France and Germany have been leading the drive to get the EU arms embargo against China lifted. As a result of China's new "Anti-Secession" Law, the EU might now delay its plan to lift the embargo. How should we respond to this situation?
The Tienannmen Square Massacre took place on June 4, 1989, in Beijing. Heads of state and government of the then 12-nation European Community (EC) strongly condemned Beijing's crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, announced a freeze on arms sales to and military cooperation with China and imposed restrictions on bilateral exchanges in scientific and cultural fields.
Although the sanctions against China were uniformly stipulated by the EC, they were implemented by individual member states. Each country had different considerations regarding the collective stance adopted by the community. In addition to its booming economy, China's importance in international affairs was such that the EC could not simply ignore it. This mixture of political and economic reasons caused the EC to resume political dialogue with Beijing soon afterward. In the mid-1990s, EC members lifted almost all the sanctions imposed on China.
The arms embargo announced 15 years ago was no more than a political statement. Since 1998, EU members have based their consideration of arms exports on eight criteria (not specifically targeted at China).
If the potential purchaser of the arms appears to have conducted a gross or large-scale violation of human rights or may employ the arms to realize expansionist ambitions, then no member states "should" sell arms to these countries. It is clear from this that the criteria are not mandatory.
In view of the fact that the extent of European arms companies' business with China has been barely restricted (arms exports to China in 2003 had a value of 400 million euros or US$526.5 million), vigorous efforts by Germany and France to lift the arms ban are probably not targeted at the business opportunity the arms could bring about but at making a political message, demonstrating an equal partnership between the EU and China and at enhancing bilateral trade relations.
As a matter of fact, if the EU wants to end its ban on selling arms to Beijing, issuing a joint statement would be adequate. If such a statement was made at a leadership summit, this would also serve to show that the EU has comprehensively normalized relations with China. European leaders, however, not only have to take the US opposition into account but also have to, as heads of free and democratic nations, consider the majority opinion in parliament and overall public opinion.
In Germany, the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party jointly put forward quite a few prerequisites for the lifting of the arms embargo, including the improvement of China's human rights record and the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. They also demanded that the EU retain the embargo until after the revision of the union's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.
This shows that lawmakers of both parties, which formed a coalition government, do not see eye to eye with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.
Beijing's Anti-Secession Law has been internationally criticized for authorizing the use of non-peaceful means to resolve the cross-strait issue. The US government and Congress, the EU Council, European Parliament and non-governmental organizations, one after another, have made statements or passed resolutions to urge the EU to maintain the arms ban because of China's failure to improve its human rights situation or the strategic stability in Northeast Asia and the security interests of the US in the region.
Luxembourg, which currently holds the EU's rotating presidency, has also reiterated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should seek peaceful resolution, and opposed the use of force.
Pushed by France and Germany, the EU has roughly completed the revision of the code of conduct, necessitating a further restriction of military exports and strengthening the exchange of information on arms sales. Quite a few EU countries have agreed to delay the knotty issue of lifting the arms embargo, which was scheduled to take effect during the first half of this year, so it is now just a question of timing.
Other than reminding the EU that lifting the ban may send the wrong message to Beijing, and that this action should be delayed as long as possible, what should Taipei do?
It could consider turning to Washington or find other channels to present the EU and its member states with a list of weapons and technologies that it should consider when tightening the restrictions placed by the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports on so-called dual-use technology (technology capable of civilian military applications), so that the cross-strait military balance won't be altered or stability and peace in the region threatened.
Chung Chih-ming is an assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies at Nanhua University.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
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