Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's (
When it comes to the Taiwan issue, however, the US' clarification of its position can only be said to have temporarily calmed the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait.
The fact that the US got involved in resolving this crisis is clear evidence that it is expanding its role in the Taiwan Strait and that the cross-strait relationship has been included in the scope of matters that can be influenced by the US.
Prior to Wen's visit, the US presented a framework for handling the cross-strait issue -- no Taiwan independence, no armed invasion by the mainland, and no unilateral change of the cross-strait status quo by either of the two sides. The US wants this framework to assure mainland China that Taiwan will not move toward independence and to assure Taiwan that mainland China will not use force against Taiwan. The US policy is to maintain the status quo and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing's Taiwan policy is not to maintain the status quo, but to achieve peaceful unification and the implementation of "one country, two systems." If the status quo is maintained, unification will be permanently postponed.
As for the US' opposition to a mainland invasion of Taiwan, no conditions have been set. Could China take armed action if Taiwan declares independence? Judging from the explanations given by several US officials and scholars, as well as US President George W. Bush's recent statement that the US will do what it takes to protect Taiwan, the US seems to demand that China not take armed action under any circumstances. If this is correct, China will have one hand tied behind its back.
It seems that maintaining the status quo would both block Taiwan independence and eliminate the Chinese wish for a unified nation, a situation that meets the US' regional and global strategic interests.
There is a touch of irony in the fact that though Beijing always has claimed that the Taiwan issue is a domestic Chinese issue, and that it will not tolerate interference by any country, it now finds it more and more difficult to resolve the Taiwan issue without the US.
The US alone can solve the current crisis, which may explode at the slightest touch. This is evidence that Beijing's influence over and appeal to Taiwan is weakening and that its room for action is shrinking as it is retreating toward its bottom line and, step by step, losing the initiative. It seems unification has become just extravagant talk, and that simply maintaining the status quo would be an achievement.
The US can help prevent independence, but cannot (and maybe does not wish to) promote unification. In the final analysis, if we want to stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Strait and solve the national unification issue, we must rely on no one but ourselves.
Beijing should reflect in earnest on why it has been led by the nose by Taiwan on the cross-strait issue since the time of former president Lee Teng-hui (
I have pointed out several times in the past that the ability to solve the Taiwan issue lies with the Chinese people, including the people of Taiwan, and not with the US. In the end, cross-strait unification must rely on the people of Taiwan. If a majority of the people of Taiwan approved of unification, would the US dare resort to armed interference?
The main reason that the Taiwan issue still has not been resolved is not the US (frankly speaking, it is not certain that the people of Taiwan would agree to unification even if the US stopped selling arms to Taiwan), but rather that Beijing has not done a good job with the people of Taiwan, has not managed to make them identify with Beijing.
The Beijing authorities in charge of Taiwan affairs have for many years declared that hope should be pinned on the people of Taiwan, but China has taken no concrete action in this regard. In particular, no studies have been made of changes in psychological attitudes or public opinion in Taiwan.
The early Russian Marxist Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov once divided social thinking into social awareness and social psychology, pointing out that the former is deeply affected by economic and political factors, while the latter is relatively independent and sometimes even contradicts the former. Here, we need earnest studies of public opinion in Taiwan in order to win over the minds of the people of Taiwan. The psychological state of the people of Taiwan must not be simplistically interpreted from an ideological point of view.
Taiwan has often been some other country's colony, and the people's wish to be their own masters has been long suppressed. Once society starts moving toward democracy, self-awareness strengthens and the people make strong demands for participation. This wish to be their own master in fact has nothing to do with unification or independence ideology. Public approval of a referendum does not necessarily demonstrate an approval of independence -- more than 70 percent of the Taiwanese public still wish to maintain the status quo -- but is rather a demand for the right to participate and express one's opinion by using one's vote to resolve issues. The psychological conditions created during this kind of social evolution may be very difficult to understand for a China that still has not experienced democratization.
In the recent referendum dispute between Taiwan's government and the opposition, the pan-blue camp, originally opposed to the referendum, suddenly changed its position and came out in support of holding referendums. This is evidence that they felt public pressure that they did not dare go against.
Another psychological attitude among the people of Taiwan is a strengthened self-respect and a wish that personal individuality and national dignity be respected. This may also be a result of the historical environment. During my many visits to Taiwan, I have traveled deep into the countryside and talked with common people. I have discovered that they harbor no animosity toward the mainland, that they long to understand and get along with the mainland, and that they do not rule out the possibility of a merger between the two sides. Their only dissatisfaction with the mainland lies in its international suppression of Taiwan, with its not letting Taiwan participate in relevant international activities and organizations, and the mainland's stance on the flag and name issues, which makes them feel lowly.
This frustration creates a public attitude where the will to resist increases along with an increase in suppression. This is borne out by the counterproductive effect of the mainland's missile tests during the presidential election in 1996 and the severe warnings by Beijing during the presidential election in 2000.
Beijing should understand and respect these psychological attitudes among the people of Taiwan, which have resulted from specific historical conditions, and act according to these circumstances instead of resisting them and applying forceful suppression.
Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's (
The eight points do not, however, provide any concrete measures for doing so, nor has the respect that Jiang spoke of been realized.
In fact, as long as the mainland prioritizes the interests of the people of Taiwan when dealing with Taiwan and cares about the demands and prosperity of our Taiwanese compatriots, many problems that now seem difficult are easily solvable.
One example is the issue of Taiwan's international space. There are many existing models that would allow Taiwan to participate in a few non-governmental and charity organizations under the "one China" principle. Not even the thorny and sensitive issues of a national title and flag are impossible to resolve.
Frankly speaking, parts of Beijing's policies are unsatisfactory. On one hand, Beijing does not recognize the "Republic of China," while on the other hand, during the referendum dispute, it opposed a change in national name, demanding that "Republic of China" be maintained.
Remember that Tang Shubei (
I don't know if this was his personal opinion or the policy of the Beijing leadership. Regrettably, the statement has not been repeated, nor has there been any follow-up.
To sum up, if the many doubts and misunderstandings regarding the mainland that exist in the minds of the people of Taiwan are not dissolved through active effort, a minority of the island's politicians will stir up populist sentiment and turn it into independence ideology.
Of course, in the final analysis, the mainland has to handle its own affairs properly, speed up the reform of its economic and political systems, implement democratization and make the mainland more attractive to the people of Taiwan. This is something the US is incapable of doing.
Zhang Jialin is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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