Recently, some media outlets have run reports on my latest book about strategic cooperation and the differences between Taiwan and the US, paying particular attention to the two parts of the book in which I touched upon the sensitive question of whether former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) sent secret envoys to China during his time in office and whether he wanted to reinstate the National Unification Council.
Given the Taiwanese media’s preference for headlines, taking things out of context and only reporting what fits its needs, this was not much of a surprise. Unfortunately, such actions often obfuscate the author’s main purpose in writing.
Focusing on major decisions made during the Chen era, the book is an analysis of how a decision-maker formulates policy when he or she is under both domestic and international pressure. My goal was to look at changes in strategic cooperation and differences in US-Taiwan relations during the eight years the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in office.
However, because cross-strait relations are inseparable from domestic politics and foreign policy, the book naturally also discussed how Chen, at different stages during his eight years in office, tried either a more conciliatory or a more combative approach to China.
The two subsections on the council and secret envoys to China refer to the periods when Chen first took office and the start of his second term when he was eager to show good will and open up dialogue with China to create a “window of opportunity.” The fact that Beijing ignored this from the start and later cooperated with Taiwan’s pan-blue camp to weaken Chen’s political leadership, forced him to retaliate by talking about “one country on each side [of the Taiwan Strait]” and hold a defensive referendum, as well as additional referendums on eventual unification and whether Taiwan should join the UN during his two terms in office.
These past events should serve as warnings for the future. Two years after being voted out of power, the DPP is once again focused and working hard at winning the year-end special municipality elections as it rebuilds the political capital needed to return to power. It is unfortunate then that the party still hasn’t seriously reviewed the policies of Chen’s eight years in power.
When the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) accuses the DPP of “corruption,” the DPP leadership should not formally distance themselves from Chen. Instead, they should humbly face up to their errors, courageously discuss the mistakes committed during their time in office and propose new policies to regain public trust. This is the reason I conducted this study.
Furthermore, the history of popularly elected presidents is very short in Taiwan. It is not as long as that of the US, which makes it difficult to conduct comparative research on the different leadership styles of former presidents.
Using my participation in the drafting of certain national security and foreign policies during Chen’s presidency and conversations I conducted with US officials involved with Taiwanese affairs during former US president George W. Bush’s administration, I tried to present a study about the decision-making process that went into major policy decisions during Chen’s time in office.
Judging the historical significance of the Chen era based on ideology, the prejudices of political parties and personal dislike is not really conducive to rebuilding strategic cooperation between the US and Taiwan or establishing balanced cross-strait relations.
Despite the fact that US-Taiwan relations were unstable during the Chen era, reviewing the shortcomings and oversights of Chen’s decision-making provides a pragmatic and important way of thinking about these issues for future leaders.
US-Taiwan relations have improved since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came into office, but they are far from perfect. A month into Ma’s presidency, a ship collision in the waters off Diaoyutai (釣魚台) almost caused a diplomatic crisis between Taiwan and Japan, amid mutual misunderstandings, and were not solved until the US stepped in. The US beef scandal then became the major reason for former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi’s (蘇起) resignation.
These and other domestic crises, such as the handling of Typhoon Morakot, have highlighted the shortcomings of the Ma administration’s policy-making system and these failings prompted the resignation of former premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) and his Cabinet and can also be blamed for Ma’s long-term low approval ratings.
The policy errors that any popularly elected president is likely to make have nothing to do with the pan-blue or pan-green camp or whether one supports independence or unification. They have much more to do with the quality of decision-making and systemic health.
Finally, China should not willfully and unilaterally focus only on Chen’s mistakes and blame him for the failure of the DPP and the Chinese Communist Party to open dialogue. Nor should it say that the impatience of DPP leaders resulted in changeable policies to rationalize their own failure to start dialogue with the DPP government.
Ultimately these were the result of the single biggest difference between the two — a pluralistic and democratic Taiwan and an undemocratic and unfree China.
If these misunderstandings continue, then we can expect a new cross-strait stalemate when the DPP returns to power.
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taipei-based Taiwan Brain Trust.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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