Chinese President Hu Jintao's (胡錦濤) two-faced strategy is more ruthless and steadier than his predecessor Jiang Zemin's (江澤民). Hu's Taiwan policy is going to be more flexible, persistent, proactive, patient, subtle and even more comprehensive.
In 1989, as secretary of the Party Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region, Hu brutally clamped down on a Tibetan demonstration for independence in the capital Lhasa. However, Hu also put Chen Guangqing (
Hu usually avoids taking high-profile action. Yet in 2003, when SARS broke out in Guangdong and 70 sailors died in a mysterious submarine accident, he responded swiftly by conducting a change of personnel to consolidate his hold on power.
Hu will adopt new thinking and strategies because his background is different from Jiang's. Hu is the first non-Moscow-trained national leader and has no revolutionary credentials. Hu has yet to return to his hometown Jixi, in Anhui Province, as his father -- a businessman -- was once oppressed by local communists.
Being the president of the Party School of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, he once invited Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics, to deliver a speech, and also added religious studies to the school curriculum.
But isn't the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against capitalism and religion? Hu seemed bold yet low-profile when, through "representatives," he touched on sensitive issues such as establishing contacts with the US, sounding Taiwan out on many issues and escalating the level of elections at the grassroots level.
Regarding the policy on Taiwan, Hu has incorporated what he has learned from the party's past experience in dealing with Taiwan and the new thinking of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But he makes his own mark. The following five points highlight the differences between Hu and Jiang.
First, Jiang toyed with a timetable for unification with Taiwan; Hu has not. Last September, only five days after Hu took over the chairmanship of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), he approved new guidelines on Taiwan policy: "strive for negotiation, prepare for war and have no fear of Taiwan's procrastination." This motto of Hu is inspired by Chairman Mao, who gave the same instructions during the Korean War.
Second, the US won an overwhelming victory against Iraq, but it has gotten bogged down in the post-war occupation. This has had a massive impact on the PLA's thinking. Over the past six months, the much-discussed topics in the PLA have been:
Initial win: Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
Complete win: The former vice president of China's Academy of Military Science Li Jijun (
Understanding victory: The military must have a plan and know how to proceed following a victory.
Cautious war: Zhang Wannian (
Beijing's first option to deal with Taiwan is to "annex Taiwan without war" and emphasize a non-military strategy. Apart from launching psychological warfare, legal warfare and media warfare on Taiwan, Hu also engaged Taiwan in diplomatic, economic, cultural and even religious warfare.
Third, be harder on Taiwan independence activities but softer on other aspects: Jiang oppressed Taiwan across the board so that there was a surge in anti-China sentiment. Hu, however, has narrowed the scope of attack, broadened the scope of solicitation and even forgiven the past mistakes of those who supported Taiwan's independence before. Hu has also tried to prevent Taipei from declaring de jure independence but tacitly acknowledged its de facto independence.
Hu's tactics for winning over the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people have gradually emerged, such as the proposal to facilitate direct charter flights, to aid the overseas Taiwanese in need and to import agricultural goods from Taiwan.
Fourth, continuous military buildup: Hu will support the use of military force to "deter the US and seize Taiwan." China will not directly attack the US and destroy Taiwan. Beijing will use its submarines, which are equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles, to deter the US military from coming to Taiwan's aid.
When Washington is still mulling over the strategy to counterbalance Beijing, Beijing will swiftly paralyze the island and occupy Taiwan. However, war is Hu's last option and he would prefer not to use it.
The other option is "coercion to the brink," to threaten Taiwan and complement the first option. This option entails striking without bloodshed or destruction, and without missiles falling on the enemy's territory. The goal is to give the the enemy a psychological feel that great misfortune could appear out of the blue.
Fifth, handle the sovereignty issue with flexibility. Once Hu's hold on power is consolidated, the proposition of separate autonomy for both sides of the Taiwan Strait will probably come to the surface.
There are also an increasing number of semi-governmental academics studying the "one nation, three seats" model introduced in the UN by the former Soviet republic including Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, the concept of "overlapping sovereignty" and the possibility of a "United States of Chinese Republic."
If we think that Hu's approach is no different from Jiang's, if we only prepare one set of strategies while Beijing has multifarious strategies and if we defend ourselves on one side while Beijing attacks us on the other, what will the result be?
Chong-Pin Lin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, and the author of a recently published book Win With Wisdom: When Wrestling With A Giant.
TRANSLATED BY DANIEL CHENG
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