s growing strength, balancing the complementary international and domestic consensuses to maximize the national interest would be the best tactic for incumbent and future leaders.
Yuan Hao-lin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of National Policy and Public Affairs at National Chung Hsing University. Shen Tsan-hung is a doctoral candidate in the university’s Graduate Institute of International Politics.
Translated by Eddy Chang
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
During the “426 rally” organized by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party under the slogan “fight green communism, resist dictatorship,” leaders from the two opposition parties framed it as a battle against an allegedly authoritarian administration led by President William Lai (賴清德). While criticism of the government can be a healthy expression of a vibrant, pluralistic society, and protests are quite common in Taiwan, the discourse of the 426 rally nonetheless betrayed troubling signs of collective amnesia. Specifically, the KMT, which imposed 38 years of martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, has never fully faced its
RSS