The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multilateral export-control regime that controls the transfer of sensitive nuclear items and technologies, approved China's membership last Friday during its annual plenary meeting in Sweden.
The NSG's decision is a milestone as China's membership is expected to strengthen international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. That is, if Beijing will and can meet its obligations as NSG membership requires.
Indeed, some controversy has surrounded Beijing's bid for NSG membership within the US government and between the executive and legislative branches. While supporters see China's NSG membership as a step toward promoting nuclear nonproliferation, opponents raise serious questions about Beijing's proliferation record and are concerned about China's willingness and ability to enforce nonproliferation measures.
This concern is not without reason. Over the years, suspected Chinese proliferation activities have been a contentious issue in Sino-US relations. During the 1980s and 1990s, China is alleged to have been engaged in a number of questionable nuclear transactions, providing nuclear reactors and technologies to Algeria, Pakistan and Iran without proper safeguards or oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The US government has imposed sanctions on Chinese companies and entities and has constantly pressured the Chinese government to change its policy.
Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has made significant progress with its nuclear nonproliferation policy. After joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and supporting its indefinite extension in 1995, Beijing has made formal pledges not to transfer nuclear items and technologies to facilities that aren't safeguarded and has issued a series of domestic regulations governing nuclear and nuclear dual-use exports. China joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997, and began to adopt the NSG dual-use list in its export-control regulations. In January, China formally applied for NSG membership.
Opposition to China's NSG membership was based on a number of concerns. One was China's continued co-operation with Pakistan, which refuses to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. The NSG stipulates that member states shall not make nuclear exports to countries that do not have full-scope safeguards with the IAEA. Beijing and Islamabad have recently signed an agreement for China to provide Pakistan with a second nuclear reactor to be built at Chashma.
In addition, critics point out that China's track record raises serious doubts about its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. For instance, after China joined the NPT in 1992, Chinese companies continued to engage in transfers of sensitive nuclear technologies that could be used in developing nuclear weapons. In 1995, China sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan that could be used to enrich uranium, a clear violation of its nonproliferation commitment.
These are all legitimate concerns. But an equally important point is to recognize and encourage the generally positive trends in Chinese nonproliferation behavior. Past Chinese deviations from its pledges can be summarized as falling into one of the following categories: different perspectives, failure of the domestic export-control system and issue linkage.
In the past, Beijing always emphasized the importance of striking a balance between nuclear nonproliferation and legitimate international nuclear trade. It accused the multilateral export-control regimes such as the NSG as discriminatory cartels that impeded developing countries' need for technologies and trade under the guise of nonproliferation. It therefore declined to adopt the IAEA full-scope safeguards so that it could continue to engage in nuclear trade with countries such as Pakistan.
Until the last few years, China's domestic export-control system was at best a very weak one. Since the early 1980s, reform and decentralization have led to a growing number of companies engaged in international trade, while the central government was not quick to recognize the importance of developing a fully functioning domestic export-control system and passing relevant laws. China's assessment of the threat posed by proliferation was trumped by competing policy priorities, rendering nonproliferation export controls low on its policy agenda.
Beijing was also seeking to link its nonproliferation pledges to issues important to national security. For instance, US arms sales to Taiwan and missile defenses were often linked to discussions of proliferation issues.
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US and the recent revelations of North Korea's nuclear program's links to the international nuclear proliferation network headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, a perception of threat has raised Beijing's awareness of the danger that proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could pose to its security interests. Indeed, the Chinese leadership in the summer of 2002 made the decision to adopt WMD nonproliferation as a priority item on its policy agenda and de-link it from other issues.
China has since sped up the process of developing a domestic export-control system. In the fall of 2002, Beijing issued a series of regulations governing nuclear, chemical, biological, missile and military trade. More detailed ministerial divisions of responsibility and measures for inter-agency consultation were put in place. Last December, China published its first white paper on nonproliferation in which, for the first time, it acknowledged the positive role that multilateral export control regimes have played in WMD nonproliferation, and warned against proliferation activities under the guise of peaceful use. This was followed by Beijing's application for NSG membership and discussion of membership with the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Beijing's proactive mediation in the North Korean nuclear crisis also reflects its recognition of the serious threat that WMD proliferation poses to its security interests. The potential East Asian nuclear chain reaction resulting from Pyongyang's covert nuclear programs and the Khan network drive home the importance of strengthened international coordination in meeting this challenge.
China is now a full member of the NSG. But challenges still abound. New membership brings with it new responsibilities and, if past experience is any guide, building up an effective domestic export-control system takes time, political commitment and resources.
It is true that China's export-control system is far from perfect. But that makes it more critical for countries with better-developed export-control systems -- such as the US and Japan -- to help China develop infrastructure and train personnel. Now that it is a member, China will have to observe the full-scope safeguards provision and, through more regular consultation with other member states, improve and strengthen its own export-control mechanisms. China's NSG membership could well open the way for it to become a member in other multilateral export-control regimes, which will provide a major contribution to international nonproliferation efforts.
Yuan Jing-dong (袁勁東) is director of research at the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS