Questions for the media
The upcoming meeting between Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) and Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) has brought dozens of international reporters to Taiwan.
Over the past five months, I have realized that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) prefers making policy announcements to the international media to facing Taiwanese media, which is why I hope the international media can ask Ma these 10 questions on behalf of the Taiwanese people:
According to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, pandas can only travel in China. When Taiwan accepts two pandas from China, does that imply that the Ma government accepts the notion that Taiwan is part of China? How can he state that he will not budge an inch on sovereignty, but actually take risky action which might give China the wrong impression?
If Ma is the president of Taiwan, and China is another country, international custom dictates that Taiwan should present the national flags of both Taiwan and China during Chen’s visit. So why are hardly any Taiwanese flags being displayed in Taiwan?
If the four agreements to be signed by Chen and Chiang are supported by the majority of Taiwanese, why does the government refuse to grant demonstration and protest rights to the opposition? Ma should not worry about this small group of opposition supporters, right?
The four agreements have not been presented or approved by the Legislative Yuan. If these agreements are for the benefit of Taiwan, why did Ma not present them to the Legislative Yuan? The chair of the Mainland Affairs Council stated that the agreements would be presented to the Legislative Yuan after being signed.
But what would happen if the agreements are rejected by the Legislative Yuan? Why is Ma taking this risk?
Ma stated that he will not sell out Taiwan and that he only wants to sell fruit to China. Doesn’t Ma know that Taiwanese fruit shops in China have closed? Chinese consumers cannot afford it. Expanding shelf life cannot solve this problem.
The Dalai Lama recently said that his faith in China is dwindling. Can Ma identify any concrete proof that China will treat Taiwan differently than Tibet?
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