At last the point has been reached in Iraq where everyone ostensibly wants the same thing: the departure of coalition forces from the country. The recent leak from Britain's Ministry of Defense of a discussion paper on troop withdrawal highlights this desire. The only question is how to satisfy it.
As long as the coalition forces stay, violence is likely to escalate. But if they leave, it will also escalate, only faster. So the real question is how to get to the point where Iraq has a police force and army that can be trusted to maintain law as well as order.
Much ground must be covered to get anywhere close. Notwithstanding the courage of the many Iraqis who join either the army or the police, no one should be surprised if some have motives that are less than pure. In northern Iraq, old scores are being settled and de facto ethnic segregation is being introduced in areas, such as Irbil, that were traditionally diverse. In other areas, Shariah law is being introduced by force.
So how can Iraq create uniformed services that can be trusted to enforce the law effectively and impartially, without consideration of ethnicity, religion and gender? The traditional answer is to recruit, train, and instill the "right values." But there is not enough time for that. Other ways are needed.
In the absence of a deeply instilled value system, Iraq needs grassroots civil-society organizations that will hold police and army to account. These could take different forms, but what is important is that they are truly inclusive at a local level, and that they get support from district, regional and national power structures when they highlight abuses.
If there is local scrutiny, and national reinforcement and recognition of the value of that scrutiny, then most members of the uniformed forces are likely to behave appropriately -- and can be more easily identified and dealt with if they don't. This might appear excessively hopeful, yet in Afghanistan, a country akin to Iraq in many ways, there are groups working towards this goal. The Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) provides a model of how this can be done.
In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, ordinary people's highest priority has been to achieve a reduction in violence. CPAU worked across the country in the last three years to set up district-level Peace Committees, supported by satellite Peace Councils in villages. The initiative faces a culture in which violence is so deeply embedded that children once learned arithmetic by counting numbers of dead Soviet soldiers. The committees therefore seek to bring together all sections of the community -- including teachers, tribal leaders, religious leaders, women, police, soldiers, judges and businesspeople -- to develop ways of resolving conflicts non-violently.
Although monitoring has not been a formal part of the role of the committees until now (it is planned for the future), the mere fact that the police, army and judiciary are part of these committees brings them into contact with the rest of the community, provides feedback and starts to build trust.
Some results are remarkable. In one workshop, the local military commander came for a couple of hours, as a courtesy, and ended up staying for the whole week. At the end, he apologized for his violent past and made a commitment to disarm his 2,000-strong private army. He now visits the committee offices regularly.
In Iraq, projects such as the Humanitarian Liaison Center in Kirkuk are starting to fulfill a monitoring function by offering the ethnically diverse local population the opportunity to bring grievances and get help in having them resolved. But, too often, even if a court ruling is made, it is not enforced as a result of intimidation.
Much good work on strengthening civil society has already been done by US and British forces. We don't hear about the workshops for women's empowerment, or the successful organization of small-scale local elections across the country.
But mobilizing civil society is hugely challenging, particularly when, as in Iraq, it needs to be done quickly and on a large scale. Military force is still necessary, but so are incentives to disarm, including the prospect of economic opportunities that are more fruitful than crime and extortion. Fortunately, building the capacity of civil society is as cheap as it is important. The Humanitarian Liaison Center serves the whole of Kirkuk at an annual cost of just US$75,000 a year. With US$10 million, such centers could be replicated 100 times -- with plenty of change left over.
The challenge is to commit to this approach, to scale up and to support to the hilt the brave people who take on the challenge of holding power to account. Otherwise, the Iraqi people are unlikely to get the security that, after so many years of suffering, they so desperately need.
Carolyn Hayman is chief executive of Peace Direct.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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