In Taiwan as elsewhere, the Beijing Olympics were the focus of attention for two weeks this month. Now is perhaps the time to consider what has been going on at home.
Taiwan has talked a lot about economic matters that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait might agree on, but has only signed agreements for cross-strait charter passenger flights and allowed larger numbers of Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan.
The Mainland Affairs Council says Taiwan is likely to initiate plans allowing Chinese investments in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. Other issues on the agenda are shipping services, direct charter cargo flights, Chinese investments in commercial property, allowing in Chinese management personnel and general investment in Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the Council for Economic Planning and Development plans to change 67 restrictive policies.
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) shares these views on economic issues, but often includes broader and sometimes more political views as well. Therefore, Taiwan’s UN bid this year will seek “meaningful participation,” not full membership.
Ma supports having Taiwan’s allies enter into economic and cultural relations with China and he will seek participation in 16 UN agencies. Many see these and other issues — suggesting a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement with China similar to Hong Kong’s; seeking UN observer status; and suggesting name flexibility — as undermining Taiwan’s sovereignty.
At the same time, the main opposition party, just beginning to recover from its election loss, was jolted by allegations surrounding former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) and his family’s alleged financial irregularities. Though the issue is still under investigation, the Democratic Progressive Party is treating it as another crisis.
Taiwanese will see it as inflicting serious damage on their country. If the present situation remains unchanged, the next election may be much more one-sided.
Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) said Taiwan would be disappointed if relations with China did not improve after the Olympics. The New York Times said Beijing obtained what it wanted — “a huge prestige … that it will surely use to promote its international influence, and … further tighten its grip at home. It pocketed these gains without offering any concessions in return.”
An opinion piece by Willy Lam in the Wall Street Journal is probably something Taiwanese want to hear more about as Taiwan moves closer to China. Lam says “a good number of the strategies and institutions put into place to ensure a fail-safe Olympics are here to stay.”
That means the powers of the law and order establishment — military, police, judiciary — have been strengthened and the neighborhood committees are back. Lam states that “All of this together bodes ill for the prospects of a post-Olympics thaw for China’s aggrieved residents and political dissidents.”
While all this might be a concern for Beijing, Taiwan will be busy trying to move closer to China.
At the same time, Taiwan is trying to rekindle US interest. That is difficult with the US focused on the election race, which will produce a new government in about five months. Its relations with a growing China will be more difficult than before. Its problems in the Middle East will not end, while recent tensions with Russia over Georgia are causing it more headaches.
This is a time to go over what has been going on. Issues both at home and abroad are changing. Are we ready?
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
A failure by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to respond to Israel’s brilliant 12-day (June 12-23) bombing and special operations war against Iran, topped by US President Donald Trump’s ordering the June 21 bombing of Iranian deep underground nuclear weapons fuel processing sites, has been noted by some as demonstrating a profound lack of resolve, even “impotence,” by China. However, this would be a dangerous underestimation of CCP ambitions and its broader and more profound military response to the Trump Administration — a challenge that includes an acceleration of its strategies to assist nuclear proxy states, and developing a wide array
Twenty-four Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers are facing recall votes on Saturday, prompting nearly all KMT officials and lawmakers to rally their supporters over the past weekend, urging them to vote “no” in a bid to retain their seats and preserve the KMT’s majority in the Legislative Yuan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had largely kept its distance from the civic recall campaigns, earlier this month instructed its officials and staff to support the recall groups in a final push to protect the nation. The justification for the recalls has increasingly been framed as a “resistance” movement against China and
Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), former chairman of Broadcasting Corp of China and leader of the “blue fighters,” recently announced that he had canned his trip to east Africa, and he would stay in Taiwan for the recall vote on Saturday. He added that he hoped “his friends in the blue camp would follow his lead.” His statement is quite interesting for a few reasons. Jaw had been criticized following media reports that he would be traveling in east Africa during the recall vote. While he decided to stay in Taiwan after drawing a lot of flak, his hesitation says it all: If
Saturday is the day of the first batch of recall votes primarily targeting lawmakers of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The scale of the recall drive far outstrips the expectations from when the idea was mooted in January by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘). The mass recall effort is reminiscent of the Sunflower movement protests against the then-KMT government’s non-transparent attempts to push through a controversial cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014. That movement, initiated by students, civic groups and non-governmental organizations, included student-led protesters occupying the main legislative chamber for three weeks. The two movements are linked