Last month, former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (
To show her support for Lien, KMT Vice Chairwoman Lin Cheng-chi (
Although everyone is aware that Lien and Ma do not get along well, the incident has made the rift between the duo public. Lien said that he was rather surprised when Ma did not show up at the airport when he returned. Lien's closest aides, therefore, berated Ma, for he had made the outside world aware of the bad blood between the two.
In all honesty, according to KMT tradition, the party chairman is the one who should to be sent off and greeted, not someone who has already stepped down. Considering the power structure within the KMT, Ma's unwillingness to see Lien off or welcome him on return is hardly surprising. The question is: Why was Lien surprised? It is evident that Lien does not want to play second fiddle to Ma. After receiving a pat on the head from Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Lien has held a grudge against Ma ever since he stepped down as KMT chairman. Recently he has said that "many things remain unsaid" and he must feel that Ma has given him a raw deal. The pan-green camp's criticism of the KMT-CCP economic forum was understandable.
However, Taipei mayor hopeful and Ma's "chosen" successor, former Taipei deputy mayor Yeh Chin-chuan (葉金川) has openly criticized two trade concessions in the medical field reached at the Lien-Hu meeting, a direct slap in the face for Lien. Perhaps Lien may not care what someone like Yeh, a man without power and position, said, but he will certainly blame it on Ma. The question is: If Ma had showed respect for Lien, would Yeh have dared put Lien down like that?
With Ma's popularity soaring, the only thing that can keep Ma in check is an alliance between Lien and Wang. When KMT Legislator John Chiang (
A new wave of conflict between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions of the KMT has begun, and the battle will be decided on the issues of constitutional amendments and the KMT's primary for Taipei mayoral nominee.
Last week, Hsu visited Lien to explain the conflict between the legislative caucus and the party leadership over the constitutional amendment issue. Afterwards, Lien said that he could not agree with Ma's view that it was inappropriate to discuss the matter and pointed out that any issue should be open for discussion.
In response to Ma's view that the KMT will be spurned and rejected by the public if it were to support yet another amend to the Constitution, Wang said that such a discussion falls within the remit of the legislature, which has a constitutional right and duty to discuss such amendments. Nor did he agree with the party leadership threatening supporters of the amendment with disciplinary measures and rhetorically asked whether the issue was really that serious. Clearly, the issue of constitutional amendment has become a catalyst for conflict within the KMT.
The fact cannot be ignored that those who favor constitutional amendments are well-prepared. Could Lien and Wang become leaders of the faction favoring constitutional amendment and confront those who -- led by Ma -- oppose it? This is not only a constitutional issue but it is also part of the KMT's internal power struggle. It offers Lien and Wang an issue on which to build their strength, and which will test Ma's power within the KMT's legislative caucus.
Regardless of whether the constitutional amendments are passed, the KMT's mainstream and opposing forces are gathering strength. This begs the question: Will this affect the year-end Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections, the 2007 legislative elections and the 2008 presidential election. Will it will lead to another KMT split? Let's wait and see.
Chin Heng-wei is the editor-in-chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
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