Exceptional circumstances call for exceptional action, and there is no doubt that Taiwan faces an exceptional predicament: Despite the Cabinet reshuffle that followed the mishandling of Typhoon Morakot, the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is becoming increasingly detached from the public and impervious to criticism.
From the harsh ruling in the trial of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) — marred by a reassignment of judges, political meddling and a ruling smacking of political retribution — to the administration’s refusal to listen to dissenting voices on cross-strait relations, the government is acting according to an agenda that mocks transparency and ignores popular misgivings.
The Ma administration has coped with the post-Morakot crisis and the Chen trial verdict partly because the opposition is weakened and unable to find a voice capable of forcing the president to listen.
Part of this is the result of fragmentation that occurred within the pan-green camp during Chen’s second term. In the process, light-green and other centrist voters were marginalized, which, added to a struggling economy, made it easy for the pan-blue camp to secure the presidency in last year’s election.
Roundly defeated in legislative and presidential elections, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is struggling to get back on its feet. When allegations of corruption were made against the former first family, the party took another hit, and its response — distancing itself from Chen and then censuring him — itself fueled party disunity.
The pan-green camp should be seeking a unified voice to counter Ma’s pro-China policies, but pan-green figureheads continue to make emotional appeals that only discredit the entire movement.
Former vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), for example, continues to trade in hyperbole, such as when she described the ruling in Chen’s trial as “Taiwan’s Sept. 11,” a declaration that both distracted the public from the sinister ramifications of the ruling and disrespected the victims of the terrorist attacks in the US eight years ago. Even bookish DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) at times speaks in exaggerated tones.
The time has come for party leaders to avoid preposterous language, regain the trust of “light greens” and revive the party’s appeal to “light blues.”
It is clear that demonstrations, however large and rowdy, will not persuade Ma to act more cautiously on China policy. Furthermore, with signs that an economic memorandum of understanding with China could be signed as early as next month and an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) early next year, waiting until 2012 to exact electoral retribution on the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) may be too late. Even the year-end local elections will only have a marginal effect on national policies.
The Ma government is rapidly altering the political balance of the cross-strait “status quo” by exacerbating Taiwan’s dependence on China and opening the door to Chinese influence in the real-estate, banking and media sectors.
With all this in train, Taiwan simply cannot afford to see more of the same from the pan-green camp. Its leaders must professionalize and fine-tune their rhetoric, break out of the confines of the electoral cycle and establish concrete links with influential members of the international community.
New, powerful voices both within and outside Taiwan must be added to the mix. Then, and only then, will Ma be forced to listen.
A foreign colleague of mine asked me recently, “What is a safe distance from potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force’s (PLARF) Taiwan targets?” This article will answer this question and help people living in Taiwan have a deeper understanding of the threat. Why is it important to understand PLA/PLARF targeting strategy? According to RAND analysis, the PLA’s “systems destruction warfare” focuses on crippling an adversary’s operational system by targeting its networks, especially leadership, command and control (C2) nodes, sensors, and information hubs. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, noted in his 15 May 2025 Sedona Forum keynote speech that, as
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) concludes his fourth visit to China since leaving office, Taiwan finds itself once again trapped in a familiar cycle of political theater. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has criticized Ma’s participation in the Straits Forum as “dancing with Beijing,” while the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) defends it as an act of constitutional diplomacy. Both sides miss a crucial point: The real question is not whether Ma’s visit helps or hurts Taiwan — it is why Taiwan lacks a sophisticated, multi-track approach to one of the most complex geopolitical relationships in the world. The disagreement reduces Taiwan’s
Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is visiting China, where he is addressed in a few ways, but never as a former president. On Sunday, he attended the Straits Forum in Xiamen, not as a former president of Taiwan, but as a former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman. There, he met with Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning (王滬寧). Presumably, Wang at least would have been aware that Ma had once been president, and yet he did not mention that fact, referring to him only as “Mr Ma Ying-jeou.” Perhaps the apparent oversight was not intended to convey a lack of
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) last week announced that the KMT was launching “Operation Patriot” in response to an unprecedented massive campaign to recall 31 KMT legislators. However, his action has also raised questions and doubts: Are these so-called “patriots” pledging allegiance to the country or to the party? While all KMT-proposed campaigns to recall Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmakers have failed, and a growing number of local KMT chapter personnel have been indicted for allegedly forging petition signatures, media reports said that at least 26 recall motions against KMT legislators have passed the second signature threshold