A nation’s relationship with its past is crucial to its present and its future, to its ability to “move on” with its life, and to learn from its past errors, not to repeat them.
There is the past that “isn’t dead and buried. In fact, it is not even past,” in William Faulkner’s famous phrase. Such a past obsessively blocks any possible evolution toward a necessary reconciliation with oneself and a former or current foe.
Such a past is painfully visible today, for example, in the Balkans, a world largely paralyzed by a painful fixation on the conflicts that tore the region apart in the 1990s. An absolute inability to consider the point of view of the other and to go beyond a sense of collective martyrdom still lingers, unequally to be fair, over the entire region.
What the Balkans needs nowadays are not historians or political scientists but psychoanalysts who can help them transcend their past for the sake of the present and the future. It is to be hoped that the promise of entrance into the EU will constitute the best “psychoanalytical cure.”
In contrast to this paranoid version of the past is a past that is buried under silence and propaganda; a past that is simply not dealt with and remains like a secret wound that can reopen at any moment. Of course, non-treatment of the past is not the exclusive privilege of non-democratic regimes. More than 30 years after the disappearance of the long dictatorship of Francisco Franco, Spain finds itself confronted by the shadows of a past it has deliberately chosen not to confront. That supposedly buried past was always there, poised to erupt with a vengeance once the economic miracle slowed or stopped.
China, which has just been celebrating with martial pomp the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic by Mao Zedong (毛澤東), constitutes one of the most interesting cases of a nation evincing “shortsightedness” toward its past. China has a lot to show for its efforts in its recent history. Just consider the massive access to education of its huge rural population in contrast with its “democratic rival” India. So China’s pride nowadays is legitimate.
In 60 years a weak and divided country, one torn apart by wars internal and external, is about to become the second-most powerful economy in the world. China’s insolent prosperity, even if it is far from being distributed equally, China’s relative political stability, even if the regime’s opening remains strictly limited, are undeniable and deserving of respect. But the success of a country that has so mobilized its energies as to transform past humiliations into massive national pride is not accompanied — and this is an understatement — by a responsible opening into its past.
From 1957 to 1976, from the beginning of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward,” which led to a mass famine that killed tens of millions of people, to the end of the “Cultural Revolution,” which left Chinese society divided and traumatized because of its wanton cruelty and the destruction of cultural goods, China endured two hideous decades. China must confront them if it wants to progress domestically and become a respected and respectable actor in the international system.
But how can China become capable of implementing the “rule of law” that it so badly needs — let us not even speak of democracy — if it continues to systematically lie to its people about the recent past? To refuse to deal with a painful past is to risk reproducing it.
Such a choice can encourage the most dangerous nationalist tendencies within a society, especially young people, that does not know what hides behind the silence and official lies. When I taught at Harvard University last year, my Chinese students almost completely ignored their recent history.
They reacted with a somewhat “defiant nationalism” to critical observations. They were going “to check” the “accuracy” of historical remarks that did not fit with the history they had been taught at school. How could I be so critical of Mao? It demonstrated my Western bias against a rising Asian giant.
Between the two extremes of the Balkans and China, the relationship between “memory” and “history” knows so many shades of gray. It took France nearly 50 years to openly confront its Vichy past and to recognize that the French state had been guilty of collaboration with the Nazis. The country’s colonial past still remains a painful issue that is far from being confronted in a dispassionate, objective manner. It is as if truth and justice are seen as potential obstacles to peace, stability and progress.
But there is a major difference between the search for historical truth, which is an absolute must for a society at large, and the search for the settling of scores and the punishment of those found and declared guilty. One must know the past, to avoid the risk of repeating it, but also in order to transcend it.
But between a history that paralyzes a nation’s ability to “move on” collectively and an absolute unwillingness to face the past, which can lead to criticism of the present, there is ample room to maneuver. Healthy nations use that room to bury the pain of the past, if not the past itself.
Dominique Moisi is visiting professor of government at Harvard University.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
A few weeks ago in Kaohsiung, tech mogul turned political pundit Robert Tsao (曹興誠) joined Western Washington University professor Chen Shih-fen (陳時奮) for a public forum in support of Taiwan’s recall campaign. Kaohsiung, already the most Taiwanese independence-minded city in Taiwan, was not in need of a recall. So Chen took a different approach: He made the case that unification with China would be too expensive to work. The argument was unusual. Most of the time, we hear that Taiwan should remain free out of respect for democracy and self-determination, but cost? That is not part of the usual script, and
Behind the gloating, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must be letting out a big sigh of relief. Its powerful party machine saved the day, but it took that much effort just to survive a challenge mounted by a humble group of active citizens, and in areas where the KMT is historically strong. On the other hand, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) must now realize how toxic a brand it has become to many voters. The campaigners’ amateurism is what made them feel valid and authentic, but when the DPP belatedly inserted itself into the campaign, it did more harm than good. The
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) held a news conference to celebrate his party’s success in surviving Saturday’s mass recall vote, shortly after the final results were confirmed. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would have much preferred a different result, it was not a defeat for the DPP in the same sense that it was a victory for the KMT: Only KMT legislators were facing recalls. That alone should have given Chu cause to reflect, acknowledge any fault, or perhaps even consider apologizing to his party and the nation. However, based on his speech, Chu showed
For nearly eight decades, Taiwan has provided a home for, and shielded and nurtured, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT fled to Taiwan, bringing with it hundreds of thousands of soldiers, along with people who would go on to become public servants and educators. The party settled and prospered in Taiwan, and it developed and governed the nation. Taiwan gave the party a second chance. It was Taiwanese who rebuilt order from the ruins of war, through their own sweat and tears. It was Taiwanese who joined forces with democratic activists