Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's resignation as chairman of Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) will deeply affect the distribution of forces within the German government and its slim "Red-Green" majority in parliament. While it seems to be premature to speak, as some in Germany now do, of a "Twilight of the Chancellor" or to call Schroeder's surprising step "the beginning of the end" of his tenure, it is correct to describe it as a dramatic loss of power.
The immediate winner is Franz Muentefering, age 64, the SPD's parliamentary floor leader who will succeed Schroeder as party chairman. Both politicians will constitute a tandem, but Schroeder will be more dependent on Muentefering's loyalty than Muentefering is dependent on Schroeder's success.
Schroeder has been representing a moderately left political platform and agenda, one comparable to British
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Prime Minister Tony Blair's New Labour philosophy or former US president Bill Clinton's centrism. Muentefering, however, is more attached to traditional Social Democratic (or Old Labour) values. In terms of leadership style, Schroeder is a soloist; Muentefering a team player.
In Germany, the chancellor holds the strongest position among the key political players. However, the main source of any chancellor's strength is not to be found in the legal powers conferred upon him by the Constitution; it is the actual support he holds within his own party.
With one notable exception in the 1950s, none of Germany's two main political parties -- the Social Democrats and the moderately conservative Christian Democrats -- has ever managed to win an absolute majority in parliament. As a consequence, German chancellors usually preside over coalition governments, and their effective authority is based on the loyalty of the party forces they command within such political alliances.
Although the Social Democrats never really liked Schroeder (they certainly do not love him in the way they did the unforgettable Willy Brandt), they willy-nilly followed him so long as they saw him as the only guarantor of electoral success after 16 frustrating years (1982 to 1998) in opposition to Helmut Kohl. But this is no longer the case. Since the end of 2002, Schroeder and the SPD have been facing unusually low public approval ratings -- and this pattern is not likely to change soon.
Last year alone, almost 40,000 Social Democrats left their party, an unheard of hemorrhaging. If elections had been held last Sunday, a center-right coalition consisting of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals would have won 57 percent of the vote, according to "Infratest dimap," one of Germany's main polling institutes. With no more than 35 percent of the vote, the "Red-Green" coalition would have suffered a disaster.
At the beginning of what has been dubbed a "super election year" in Germany -- with 14 elections, one at the European, five at the regional, and eight at local levels -- this is hideously bad news for the SPD.
Several times before, Schroeder had been thoroughly energized by desperate situations when he had his back to the wall. This was his greatest strength, but it seems he has now embarked on his riskiest counteroffensive ever. It is based on the bet that there will be a considerable economic upswing from the middle of this year on until the next national elections in autumn 2006 -- and that voters will attribute the expected recovery to the economic, labor market and welfare state reforms, called "Agenda 2010," that Schroeder has made the hallmark of his chancellorship.
For a long time, Schroeder's reformist rhetoric had not been matched by his politics. Only after his re-election in autumn 2002 did he give up his previous populist stance, short-term responses and neo-corporatist ways of talking trade unions and employers' associations into compromise.
In view of Germany's most pressing problems -- an accelerating demographic decline, an overregulated labor market and a confusing tax system -- Schroeder's reform agenda may look too timid, but many cuts have been perceived as extremely cruel by the SPD's core constituency, especially the powerful labor unions.
But, given Germany's economic distress, which looks likely to worsen given the country's demographic problems, the Social Democrats are now condemned to favor wealth creation over redistribution. Germany cannot afford to slow down or stop the reform process.
In the best case scenario, Schroeder will therefore stick to the "Agenda 2010" philosophy and Muentefering will patiently explain to a reluctant SPD that one must cross the desert in order to see the Promised Land. In the worst case, Schroeder will lapse back into populism for the sake of short-term electoral success and Muentefering will confirm that method so as to save the wounded Social Democratic soul from total despair.
Schroeder's tragedy is that his power may further erode whatever way he chooses. At the end of this current "super election year," we will know the answer.
Michael Mertes, a former advisor to Helmut Kohl, is an author and partner at dimap consult, a think tank based in Bonn and Berlin.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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