Democracy is alive and kicking in Taiwan, as was demonstrated again by the recent municipal elections. But the results of the elections might not be all that comforting for those who would like Taiwan to be independent. By all accounts, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has done pretty well. And some even forecast its return to power in next year's presidential elections.
What has gone wrong to warrant such a possibility? To begin with, there has been considerable disenchantment in the electorate between the early promise of President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) election in 2000 (and re-election in 2004) and his administration's track record.
The economy hasn't been doing brilliantly, though it has been chugging along at a steady pace.
However, because of the chaotic nature of Taiwanese politics (after the 2004 elections, for in-stance, the results were contested for a long time), the country sometimes appears to be in a constant state of political paralysis.
In the same way, the legislature, where the opposition has a narrow majority, continues to block necessary legislation for effective governance. But, for the most part, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gets the blame for it because it is the governing party.
The corruption scandals engulfing the president's family and his inner circle have simply reinforced a sense of ever-present crisis.
This sense of crisis engulfing the DPP and consequently the state has, at times, made the KMT look like a better option. But its shine might wear off if the corruption allegations against KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (
In this sense, the outcome of the presidential election next year, which currently seems to favor the KMT candidate, might not be as cut and dried as some analysts have forecast.
Be that as it may, one cannot overlook the harsh reality that Chen has not been able to deliver on the high expectations his election originally raised. And the most crucial area where he has failed is to carve out an independent sovereign status for Taiwan. He fell short of making a determined bid in that direction and, in the process, lost the political momentum that might have rallied the people of Taiwan behind him.
One can, of course, find extenuating circumstances to account for his failure. In this regard, US pressure against provoking China would take top billing.
Even though US President George W. Bush had made a categorical commitment, early in his administration, to protect Taiwan with "whatever it takes," the political dynamics of the situation changed after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
The US wanted China's political support for the global war on terrorism, which superseded all other concerns. Taiwan was, therefore, relegated sideways and Chen was snubbed whenever he sought to highlight Taiwan's separate political identity.
Not only did this make Chen look like an ineffectual leader at home, it simultaneously gave the KMT a political lift by making it seem responsible and well regarded both in Beijing and Washington.
The point, though, is that Chen could have saved the day by being bold and imaginative and making a pitch for independence. He didn't, and that has made him politically irrelevant.
Would that have led to an invasion by China? If so, would the US have come to Taiwan's rescue?
Whatever the answer, it would seem that Taiwan, as represented by the KMT, is drifting into China's embrace.
At least, by calling Beijing's bluff and putting the US commitment on the line, Taiwan might have a better chance of emerging as a sovereign, independent state.
In the meantime, the KMT has managed to create a new political space for itself around a safer and more prosperous alternative of becoming a future Hong Kong.
To buttress this, it might offer two arguments.
First, China is an upcoming superpower and an economic powerhouse likely to equal, if not overtake, the US in the next few decades. If Taiwan were to decide on going it alone, it would lose a share of the growing China market with a consequent decline in its national wealth and lifestyle. Therefore, if not for anything else, pragmatism demands that Taiwan shouldn't put itself on a collision course with China.
Second, China's continuing economic growth and the expansion of its middle class is bound to generate pressure at some point in favor of a pluralist political system. At that time, the KMT would have a legitimate claim to be part of China's new political process.
And who knows, the once exiled KMT might eventually fulfill its mission of recapturing power in China!
It might seem fanciful, but for true believers, faith is all that matters.
Take the first argument. It is facile to suggest that Taiwan might, over a period of time, become an economic basket case if it didn't kowtow to China.
Despite all the pressure brought to bear on Taiwan by China (even with several hundred Chinese missiles targeted at it), its economy is continuing on a steady course. If there are problems with Taiwan's economy, they have more to do with structural deficiencies and a fractious polity.
China can put the squeeze on Taiwan, but so long as Taipei keeps its insurance policy with the US intact, those pressures are not insurmountable.
But the KMT's China drift is likely to put Taiwan's relations with the US in jeopardy.
There is still a sizeable constituency in Taiwan of about 30 percent which favors independence. And if you add those who simply want to continue the "status quo" (virtual independence without a formal declaration), they might as well constitute a majority opposed to becoming part of China.
If that were the case, the KMT's presumed electoral success next year might not be as assured as some would have us believe. But the DPP will need to overhaul its image to win voters' confidence.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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