US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage publicly questioned Taiwan's referendum plan during his visit to Beijing in late January. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver reaffirmed this position immediately. On Feb. 11, US Secretary of State Colin Powell told the US Congress that "we don't really see a need for these referenda."
Why are the referendum questions with a so-called certain "policy significance" still seen as unnecessary by pro-Taiwan Powell and Armitage? In a word, the US is actually pursuing its maximum national interests while Taiwan is insisting on holding the referendum.
Before March 20, Washington will inevitably adopt a dual tactic toward Taiwan. Thus, it will continue to question the referendum on the one hand while earning interest from its results on the other -- while waiting for an opportunity to affect the outcome of the presidential election as well.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should not think that US pressure has already been resolved, and should handle this appropriately. The media and the opposition parties should not exaggerate US pressure either. They should understand that this is Washington's diplomatic maneuvers aimed at maintaining its national interests.
Decision-makers in Taipei began actively searching in December for possible referendum questions with a policy significance acceptable to Washington. Judging from various reports, the origin of this line of thinking was Schriver's report at the Brookings Institution in mid-December. In his speech, he pointed out that the US opposes Taiwan holding a referendum that could change the status quo (eg, a unification-independence referendum), does not support a substantially meaningless referendum that might increase tension across the Taiwan Strait ( an anti-missile referendum), and has no opinion on a referendum on domestic policies (a referendum on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant).
About the same time, decision-makers in Taipei announced that the referendum questions they would propose would be questions concerning public policies.
Was Schriver's statement that the US has no opinion on a referendum on public policies a comment or a hint? If his remarks were merely a comment, not a hint, then Taipei would have been mistaken in pursuing referendum questions that would be acceptable to Washington, and Powell's and Armitage's constant questions would not be surprising. Even if the US did hint to Taiwanese officials through special channels that they could resolve the matter by holding a referendum on public policies only, it would be reasonable to expect that the US would use Taiwan's concession to maximize its national interests.
The US' biggest national interest in the Taiwan Strait lies in maintaining the status quo: maintaining Taiwan's independence without provoking China into using force, which would help the US to avoid being engaged in a cross-strait war. Maintaining good relations with China is also crucial to both the strategic and economic interests of the US.
Looking at it from another angle, the US must have been hoping that Taiwan would not hold the referendum at this unfavorable moment -- because US forces are tied up in the Middle East, it has to deal with North Korea, for which China's help is needed, and because US President George W. Bush needs to stabilize the international environment in order to benefit his re-election bid. But the referendum is certain, so the US' best option does not exist anymore.
Since it's impossible to cancel the referendum, the second-best possibility for the US would be if Taiwan proposed a referendum that benefits US national interests, with a predictable positive outcome. The two referendum questions proposed by President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) -- about strengthening armaments and increasing the military's purchase budget, and starting peace talks across the strait -- do tally with the US' long-term expectations for Taiwan. In light of Taipei's determination to hold the referendum, the US cannot continue its strong opposition, because it cannot dominate the internal affairs of another democratic polity.
Besides, Washington also worries that excessive opposition will cause panic among the Taiwanese over the referendum, which may encourage anti-referendum forces such as the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-People First Part alliance and the Chinese Communist Party. It would be more disadvantageous for the US if the referendum has a low voter turnout, or if the two questions are vetoed by the Taiwanese people. Another possibility is that anti-American sentiments could be triggered by excessive US pressure on Taiwan.
But constant pressure and questioning are certain, so that the US can comfort China while limiting Chen's referendum options. The US government obviously knows it has some influence on Taiwan's public opinions, and might therefore try to affect the election results in this way.
The government cannot afford to have excessive expectations of US goodwill, or make the mistaken assumption that the pressure has been removed. As Schriver said, the US has its own national interests to consider. If the government disregards the pressure, it will force Washington to push harder, or adopt self-protective measures.
But the media and opposition parties should not threaten the public by portraying the US' diplomatic maneuvers as part of a conflict between the two countries. After all, if the referendum is canceled or vetoed, the national interests of Taiwan and the US will suffer, and China will be the only winner.
Jou Yi-cheng is a former director of the DPP's Youth Department.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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