Speaking on constitutional re-engineering at his inauguration, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) painted a very attractive picture. The problems that constitutional re-engineering will fix include: "whether to have a three-branch or five-branch separation of power; whether to adopt a presidential or parliamentary system of government; whether the president should be elected by a relative or an absolute majority; reform of the national legislature; the role of the National Assembly and its retainment versus abolishment; whether to suspend or abolish the provincial government; lowering the voting age; modification of compulsory military service requirements; protection of basic human rights and the rights of the disadvantaged; and, principles governing the running of the national economy, [etcetera]."
This "etcetera" gives us an infinite realm for our imagina-tions: we can imagine that constitutional re-engineering offers the opportunity of resolving all our problems; that this process will give rise to a harmonious society.
Chen clearly indicated that the process of constitutional re-
engineering would not be complete for another four years. Everyone knows that the re-engineering process will involve a struggle for power, a process of give and take. Chen has solemnly sworn that there will be no repetition of the six rounds of constitutional amendments in 10 years that took place during former president Lee Teng-hui's (
No one would deny that if the assurance of social and economic rights, along with the limitless extras represented by "etcetera," can be brought into being through constitutional re-engineering, then the chance of realizing Chen's "just new Taiwan" will be greatly increased. But is constitutional re-engineering the herald of major reforms, or is it the culmination of reform?
It will probably take more than simply inviting politicians and experts to form a constitutional reform committee to reflect the vast potential for social justice reflected in Chen's "etcetera." Instead the consensus on the details of constitutional re-
engineering should be built on a positive response to structural bottlenecks met during the course of the specific reforms that are now being initiated.
In his speech, Chen promised a whole range of reforms. None of his proposals are new. These reforms cannot wait to be realized by a constitutional reform committee in a single document that will not be released until 2008.
Redistribution of educational resources, equitable taxation, immigrant rights, judicial reform and the strategic response to China's "peaceful arising" are all areas in which the first Chen administration failed to deliver satisfactory results. Revelations of money politics and government corruption have also tarnished the reputation of that administration. These problems will not disappear with a second term, and accusations of vote-buying in the DPP legislative primaries underline the growing problem of corruption in the government.
These problems can't be resolved through constitutional re-engineering. If they are not resolved soon, however, the government's burden will become heavier and it will be forced into more compromises, leading to a repeat of Lee's failures.
The inauguration should not be the start of a new election campaign; it should be the start of reform. In setting the time-frame for constitutional reform, it is more important that a schedule, and concrete policies and goals for specific reforms be established. Without these reforms, social justice will not be realized in 2008.
We should not be thinking about the year-end elections, or next year's or years to come. A-Bian, it is time to start reform!
Ku Er-teh is a freelance writer.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
I have heard people equate the government’s stance on resisting forced unification with China or the conditional reinstatement of the military court system with the rise of the Nazis before World War II. The comparison is absurd. There is no meaningful parallel between the government and Nazi Germany, nor does such a mindset exist within the general public in Taiwan. It is important to remember that the German public bore some responsibility for the horrors of the Holocaust. Post-World War II Germany’s transitional justice efforts were rooted in a national reckoning and introspection. Many Jews were sent to concentration camps not
Deflation in China is persisting, raising growing concerns domestically and internationally. Beijing’s stimulus policies introduced in September last year have largely been short-lived in financial markets and negligible in the real economy. Recent data showing disproportionately low bank loan growth relative to the expansion of the money supply suggest the limited effectiveness of the measures. Many have urged the government to take more decisive action, particularly through fiscal expansion, to avoid a deep deflationary spiral akin to Japan’s experience in the early 1990s. While Beijing’s policy choices remain uncertain, questions abound about the possible endgame for the Chinese economy if no decisive
RSS