Recent discussions on the merger of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP) have ignited a new round of political bickering within the pan-blue alliance. However, changes to Taiwan's political landscape in the past month have rendered this year-long project somewhat irrelevant.
The meeting between KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (
Not only did the two have little of substance to say about the proposed merger of their parties, but each utilized the meeting as a chance to achieve individual goals. Soong used his moment in the spotlight to divert attention from rumors of a potential wave of defections of PFP legislators to the KMT. Ma, on the other hand, used the meeting to further consolidate his new leadership position within the pan-blue alliance, made especially secure in the wake of the Dec. 3 local elections.
The political situation now lends itself to Ma's strategy of gradually absorbing the PFP. Ma appears to have emerged as the big winner and is perhaps the most popular political figure in politics. And the PFP has emerged with little in the way of bargaining chips when it comes to negotiating a merger.
Moreover, Soong's leadership and popularity are declining rapidly. Some PFP legislators have publicly challenged their leader by calling for an immediate merger with the KMT.
Faced with the very real possibility that his political career is coming to an end and the imminent disintegration of the PFP, Soong has no choice but to dance to Ma's tune while at the same time doing his best to increase his dwindling share of the pan-blue camp's political pie.
As the leader of the smaller party, Soong's goal is to broker a deal with the KMT to determine future power distribution and resource allocation. But time is not on Soong's side. The simple majority rule for the next legislative election leaves no option for the PFP but to cooperate with the KMT on the issue of pan-blue camp nominations.
This also explains why speculation has been doing the rounds that Soong hopes to make his candidacy in next year's Taipei mayoral election a precondition of the merger.
Negotiation is no doubt the PFP's only hope of bargaining its way into a better position. However, it is also risky for Soong to overemphasize the principles of "respecting public opinion, building mutual trust, establishing a workable system and sharpening competitive edges" as the preconditions for a KMT-PFP merger. In doing so, Soong may risk having some of his legislators cross the floor to the KMT, thereby sabotaging his own position.
As for the KMT, Ma has the option of either pushing for a speedy merger or simply utilizing the potential of the merger to divide the PFP and further shore up his leadership within the pan-blue camp. It is not surprising to see Ma adopting the "good cop" strategy by demonstrating the "maximum sincerity and the greatest goodwill" in pursuing cooperation with the PFP.
Ma knows full well that he need not make any unnecessary concessions -- all he wants to do is to create the illusion that he is working to create pan-blue unity. In reality, Ma is unlikely to accept any preconditions from Soong and is expected to insist on using democratic principles to select future pan-blue candidates.
Given these contradictions, a KMT-PFP merger is not only politically impractical, but totally unworkable. Unless both sides can work out an amicable solution, the chances of its success are extremely limited.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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