The demonstration organized by the Taiwan Society in Taipei on Aug. 30 was a biased mobilization in that it highlighted certain problems while ignoring other ones.
Although the protest targeted President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), one wonders to what extent it was influenced by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), who participated, and by former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
We should look into what impact the demonstration will have on political support for the pan-blue and pan-green camps.
The demonstration called for a stronger economy through tax rebates and price stabilization measures, insistence on Taiwanese sovereignty and greater political transparency made possible by legislation and clean politics.
These demands were used to attack Ma and Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) and deal with the different views between pan-green members who either oppose Chen or support him. This is why prior to the demonstration, the organizers stressed that those who wanted to show their support or opposition to Chen should stage separate rallies.
In theory, the appeal for a better economy was meant to mock Ma’s campaign slogan that “things would turn around as soon as Ma took power.”
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators, pro-KMT political pundits and the media have set the agenda as far as a majority of the public is concerned: pay more attention to Chen’s financial irregularities and stop criticizing Ma’s lack of results during his first 100 days in office. They would have people believe that Ma’s incompetence is far less serious than Chen’s financial irregularities.
The KMT’s strategy has proven effective. It called on the public to give Ma more time and to be lenient with his poor performance, successfully deflecting public indignation.
Furthermore, tax rebates and price stabilization efforts are affected by the national financial structure, while global issues such as inflation and the subprime mortgage crisis cannot be blamed on the government. Tsai, on the other hand, apart from shouting slogans calling for tax rebates, failed to propose any suggestions to boost the economy.
However, the Taiwan Society appeal for better protection of the country’s sovereignty was successful, in particular because the Ma administration cozied up to Beijing during the Olympics. Ma accepted China’s arrangement for the Taiwanese Olympic team’s order of appearance under the “China” category at the opening ceremony and failed to protest forcefully against the use of the name “Taipei, China” (中國台北) for Taiwan’s Olympic team.
The “one China” principle — or the so-called “1992 consensus” — and the deregulation of cross-strait policy will remain the Achilles’ heel of the Ma administration. Because of that, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan’s (賴幸媛) role will become increasingly important regardless of whether she can effectively put a damper on Ma’s cross-strait policies.
Interestingly, Ma’s cross-strait policy offers an opportunity for Tsai. The number of Chinese tourists is declining despite Ma’s government relaxing regulations on Chinese tourism.
The cap on China-bound investment has been relaxed for Taiwan’s listed and over-the-counter companies, resulting in fewer of them wanting to invest in Taiwan, thus exacerbating financial difficulties for workers.
In addition, the government’s attempts to ingratiate itself with Beijing during the Games has almost turned “Taipei, China” into a reality. If Tsai could connect the separate calls for a stronger economy and better protection of Taiwanese sovereignty into one combined appeal for protecting Taiwan to improve the economy, she would be able to strike an even heavier blow to Ma’s cross-strait policies.
Although the appeal for greater transparency was intended as criticism against the KMT for the injustice of its ill-gotten party assets, it also struck a blow against Chen’s alleged money laundering.
In other words, if the rally had expressed open support of Chen, it would have been self-contradictory and would have diverted attention from its appeals for a better economy and protecting Taiwan’s sovereignty.
The rally didn’t oppose Chen, nor call for and clean politics. Even though the demonstration was a condemnation of the Ma administration, it was quiet on criticism of Chen — some pro-Chen groups even took part. This raises the question of whether civic forces in Taiwan are biased.
The Taiwan Society and Tsai failed to use the rally to bring the Chen era to a close. Continued revelations in the Chen scandal will not only scare swing voters away from the DPP, but will also make it more difficult to bring about changes in fundamental voter support for both camps.
Chen Chao-chien is an assistant professor of public affairs at Ming Chuan University.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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