After nine-and-a-half years of pursuit, one of the world’s most dangerous men reaped what he sowed, early yesterday morning. Osama bin Laden, the exiled Saudi millionaire who left a trail of death and devastation behind him, is dead.
Despite what is already being hailed as a victory for embattled US President Barack Obama, the death of the al-Qaeda leader will not bring an end to the threat of international terrorism for several reasons — some of which were probably foreseen by bin Laden himself.
Since the devastating Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US, which reinvigorated the hunt for a man who had already been sought by the US for about a decade, bin Laden’s organization has become increasingly decentralized, so much so that terrorism experts and intelligence agencies are often at a loss to determine whether certain terrorist organizations are part of bin Laden’s network or not.
In many instances, despite the fact that some members of terror organizations received training at al-Qaeda terror camps in the 1990s, many of the organizations they formed have proven themselves to be financially and tactically independent, meaning that they have not relied on bin Laden for financial support or operational planning.
As such, despite bin Laden’s death, those terrorist organizations that belong to the “al-Qaeda” franchise only inasmuch as they share certain aspects of its ideology, will continue to exist and threaten mayhem.
What this means is that as long as the conditions that motivate groups to resort to terrorism are not addressed, the slaying of one man, however influential a rallying figure he may have been, or indeed still proves to be, the instrument of terror will not go away.
Despite claims by former US president George W. Bush’s administration and others that al-Qaeda was targeting the West because it abhorred its democracy and freedom, there is ample evidence that for the great majority of those who support Islamic extremist organizations, the real reasons for that support are far more pragmatic and localized than ideological. Among these factors are opposition to repressive regimes propped up by the West and wars of national liberation pitting weak oppositions against a modern military (again often funded by the West).
The widening gap between rich and poor that is now occurring on a global scale, which is often, if somewhat unfairly, blamed on US-style capitalism, also remains an object of hatred for many have-nots, pushing some to adopt violence as a last, desperate resort. Unless that iniquity is resolved, poverty will continue to feed the sense of injustice that, for some, apparently makes commiting violence against civilians a just cause.
Terrorist organizations often vow revenge following the death of their leader and there is no reason to believe that al-Qaeda will be an exception.
Aside from the need for the new leadership to prove its mettle, in order to remain relevant such organizations must prove to their “audience” that they remain a threat. For terrorist groups, nothing signals relevance more than turning rhetoric into action.
Already, Interpol has warned of a “heightened terror risk” amid the high likelihood of reprisals.
Undoubtedly, al-Qaeda has been struck a serious blow with the killing of bin Laden and this will likely have an impact on its finances. However, this development by no means diminishes the threat posed by global terror.
The fundamental problem is political in nature and simply cannot be resolved by force.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has over the past few months continued to escalate its hegemonic rhetoric and increase its incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. The US, in turn, has finally realized how its “strategic ambiguity” is increasingly wearing thin. Similarly, any hopes the US had that the PRC would be a responsible stakeholder and economic player have diminished, if not been abandoned. Taiwan, of course, remains as the same de facto independent, democratic nation that the PRC covets. As a result, the US needs to reconsider not only the amount, but also the type of arms
Taking advantage of my Taipei Times editors’ forbearance, I thought I would go with a change of pace by offering a few observations on an interesting nature topic, the many varieties of snakes in Taiwan. I will be drawing on my experiences living in Taiwan five times, from my teenage years in Kaohsiung back in the early sixties, to my last assignment as American Institute in Taiwan Director in 2006-9. Taiwan, with its semitropical climate, is a perfect setting for serpents. Indeed, one might say serpents are an integral part of the island’s ecosystem. Taiwan is warm, humid, with lots of
China constantly seeks out ways to complain about perceived slights and provocations as pretexts for its own aggressive behavior. It is both victimization paranoia and a form of information warfare that keeps the West on the defensive. True to form, China objected even to the innocuous reference to Taiwan at April 16’s summit meeting between US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Neither leader’s prepared remarks even mentioned Taiwan, out of deference to the Japanese side. Biden’s opening statement was modest: “Prime Minister Suga and I affirmed our ironclad support for US-Japanese alliance and for our shared security.
Determined to keep a permanent grip on power, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has abandoned former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) dogma of “hiding our capacities and biding our time” along with the “peaceful development” line that prevailed under former Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin (江澤民) and Hu Jintao (胡錦濤). Instead, he is treading a “wolf warrior” path of diplomacy that resorts to coercion, debt entrapment and hostage-taking. Externally, Xi’s China has claimed that it would never seek hegemony, yet it challenges the free, rules-based international order wherever it can. While insisting that it will not export its ideology, it has
RSS