On June 28 a coup deposed Honduran president Manuel Zelaya, ending his attempt to hold a referendum that would permit his re-election. That same day in Argentina, former president Nestor Kirchner was defeated in a mid-term election that many people viewed as a test of whether or not he or his wife Cristina, Argentina’s current president and Nestor’s successor, would continue as president after the vote of 2011. Both events crystallized a peculiar Latin American phenomenon: the temptation to empower a new, local Caesar.
This “caesarism” is not a new idea. Instead, it marks the return of a practice that had seemed to have been consigned to history’s dustbin that has now returned with a vengeance.
In 1919, the first edition of Democratic Caesarism, by the Venezuelan historian and sociologist Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, was published and widely circulated across the continent. Vallenilla claimed to be seeking an effective (as opposed to the formal) constitutional system for his country.
To achieve this end, Vallenilla argued that, at least in the case of Venezuela, a charismatic leader, confirmed in power through regular elections, would be best placed to concentrate political power successfully and guarantee institutional order. Ninety years later, it looks as though with the rise of a variety of neo-caudillos, Vallenilla’s idea of the “good Caesar” is coming back.
Indeed, the victory of presidential incumbents across Latin America has become the predominant trend in the region’s elections. For most of the 19th century and well into the Cold War era, re-election of a sitting president was generally prohibited in the great majority of Latin American countries, owing to a general fear of leaders remaining permanently in power, abetted by the prevalence of electoral fraud.
Permanence and fraud are, of course, the hallmarks of authoritarian governments everywhere. In the last century, coups d’etat were often the means by which (mostly military) rulers remained in power for many years, outlawing and persecuting the opposition. Nowadays, leaders are achieving the same end at the ballot box.
This phenomenon is relatively new. With Latin America’s most recent democratic transition, which began in the 1980s, national constitutions and electoral laws were gradually reformed and modernized. Several democratically elected leaders urged constitutional modifications in order to remain in power.
Over time, what had been an exception became routine: the possibility of consecutive terms or alternating re-election of presidents in countries with little democratic tradition. This trend was accompanied by the fact that these societies were marked by a high degree of inequality, as well as unstable economies, weak political parties, fragmented oppositions and fragile institutions. Indeed, in Latin America today, there are 14 representative democracies that allow presidential re-election: seven consecutively and seven discontinuously.
But something new has recently been introduced in Latin America’s political system: the notion of unlimited re-election. Hugo Chavez first achieved this in Venezuela and there are other specters of potentially perpetual re-elections. In the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fernandez (1996-2000, 2004-2008, 2008-2012) began serving his third four-year term in office last year and the party in power has not ruled out the possibility of modifying the Carta Magna to allow him yet another term.
In Colombia, Alvaro Uribe (2002-2006, 2006-2010), in power since 2002, got his chance for a first re-election in 2006 through a questionable constitutional reform and appears set to try for a third term by forcing a referendum to amend the Constitution again. In Brazil, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, in power since 2003, was re-elected in 2007, and now many members of his party are pushing for a constitutional reform that would allow him a third term.
In a recent interview with British journalist David Frost, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who returned to power in 2006, declared himself in favor of immediate re-election. Before having completed a year in office, Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo declared himself in favor of presidential re-election, currently prohibited in his country. In Bolivia and Ecuador, immediate re-election is already possible. In short, Latin America appears to be becoming a region of democracy by plebiscite.
Many of the presidents re-elected, either directly or by alternating terms with someone else, a la the Kirchners, won because they seemed to be responding to social demands for more security or less poverty. So Latin America is now constantly presented with “extraordinary” situations that supposedly require a certain individual, such as a great, benevolent cacique, to occupy the center of the political scene and govern with an enormous discretionary capacity.
However, as the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham once wrote, the more one is exposed to the exercise of political power, the greater the temptations. True to that dictum, the excessive personalization of politics, the search for political hegemony and the fragmentation of the opposition reflected in Latin America’s neo-caesarism have served to concentrate power in the executive and hollow out countervailing institutions, including intermediary bodies between the state and society.
The attraction of remaining in power is getting stronger across the region. In view of this, it is essential to seek better systems of checks and balances as well as to strengthen and sharpen public control of the executive.
All of these tasks are domestic; the danger posed by the profusion of re-elected presidents will not be checked by external forces. Moreover, since Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, the US has lost its formerly strong authority in promoting democracy. Confused and self-absorbed, Europe is not in the best position to wield influence. Russia and China continue to apply their own authoritarian formulas at home and have little to offer internationally to curb caudillismo.
So the problem of democratic caesarism is one for Latin America’s people to confront. They will either reject this trend, or succumb to it.
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is a professor of international relations at the Universidad de Di Tella, Argentina.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
China has not been a top-tier issue for much of the second Trump administration. Instead, Trump has focused considerable energy on Ukraine, Israel, Iran, and defending America’s borders. At home, Trump has been busy passing an overhaul to America’s tax system, deporting unlawful immigrants, and targeting his political enemies. More recently, he has been consumed by the fallout of a political scandal involving his past relationship with a disgraced sex offender. When the administration has focused on China, there has not been a consistent throughline in its approach or its public statements. This lack of overarching narrative likely reflects a combination
US President Donald Trump’s alleged request that Taiwanese President William Lai (賴清德) not stop in New York while traveling to three of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, after his administration also rescheduled a visit to Washington by the minister of national defense, sets an unwise precedent and risks locking the US into a trajectory of either direct conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or capitulation to it over Taiwan. Taiwanese authorities have said that no plans to request a stopover in the US had been submitted to Washington, but Trump shared a direct call with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平)
Heavy rains over the past week have overwhelmed southern and central Taiwan, with flooding, landslides, road closures, damage to property and the evacuations of thousands of people. Schools and offices were closed in some areas due to the deluge throughout the week. The heavy downpours brought by the southwest monsoon are a second blow to a region still recovering from last month’s Typhoon Danas. Strong winds and significant rain from the storm inflicted more than NT$2.6 billion (US$86.6 million) in agricultural losses, and damaged more than 23,000 roofs and a record high of nearly 2,500 utility poles, causing power outages. As
The greatest pressure Taiwan has faced in negotiations stems from its continuously growing trade surplus with the US. Taiwan’s trade surplus with the US reached an unprecedented high last year, surging by 54.6 percent from the previous year and placing it among the top six countries with which the US has a trade deficit. The figures became Washington’s primary reason for adopting its firm stance and demanding substantial concessions from Taipei, which put Taiwan at somewhat of a disadvantage at the negotiating table. Taiwan’s most crucial bargaining chip is undoubtedly its key position in the global semiconductor supply chain, which led