The US preparation for military action against Iraq has met a variety of responses in the international community. Discussion on the matter in Taiwan tends to simplify the position of some countries, however. The public, for example, seems mostly to consider Beijing's position to be one of opposition to US military action. This is an inaccurate interpretation of Beijing's stance and of trends in Sino-US relations.
When a reporter at a press conference on Jan. 30 asked Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue (
On Feb. 3, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (
So what is China's calculation? First, Chinese officials calculate unanimously that Iraq has almost no prospect of winning a war with the US. The overwhelming consensus among these officials is that the US will not take long to secure victory. Opposition to the use of military force, therefore, would be of little point.
When NATO took military action against Yugoslavia, China was opposed. Politics apart, China's opposition was partly due to its calculation that NATO had little chance of success and that NATO might get bogged down in a long, drawn-out war. It is now evident that China, apart from making an erroneous prediction, also found out that there is nothing to be gained from disagreeing with the US.
In addition, Russia's position is also doubtful. On Jan. 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that "if Iraq begins to make problems for the work of the inspectors, then Russia may change its position and agree with the United States on the development of different, tougher UN Security Council decisions." It is clear that Russia has no firm intention of opposing the US position.
Although France and Germany oppose the US position, their reactions are within the scope of the usual points of contention between the US and Europe. There is no advantage for China in aligning herself with France and Germany. No such alignment could compensate for the losses China would suffer from the deterioration in Sino-US relations that would inevitably follow. The Sino-US relationship will remain of paramount importance.
In fact, the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime by the US would not necessarily redound to China's detriment. Besides the fact that a reduction in oil prices would be conducive to China's economic development, post-war reconstruction would provide Beijing with tremendous business opportunities in serving the likely demand for consumer goods and labor.
More importantly, the reconstruction of Iraq's political order would be a good opportunity for China to bring her international influence into full play. The war in Afghanistan, for example, has almost entirely been fought by the US alone, but China is among the important members of the "six plus two" group in the post-war reconstruction process. And because Iraq is an Islamic country, opposition to Western democracy is inevitable.
As a Third World country, China has always maintained good relations with Iraq. The Iraqi people have no enmity with China. Beijing, therefore, can play an important role and serve as a bridge. Because reconstruction work is far more difficult than military affairs and also has implications for US President George W. Bush's political reputation and prospects for reelection, the possibility of the US taking the opportunity to work closely with China will be even greater.
On Feb. 12, the Egyptian government-controlled newspaper al-Ahram held an interview with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Powell said that the US hopes for a "peaceful solution" to the Iraqi problem. Now, with war apparently imminent, Powell's statement actually suggests that the US still hopes to subdue the enemy without going to war. The Iraqi government has continued to send out messages of reconciliation. There is still hope.
Should China decide to issue a formal statement against military action, that will possibly be a sign that a peaceful solution is in the offing. In any case, the key is the arrangements for a new order in Iraq and the Middle East, where Beijing can possibly exercise its influence. It is still too early to jump to a conclusion or even choose sides.
Chang Kuo-cheng is the former deputy director of the DPP's Chinese Affairs Department.
Translated by Grace Shaw
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