On the first National Day since the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regained the presidency, the government finds itself confronted with a global financial crisis and has been forced to lower many of its economic targets.
The KMT feels compelled to differentiate itself from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and establish its own positions. Taiwan is divided into two camps — “blue” (pro-KMT) and “green” (pro-DPP) — with no shades of color in between. Neither side is ever willing to applaud the other and they do not recognize the importance of policy continuity — at least not in public.
In his National Day address, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) spoke of Taiwan and China restarting negotiations on the basis of the “1992 consensus.”
He said: “Our efforts to alleviate cross-strait tension, create a new dynamic for peace and enhance stability in East Asia have won the international community’s affirmation.”
With the KMT back in power, cross-strait tensions have been eased. This is something that the DPP could not achieve because it does not accept the “one China” principle.
In his first National Day address after he was elected in 2000, former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) avoided the framework of “one China” and called on Beijing to set aside differences in the “spirit of 1992.” When Chen was reelected, giving the DPP a second term in office, he was of course not obliged to accept the “1992 consensus” any more. The terms “1992 consensus,” “spirit of 1992” and “basis of 1992” are rather similar, but the key point is the different parties’ attitude toward the notion of “one China.”
There is some crossover between the KMT and DPP in their policies regarding such issues as direct chartered flights across the Taiwan Strait, accepting Chinese tourists, expanding the “three small links” between offshore islands and China’s Fujian Province and inviting Taiwanese businesspeople operating in China to move their head offices back to Taiwan and list their companies on the Taipei stock market.
Ma committed himself to upholding the principle of “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people” and creating “a more open, stable environment for cross-strait interaction.” Negotiations between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and its Chinese counterpart the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) will move ahead with the expected visit of ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) and the delivery of pandas from China to the Taipei Zoo.
When the DPP was in power, the conditions were not right for either Chen Yunlin or the pandas to come to Taiwan and China’s peaceful reunification policy had no chance of making headway.
The new KMT government welcomes Chen Yunlin and the pandas, but the crux of the matter is whether Beijing can demonstrate its sincerity in seeking a peaceful resolution and whether it can offer policies friendly enough to allow Taiwanese to overlook concessions their government may make on the “one China” principle.
The DPP is opposed to liberalizing cross-strait exchanges if negotiations are based on preset conditions. The KMT could make use of the opposition’s dissenting voice as a bargaining chip or a buffer to strengthen its own position in negotiations with China, but its unwillingness to do so means that Beijing does not have to face a tough negotiating partner.
If China wishes to compensate for the storm of indignation unleashed over imports of melamine-tainted food products, Chen Yunlin will have to show that Chinese policy toward Taiwan has relaxed significantly. If he doesn’t, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) campaign to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese will suffer a major setback.
Since he became president, Ma has been calling for a “diplomatic truce,” with both sides setting aside counterproductive rivalry on the diplomatic front.
In his National Day address, Ma chose to use the term “diplomacy of the possible” instead of “diplomatic truce” or the DPP’s “beacon diplomacy.” When the DPP was in power, its “beacon diplomacy” was more of a slogan than a substantial policy. It wasn’t given necessary resources or priority, so its failings became apparent before any benefits could be seen.
As to Ma’s “diplomatic truce,” clearly more time is needed to see whether it will work. Having tried the “diplomatic truce” approach for a while and after a few adjustments, Ma has enumerated some key features of the policy: Safeguarding the sovereignty of the Republic of China; consolidating existing diplomatic relations; improving those overseas relations that have real value, especially those with the US and Japan; and cultivating multilateral relations and adopting a flexible approach so as to participate in more international bodies and activities. This policy can only work if China, Taiwan and other countries are willing to cooperate.
A “diplomatic truce” does not mean a diplomatic withdrawal. Rather, it means seeking substantial breakthroughs with all sides showing benevolence and efforts toward a peaceful solution.
In its national defense policy, the KMT has reversed the DPP administration’s slogan of “effective deterrence and resolute defense,” returning to the previous KMT government’s position of “resolute defense and effective deterrence.” The KMT and DPP try to differentiate themselves from each other and make changes to each other’s policies. Despite the change of word order, the stance on defense is the same. If there is any difference, it is only a matter of priorities.
While the DPP wants to strengthen Taiwanese civil defense and psychological vigilance, the KMT aims to reestablish the military’s knowledge of who and for what they would be fighting for, if it ever came to that. Both civil and military morale need to be rebuilt to adapt to the constant and rapid changes in cross-straits relations.
Diplomacy and defense require consensus between the two major parties, and the same is true of cross-strait policy. As things stand, the governing and opposition parties lack mutual confidence and their differences are growing wider and wider with each passing day.
Eager to deal with the economic and financial crisis, in part by developing trade and business links with China, the KMT has overlooked the need to fill the breach caused by the standoff between the ruling and opposition parties. While talks have been going on between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, there is no mechanism for communication between the KMT and the DPP, each of which sees the other, not China, as its real adversary.
Just as the DPP government needed to buy US armaments, so does the current KMT administration, but party politics have set back the timetable for building and modernizing the country’s armed forces and have damaged confidence between Taiwan and the US. If the KMT wants to rebuild diplomatic relations and national defense, the first challenge it must face is bridging the gulf between itself and the opposition and getting away from the idea that blue is blue and green is green and never the twain shall meet.
Lin Cheng-yi is a research fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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