While it is obvious that an arms race between superpowers should not be encouraged, it is paradoxical for Charles Glaser to suggest in his recent article in Foreign Affairs that China’s rise would not force the US and China into conflict, and the only “challenge for the United States will come in making adjustments to its policies in situations in which less-than-vital interests [such as Taiwan] might cause problems.”
It is also short-sighted for Glaser to conclude that if the US makes “uncomfortable concessions” and considers backing away from its commitment to Taiwan, it would not ultimately affect the US’ alliance with Japan and South Korea and the stability of Northeast Asia.
The fundamental flaw in Glaser’s argument lies in some of his basic assumptions.
First, in focusing on the concept of the security dilemma, Glaser’s discussion is strictly limited to a consideration of territorial security and the effect of the “twin advantages of defense.” Glaser thinks that being separated by a “vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean” between the US and China, together with the nuclear forces maintained by the US, are sufficient reasons for the US to be less concerned about any threats from China.
However, it is self-evident that security concerns in the modern world are no longer just a matter of military attacks and that a vast expanse of the ocean does not necessarily protect homeland security. An argument that ignores the dynamic array of forces at play in a country’s national security cannot result in a sound and meaningful recommendation.
Second, although Glaser is aware that “the intensity of the security dilemma also depends on the states’ beliefs about one another’s motives and goals,” he neglects to separate the issues of perceived motives from the actual motives of a state. As a result, he fails to recognize the realistic possibility that China holds “an inherent desire to dominate the system” instead of being driven only “by a quest for security,” as he assumes.
Glaser claims that “the security dilemma suggests that a state will be more secure when its adversary is more secure — because insecurity can pressure an adversary to adopt competitive and threatening policies.”
This statement holds true only if the true desire and goal of a state can be ignored and if there is reciprocal goodwill between both parties.
China’s hegemonic territorial claims, however, indicate that a consideration of China’s “unique qualities, past behavior, and economic trajectory” should not be totally ruled out in trying to predict the ending to “the most important international relations story in the twenty-first century.”
While one can agree with the belief that the outcome of China’s rise will depend on how well US and Chinese leaders manage the situation, is it really possible to accurately predict how the Chinese leaders can or will manage the situation? To believe in the unpredictable and to rely on the prediction of an unpredictable situation could be a major security pitfall.
Third, Glaser raises the question of “just how essential regional alliances in the Pacific are to US security,” and he seems to think that after backing away from the alliance commitment to Taiwan, the continuing US “alliance commitments to Japan would be accepted by China as adding regional stability because China fears Japan more than the United States, and the US -alliance with Japan would benefit China by enabling Japan to spend less on defense.”
However, Glaser ignores the reality that the continuing presence of a US military base in Japan has been met with increasing opposition within Japan during recent years. In addition, there is no reason to assume that China would rather accept a continuing US presence in the region because its fear of Japan is greater than its fear of the US. Furthermore, once Taiwan is no longer part of the island chain of defense, how effectively deterrence can be maintained becomes highly questionable.
While Glaser is fully aware that “China’s conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the US’ ability to intervene,” he nonetheless recommends that “the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan.”
In stating that “China places such a high value on Taiwan,” does he imply that the US does not and should not place a high value on Taiwan? Does he suggest that the US should turn a blind eye and abandon Taiwan?
Glaser emphasizes that “although [China] lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal of Beijing.”
Glaser appears to have forgotten that Taiwan was never involved in a so-called “Chinese Civil War,” a war between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party in China. More than 80 percent of the residents of Taiwan are not related to those who fled China after the “Chinese Civil War.”
Glaser’s discussion totally overlooks a significant point: the different political systems between Taiwan and China. It is perplexing that the voices and rights of Taiwanese residents have been repeatedly ignored by people like Charles Glaser. The US seems to respect the rights of people all over the world to choose their own future and supports and promotes democracy in many countries.
Why does Glaser recommend endangering Taiwan’s democracy by suggesting that the US walk away from its commitment to defend Taiwan in the face of China’s rise and its ability to escalate a Taiwan crisis? Is it realistic to still expect that China’s regional hegemony in the East China Seas and the South China Sea can be contained and deterrence by South Korea and Japan can still be achieved?
The US’ long-term interests are more important than its short-term interests and should be given greater consideration. Abandoning a long-held alliance to preserve democracy and freedom for the Taiwanese people would constitute a real threat to US core values, not to mention its national honor and credibility.
It is time for the US to put its foot down firmly and send a strong signal to discourage Chinese hegemonic expansion, especially the escalation of its coercion on Taiwan. The current tide of democratization movements — such as those in the Middle East — should not be reversed. US foreign policy should not result in an autocratic regime such as China subjugating the people of a democratic society such as Taiwan.
The US is facing a tough challenge and the world is watching to see how well it will perform in this leadership role.
Chihmei Lin Chen is a professor emeritus of psychology at Northern Virginia Community College and former president of the North America Taiwanese Professors’ Association. The views expressed in this article are her own.
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