Now that both major parties have new chairmen in place, the march to 2008 begins. There will be transitional elections on the way, including new legislative elections. The Legislative Yuan has gained considerable power, but both domestic and overseas interest will be focused on the presidential election.
The two groups that fought the 2004 election will be more dominated next time around by the two major parties -- the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Still, the more than two-year period left before the presidential election is a long time politically, and change could easily take place.
Bolstered by momentum from the recent local government elections, the KMT and its new Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) have moved quickly to expand party membership. The new chairman benefits from having a well-known name and a reputation for advocating integrity in politics. This is very useful for his party since the DPP has suffered considerable damage from corruption scandals.
Despite the KMT's own reputation for corruption, ill-gotten funds and its past profile as an authoritarian party, it still benefits from the capabilities of leaders with years of experience, and discipline -- though somewhat diminished -- that keeps the party strong.
Still, there is an entrenched party elite that remains opposed to what the new chairman calls "reform" but which they see as moves to dismantle their strength. Then there are the local (ie, ethnic Taiwanese) members that comprise about 70 percent of the total membership. They have remained loyal to the party, but inevitably are more oriented toward Taiwan than to China. It will not be easy for the new chairman to overcome these differences.
Over the past six years, the KMT's objective has clearly been to destroy the opposition, at whatever cost to the nation. Some now want a party that is more adapted to the democratic system but will still steer the people to accept a more China-oriented agenda.
The DPP has been a ruling party with differing objectives and little experience in governance. It has often been thwarted by the opposition. Its new party chairman is also well known to the voters, and like his KMT counterpart he will experience a great deal of disagreement within his party with little time to overcome the problem.
Unlike the differences within the KMT, which are not so openly discussed, the DPP's culture of debate is more open and less disciplined. Incoming DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun has stated his objectives, one of which is to make the party a central point where the views of the executive branch, the DPP legislative caucus and the Presidential Office are coordinated before action is taken.
Again, like his KMT counterpart, within the next year Yu will have to deal with the Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections and the redistribution of electorates, followed by the legislative elections and the presidential election.
There are domestic and external challenges that each side will have to address. Voters are tired of continuous political activities that do not address their interests. Younger voters seem to take the potential for serious conflict for granted. There is a temptation to simply accept an unclear status quo, but there is also a need to carry out government reform and deal with the external problems that arise from this. An understanding of two issues is likely to influence the result of the next election. These are the strength of the cross-strait relationship and changes in the nation's identity.
Voters have voiced frustration at the continuous gridlock and the failure to implement promised policies. One reason for this is the ambiguity that prevails in each party's explanation of its policies or commitments. This reduces voter confidence in politicians generally.
Equally as important, recent polls indicate that young voters seem to take their freedom for granted without bearing the responsibility of being a member of this community.
China and the US strongly support the status quo in cross-strait relations. The US understandably wants to avoid being caught in a catastrophic war. China is satisfied with the status quo under its present policies, as long as it can continue to undermine Taiwan's ability to work in the international community. Taiwan may avoid war in supporting the status quo, but this is likely to be at the cost of gradually being forced into China's orbit.
Newspaper reports and TV news programs about Hong Kong's struggle with Beijing's behavior and its breaking of commitments made to the people in the territory give the young voters of Taiwan ample understanding of why the concept of "one country, two systems" is not suitable for Taiwan. Creeping into discourse in Taiwan lately has been an old, almost forgotten, principle known as "Asian values." It is even being promoted as a possible system for Taiwan, using Singapore as a model.
The voters of Taiwan may be critical of their politicians, but they would be far more critical if their power was diminished in adopting this mode of thinking.
The final challenge -- dealing with constitutional reform -- goes beyond internal campaigning and debating. Taiwan has changed elements of the Constitution in the past, but the process inevitably led to obstacles that required difficult and time-consuming negotiations.
During the course of the long, unofficial campaign for president issues will change and new topics will surface as others disappear. Two broad issues, however, will likely continue to be influential: the strengthening of cross-strait relations on one hand and the establishment of a Taiwanese entity on the other. One side in this debate wants a closer Taiwan-China relationship, while the other wants to strengthen Taiwan's separate identity. This is not a new debate by any means, and it is hard to imagine that it will be solved any time soon.
But the challenge that has paralyzed progress in Taiwan for six years must be resolved immediately if a free and fair contest can take place in the legislative and presidential elections within the next two years. All parties need to demonstrate leadership and arrive at a consensus, but this must be done as part of a multi-party effort while working for the benefit of all Taiwanese. If not, the challenges facing Taiwan may be more than its freedom and democracy can endure.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
For Taiwan, the ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets are a warning signal: When a major power stretches the boundaries of self-defense, smaller states feel the tremors first. Taiwan’s security rests on two pillars: US deterrence and the credibility of international law. The first deters coercion from China. The second legitimizes Taiwan’s place in the international community. One is material. The other is moral. Both are indispensable. Under the UN Charter, force is lawful only in response to an armed attack or with UN Security Council authorization. Even pre-emptive self-defense — long debated — requires a demonstrably imminent
Since being re-elected, US President Donald Trump has consistently taken concrete action to counter China and to safeguard the interests of the US and other democratic nations. The attacks on Iran, the earlier capture of deposed of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and efforts to remove Chinese influence from the Panama Canal all demonstrate that, as tensions with Beijing intensify, Washington has adopted a hardline stance aimed at weakening its power. Iran and Venezuela are important allies and major oil suppliers of China, and the US has effectively decapitated both. The US has continuously strengthened its military presence in the Philippines. Japanese Prime
RSS