What is the primary motivating force driving Taiwanese politics? Following democratization, we have seen the gradual formation of the pan-blue and pan-green camps. Both camps have had their electoral ups and downs, and both have adjusted their platform in response to changes in public opinion. Change in public attitudes is the force that drives the nation's political development.
The stance of the camps today differs considerably from the 1990s when they were closer to each other on the ideological spectrum -- and almost shared the same position on unification/independence. During the 2000 presidential election campaign, there was almost no difference between the three candidates, with then Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) following then president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) dictum on special state-to-state relations, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) pushing something similar, and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜), then an independent candidate, advocating a quasi-international relationship.
The three candidates had differing approaches but came up with comparable results in their China policies, with Lien making the Guidelines for National Reunification more lenient, Chen pushing for "one-way direct cross-strait transportation," and Soong advocating the "three links." With their similar views on national identity and China policy, they all wanted to gain the support of swing voters.
In the early 21st century, the nation's politics began to move away from the center. The 2004 presidential election campaign was carried out in the midst of excitement triggered by debate over national referendums and constitutional reform. After broaching the sensitive subject of constitutional reform, Chen's popularity saw a dramatic rise, forcing pan-blue candidates Lien and Soong to respond to the issue of referendums. This led the two camps into a competition to establish a timetable for constitutional amendment or wholesale change.
Lee stated that a new constitution had to be implemented by 2008, and Chen pushed the schedule forward by promising a constitutional referendum by 2006, while Lien and Soong promised to carry out large-scale constitutional amendment in 2005. This radicalization of the issue of national identity would have been unimaginable in the 1990s.
For the DPP, touching upon the sensitive issue of unification or independence did not damage its image, but instead became a catalyst giving it wider public support. The green camp's millions-strong Feb. 28, 2004, "hand in hand" rally brought support for the DPP's platform to new heights. It seemed that public opinion was moving from the center towards independence. The fact that the DPP was able to gain more than half of the national vote after promoting referendums and the writing of a new constitution was something beyond the scope of anyone's imagination four years earlier.
When the green camp abandoned its moderate position on unification/independence and reaped the benefits of adopting a more radical position, the pan-blue camp found itself in the doldrums. With the 2004 presidential elections just around the corner, Lien and Soong's act of kissing Taiwanese soil was an emotive act of self-defense, reflecting the fact that their opponents controlled the agenda and generally held the upper hand. With the pan-blue camp only able to exercise passive damage control, people wondered what had happened to its strength.
The change in public opinion after 2000 is not only manifested in the public's greater willingness to accept talk and action in support of independence, but also in its longing for a stable cross-strait relationship, and this is where the pan-blue camp's strengths lie. The accusation that pan-blue politicians do not love Taiwan hampered them and forced them to tread carefully at election time. There remained deep-seated fears that contact with China would destroy their chances at the ballot box. Then, last year, the blue camp made a massive breakthrough.
During their visits to China, Lien and Soong met in person with China's top leaders. Lien's speech at Peking University was a direct attack on Taiwan's independence that encouraged nationalism in China. Such daring actions would have been unimaginable in the past. The green camp's breakthrough on referendums and writing a new constitution in 2003 and 2004 was therefore followed by a counter-breakthrough by the blue camp last year. All were radically different from the middle-of-the-road policies advocated by both camps in the 1990s.
Although Lien's departure for China was accompanied by rowdy green camp demonstrations, the public in general reacted with optimism. Lien's personal prestige reached new heights after his return from China.
It is also a very poignant fact that this happened just after China had passed its "Anti-Secession" Law. Many were expecting Beijing's new law to provoke fierce opposition in Taiwan. Then, when Lien visited China, he confirmed the perception that the KMT was colluding with the enemy and opened himself up to massive attack from the pan-green camp. But just as Chen did not lose support over his advocacy of referendums and the writing of a new constitution a year earlier, Lien's visit to China did not harm the pan-blue camp.
Although the green camp rout and the blue camp victory in the local government elections last month were not directly related to Lien's visit to China, it was made abundantly clear that the electorate did not want to punish the pan-blue camp politically for its contact with China.
That punishment instead befell the pan-green camp, which has disappointed voters with its performance on reform and corruption. The series of pan-blue camp politicians traveling to Beijing resulted in closer relations between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), emboldening the KMT to sidestep the government and invite Taiwan Affairs Office head Chen Yunlin (
It is now the pan-blue camp and the CCP that are promoting cross-strait exchanges while restricting the pan-green camp's independence tendencies. It is interesting to see that just as the electorate did not condemn the green camp for promoting the referendum issue and the writing of a new constitution, they are now happy with the KMT and the CCP shaking hands.
The two camps have made breakthroughs in the places where they have their own strengths. The pan-green camp is adept at stimulating awareness of localization, with the referendum and constitutional issues being ideological high points. The pan-blue camp is a natural when it comes to interacting with China, and the party chairmen went to Beijing relying on inter-party diplomacy to bring this to a climax.
And local voters behave like an appreciative audience that applauds both camps for their efforts -- even when old boundaries are crossed, they are still inclined to accept the situation.
How did all of this come about? What in the Taiwanese public's mindset has changed since the 1990s?
The fact is that we see a clear trend beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the 1990s to the 2000s. On the one hand, the public's identification with China has weakened and its identification with Taiwan has grown stronger, while on the other hand we have come to realize the importance of cross-strait relations to the economy and the public interests, and that this must be handled properly.
This change in mindset has given the pan-blue and pan-green camps more room to maneuver. The pan-blue camp has been able to grasp the core of the public interest and demand stability in the cross-strait relationship, while attacking the pan-green camp for letting ideology rule the nation and throttling Taiwan's ability to develop. The pan-green camp has been able to hold a tight grip on the core of the public's national identification and demand that Taiwan's uniqueness be highlighted while both resisting Beijing's suppression and attacking the pan-blue camp for selling the country down the river.
Because the public wants both sovereignty and dignity while protecting the benefits of the cross-strait relationship, the pan-blue camp must handle the issue of identification by moving toward localization. The pan-green camp, on the other hand, must display a willingness and an ability to deal with the cross-strait relationship in response to the public's demands. The pan-blue camp, however, travels down the road of localization with great trepidation because the KMT is after all a Chinese nationalist party and still not ready to accept a Taiwanese consciousness that rejects this nationalism.
In the same way, the pan-green camp only nourishes the cross-strait relationship with unease -- out of fear that it will be swallowed whole by China's economy. The fact that the Taiwanese people want the best of both worlds gives both camps a chance to perform, but it also makes them aware of their limitations, because they are unable to satisfy all of the public's demands.
Last year saw the pan-blue camp's first breakthrough, a development that counterbalances Chen's advocacy of referendums and the writing of a new constitution. The two issues highlight the differences between Taiwanese politics in the 20th and 21st centuries. When faced with the problem of China, the Taiwanese public's need for national identification has deepened. For the pan-blue and the pan-green camps, this offers an opportunity, but it is also a limiting opportunity.
Despite last year's breakthrough, it is difficult to predict whether pan-blue politicians will be able to build on this or if they will waver and pull back. The KMT's new chairman, Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
Regardless of what happens, the breakthroughs by both camps have greatly increased the room for politicians to act, and it has also created greater potential for change.
The only thing that we can know for certain is that both camps will gauge public opinion before making any adjustments. In this sense, the question of whether politics will become more radical or more centrist -- like in the 1990s -- will be decided by voters.
Wu Yu-shan is the director of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti and Perry Svensson
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