On his recent visit to Brussels, Russian President Vladimir Putin stunned European leaders and journalists alike with his comments about the Islamic desire to establish a global Caliphate. Sensational in his rhetoric, Putin presents Russia's brutal war against the Chechens as his country's contribution to the international war against Islamist terrorism. But is it really? \nRussia's attempts to subdue the Chechen insurrection are but another bloody chapter in a 200-year colonial policy that began with Russia's subjugation of Caucasian mountain peoples in a cruel war that lasted for 30 years. This war lingered and flared well into the early Soviet era and, in 1944, the entire Chechen population was forcibly deported to Central Asia. \nFifty years later, president Boris Yeltsin resumed the war when Chechens made a new bid for independence. So, from a historic perspective, it is more appropriate to compare today's Chechen war with the other great wars of the era of de-colonialization, particularly the bloody French war in Algeria, than it is to view it as a "clash of civilizations" or a war on terror. \nAll the while, the fighting and ruined cities of Chechnya cast a shadow on the otherwise much more complex encounter of Russia with the Islamic world. Indeed, the Chechens are only a fraction of the 13 million Muslims who live in Russia -- 9 percent of the total population. \nBut simultaneous with its attempts to crush the Chechen rebellion, Russia has pursued a very different path in its relations with the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs, who live in their own republics in the Volga-Ural area. In the early 1990s, Yeltsin concluded bilateral agreements with those republics, conceding extensive autonomy to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. \nAlthough restoration of centralized political power in the Kremlin has marked Putin's presidency, Moscow and the two Muslim-dominated Russian republics still adhere to the Yeltsin-era bargain. \nThe ambivalent relationship between Russia and its Muslims is deeply rooted in history. Russia conquered Muslim territories in the Volga-Ural area, Caucasus and Central Asia, and brutally suppressed any resistance. However, after loyalty was secured, the government adopted a more pragmatic policy. \nUntil the mid 19th century, sedentary Muslim elites were co-opted into the imperial aristocracy, just as, in the 20th century, national communist elites were absorbed into the Soviet nomenclature. \nIndeed, Russia's contacts with the Muslim world go back thousands of years and were rooted in a tradition of tolerance. With a few short-lived exceptions, Russia's imperial government did not support Orthodox evangelism. Forced conversion was unknown and Russia's policy with regard to Muslims was guided primarily by the political and economic interests of the state. \nAfter the Revolution, Soviet policy preserved the most important aspects of the old imperial approach. To be sure, the Communists tried to repress Islam as a religion -- as they tried to repress all religions. \nBut the Soviets encouraged the development of nations based on ethnic identity -- Stalin, it is to be recalled, fancied himself a theorist of nationalities -- and the ethnic identity of Soviet Muslims derived largely from their Islamic culture. In this sense, the Soviets helped keep Islam alive. \nWhat few people realize is that, overall, the history of Russian-Muslim relations stand in sharp contrast with the policy pursued by most West European governments over the centuries -- policies that have been rooted in anti-Islamic stereotypes since the Middle Ages. \nIn Spain and Sicily, Muslims were discriminated against, forcibly baptized, and expelled since the 15th century. Five hundred years of warfare against the Ottomans also helped to fuel anti-Islamic prejudices and intolerance. Indeed, whenever Russia (as in the first half of the 18th century) or the Soviet Union (in the late 1920s and 1930s) combated Islam, its rulers pointed to the Western example. \nThe policy toward the Muslims pursued by the Russian Empire, by contrast, largely preserved ethnic and religious communities. This pragmatism has mostly been preserved to this day. Reverting to the imperial Russian tradition, Boris Yeltsin, as the first president of an independent Russian nation-state, sought realistic solutions for the Muslim republics that desired autonomy or, as Chechnya, independence. \nThis tolerant posture gave way to war in Chechnya in 1994, but the armistice of 1996, which de facto recognized Chechnya's independence, gave rise to new hopes of a better future. \nIn 1999 Yeltsin and Putin, his then prime minister, resumed combat. The Chechen war was exploited in Putin's presidential election campaign and, after the Sept. 11 attacks on the US, Putin has tried to legitimize his intransigence by presenting the war in Chechnya as Russia's contribution to its emerging partnership with the US in the war against terrorism. \nWith the Soviet Union's disintegration, Russia and the West lost the enemy each had seen in the other. Both deem Islam the new enemy, one held in common. \nWhat they fail to see is that Islam is not a homogenous entity and that today's conflicts do not have religious or civilizing causes, but are rooted in political, social and economic reasons. Indeed, many Islamic movements are largely a reaction to former or still existing colonial dependence. \nThe Putin government's focus on violence demonstrates that Russia hasn't learned from its long history of engagement with Islam. The Chechen War is not part of some Clash of Civilizations, but a retreat to a colonial policy that failed. \nAndreas Kappeler is director of the Institute for East European History, University of Vienna. He is the author of, among other books, The Russian Multi-Ethnic Empire. \nCopyright: Project Syndicate and Institute for Human Sciences
ILLUSTATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
Last year, China entered into a spat with Lithuania over Vilnius allowing Taipei to open a de facto embassy using the name “Taiwan.” Beijing recalled its ambassadors from Lithuania and downgraded its diplomatic ties with the Baltic state to the “charge d’affaires” level. In hindsight, China should realize that this move handed Lithuania on a plate to Taiwan. China used its economic leverage as punishment. First, it tried to pressure German industry giant Continental AG to stop using Lithuanian-made components. When an EU trade commissioner said that Chinese customs were refusing to clear goods containing Lithuanian parts, China denied it was at
With the fall of Kabul not yet six months past, Washington faces a fresh test of its ability to sustain Pax Americana, as more than 100,000 Russian troops, heavy artillery and tanks mass on Russia’s border with Ukraine. The mounting crisis looks set to become the greatest test of US President Joe Biden’s administration to date — the outcome of which could have far-reaching implications and send ripples through the Taiwan Strait. Moscow’s Ukraine gambit appears designed to probe the Biden administration — to ferret out its red lines and ascertain whether Washington is willing to commit troops to defend its
The State Bank of India has raised US$300 million from the Taiwanese market through a maiden issue of Formosa bonds at a coupon rate of 2.49 percent. The issuance attracted a wide range of investors, such as supranational agencies, asset managers, private bankers and financial institutions. Meanwhile, the Indian government has also started talks with Taiwan on a free-trade agreement. These developments would normally have been treated as a routine affair between India and Taiwan, but as the countries do not enjoy formal ties, and India has in the past remained hesitant to sign a free-trade agreement with Taiwan, the activities
Treason, in legal terms, is when a person is disloyal to their own nation, as opposed to their government. In the US context, Oran’s Dictionary of the Law defines treason as “the crime ... committed by a US citizen who helps a foreign government to overthrow, make war against, or seriously injure the US” — again, as opposed to the US government. Former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅) was the first Taiwanese to encourage China to unify with Taiwan by force. Appearing on Chinese television, he called for “reunification,” saying that Beijing should aim its missiles at
RSS