A few days ago, on the eve of the ninth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks on the US, several media outlets re-ran an old story that the administration of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) had planned to develop nuclear weapons. This time the media sought to back up their story by quoting from Catalytic Diplomacy, the second portion of Jeremy Stone’s memoirs, former president of the Federation of American Scientists.
The story in question first arose in October 2007, when then-Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislator Su Chi (蘇起), who later served as secretary-general of the National Security Council, claimed that Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration had been in contact with a certain nuclear power and had invited a former defense minister of that country to visit Taiwan.
Following up on Su’s statement, Hong Kong-based current affairs magazine Yazhou Zhoukan reported that the person in question was former Indian defense minister George Fernandes, and that he had come to Taiwan for secret talks about nuclear weapons on the invitation of Taiwan Thinktank.
First, let’s get the facts straight. Since I have in the past served as director of Taiwan Thinktank’s international affairs department and also as director of the DPP’s Department of Chinese Affairs, I think I ought to be as clear as anyone about how Fernandes was invited to Taiwan. His 2007 visit was an open affair. He was invited not by Taiwan Thinktank, but by the DPP to take part in a forum on the rise of democracy in Taiwan. Taiwan Thinktank did invite Fernandes to the country earlier — in late 2004 to take part in a forum on democratic cooperation between Taiwan, Japan and India. Both these forums were entirely open affairs and Su’s version of the events is seriously at variance with the facts. Another participant was Henry Hyde, former chairman of the US House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs. Is Su implying that Hyde also supports Taiwan developing nuclear weapons?
As everyone knows, developing nuclear weapons requires a massive support system. Getting hold of uranium is no simple matter, still less reprocessing and enriching it to produce weapons-grade fuel. Even if you can get weapons-grade uranium, it doesn’t mean you can build nuclear bombs. How could North Korea and Pakistan get hold of nuclear weapons without support from China? Taiwan couldn’t get nuclear weapons unless it bought them from a rogue state that was willing to sell them.
What Su said amounts to suggesting that Taiwan has had nuclear dealings with rogue states or shady organizations. That makes the matter pretty serious. The record needs to be set straight here and now, otherwise it could have unthinkable consequences for Taiwan.
That said, not having nuclear weapons doesn’t mean we can’t talk about strategies for responding to nuclear threats. It is, after all, a serious strategic problem facing this country. Even in Japan, which has long stuck to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not having or making nuclear weapons or allowing them on its territory, Taro Aso, when he was foreign minister, said discussion about whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons should not be suppressed.
China has never declared that it won’t use nuclear weapons against Taiwan. We obviously need to think about how to respond to this threat, but how can that be twisted into saying that Taiwan plans to develop its own nuclear weapons?
Lai I-chung is an executive committee member of Taiwan Thinktank. Catalytic Diplomacy is available online.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
A few weeks ago in Kaohsiung, tech mogul turned political pundit Robert Tsao (曹興誠) joined Western Washington University professor Chen Shih-fen (陳時奮) for a public forum in support of Taiwan’s recall campaign. Kaohsiung, already the most Taiwanese independence-minded city in Taiwan, was not in need of a recall. So Chen took a different approach: He made the case that unification with China would be too expensive to work. The argument was unusual. Most of the time, we hear that Taiwan should remain free out of respect for democracy and self-determination, but cost? That is not part of the usual script, and
Behind the gloating, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must be letting out a big sigh of relief. Its powerful party machine saved the day, but it took that much effort just to survive a challenge mounted by a humble group of active citizens, and in areas where the KMT is historically strong. On the other hand, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) must now realize how toxic a brand it has become to many voters. The campaigners’ amateurism is what made them feel valid and authentic, but when the DPP belatedly inserted itself into the campaign, it did more harm than good. The
For nearly eight decades, Taiwan has provided a home for, and shielded and nurtured, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT fled to Taiwan, bringing with it hundreds of thousands of soldiers, along with people who would go on to become public servants and educators. The party settled and prospered in Taiwan, and it developed and governed the nation. Taiwan gave the party a second chance. It was Taiwanese who rebuilt order from the ruins of war, through their own sweat and tears. It was Taiwanese who joined forces with democratic activists
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) held a news conference to celebrate his party’s success in surviving Saturday’s mass recall vote, shortly after the final results were confirmed. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would have much preferred a different result, it was not a defeat for the DPP in the same sense that it was a victory for the KMT: Only KMT legislators were facing recalls. That alone should have given Chu cause to reflect, acknowledge any fault, or perhaps even consider apologizing to his party and the nation. However, based on his speech, Chu showed
RSS