In the course of my in-depth reporting about the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 16th National Congress, sources in positions of authority in Beijing and Shanghai have revealed that President Jiang Zemin (
The Beijing plan is to revise the party charter to establish the offices of a party chairman and a vice chairman, both to be generated from the Political Bureau's Standing Committee. The party chairman will also serve as chairman of the Central Military Commission, under whom would be the secretariat, led by the general secretary and charged with handling the everyday affairs of the party.
To implement this plan, the party charter must be revised at the 16th National Congress. This plan has been called a "return to the order of the Eighth National Congress." In the arrangement of personnel, Jiang would hold the posts of party chairman and chairman of the Central Military Commission, while Hu Jintao (
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
The part of the Shanghai plan that comes as a surprise is that the office Jiang wants first and foremost to hold on to is that of president and not general secretary of the CCP. Over the years, in Jiang's activities abroad, foreigners have called him "president." This made him feel glorious and became the aspect of his current role that he is most reluctant to give up. The title of general secretary carries no weight abroad. However, the Constitution clearly stipulates that the president can only serve for two consecutive terms. Thus the Constitution must be amended. Jiang's team has retained legal experts to help him find some justification for doing that. They discovered that there are examples of Western countries in which the Constitution does not prevent the president from serving more than two consecutive terms in office. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) set a precedent by amending the Constitution so that he could be chairman of the Central Military Commission.
In internal communications, the plan naturally expanded into one for "holding on to everything." It is also referred to as the "comprehensive" plan, implying that Jiang, Li Peng (
Sources assert that neither of the two plans described above has been settled upon. The estimation of Jiang and his advisers is that the Beijing plan is more viable while the Shanghai plan presents greater difficulties. Some people said regretfully that a presidential system had previously been the subject of internal study and discussion. If such a system could be implemented and the Constitution amended, then remaining in office would be a matter of course. Naturally, this is no longer an option.
Thus, current arrangements give priority to the Beijing plan. It will be discussed at a meeting of the Political Bureau at Beidaihe this month in the hope of achieving a consensus. But in accord with Jiang's will, the emphasis of the Beidaihe meeting will be to move forward the reshuffle of the Central Military Commission. Jiang feels that making the Military Commission younger and more professional ("more obedient," according to one source) during his term in office will safeguard the smooth transfer of power at the 16th National Congress.
The Beidaihe meeting will also decide the roster for the Political Bureau Standing Committee at the 16th National Congress. If the party chairman plan is carried out, then Jiang Zemin, 76; Hu Jintao, 59; and Li Ruihuan (
As for the Central Military Commission, the two vice chairmen, Zhang Wannian (張萬年), 74, and Chi Haotian (遲浩田), 73, will both step down. Hu Jintao has made a point of emphasizing the need to elevate outstanding young cadres into the military commission. Jiang views the early reshuffle of the military commission as an important condition and guarantee for a smooth handover of power at the 16th National Congress. For this reason, the actual roster is top secret and can't be revealed. But sources predict that the current 76-year-old director of the General Armament Department, Cao Gangchuan (曹剛川), will be promoted from his position as a member of the military commission. Zeng Qinghong may take the post of the commission's general secretary.
Daunting task
This work to redistribute power will be an enormous task. Not only must differing opinions within the party be confronted, but opportunistic attempts by outside forces to cause trouble must also be prevented.
In early July, the party headquarters circulated a secret plan by terrorists from East Turkestan to attack Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong. The East Turkestan Organization has announced that it won't emulate the example of Osama bin Laden by slaughtering innocents. The focus of their attacks will be high-level officials and symbolic targets. The central government requested that local governments take this threat very seriously. Guangdong's number one man, Li Changchun (
Preliminary work
Sources said the party center has already completed painstaking preparations in order to prevent the unexpected. The standard for selecting representatives to the 16th National Congress requires that they must endorse the theory of the "three represents" (三個代表), endorse the party center with Jiang at its nucleus, and endorse Jiang's May 31 speech made at the Central Party School. Personnel adjustments in each major military region have already been completed a step ahead of the local party organizations. The "three represents" theory will be written into the party charter to serve as a compass to guide the party in the new century.
Jiang's desire to "reinstate the order of the Eighth National Congress" is an obvious scheme to retain the highest authority for himself by once again establishing the post of party chairman, while at the same time lifting the status of Hu Jintao. Hu would have a string of impressive titles: vice chairman of the party, general secretary, first vice chairman of the Military Commission, and president, highlighting his role as the number two man, second only to Jiang. But Jiang would maintain his grasp on the reins of power at the highest level by staying on as chief of both the party and the military. The difference between this new order and the order of the Eighth National Congress is that in Mao Zedong's (
In 1982, the CCP's 12th National Congress abolished the position of party chairman and established that of general secretary. However, this position of general secretary was quite different from that of the general secretary of the secretariat, which was scrapped by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. The party charter after the 12th National Congress clearly defines the general secretary as "the general secretary of the Central Committee." His name is not listed on the roster of the secretariat. Rather, he is the convener of the Political Bureau and its standing committee. In fact -- the modern general secretary is also the party "chairman." The fact that he is not called "chairman" is meant to emphasize collective leadership and to stay in line with the international communist movement, since the highest leaders in worker's parties and communist parties around the world have been called "first secretary" or "general secretary" since the later years of Stalin. And China's "chairmanship" had long since been corrupted beyond recognition by Mao.
Party foreman
Thus, if Hu succeeds Jiang as general secretary at the 16th National Congress, he will still be merely the foreman of a party organization.
Naturally Jiang's disregard for the taboo on using the title "chairman" will meet with resistance from more sensible factions within the party. Amid the chorus of voices urging him to stay in office, a group of party elders, who long ago caught a whiff of Jiang's reluctance to leave, have begun to act. Recently, the former chairman of the National People's Congress, Qiao Shi (
In Shanghai, many people are already privately debating Jiang's plan of "holding on to everything." They are particularly dissatisfied with his scheme to amend the Constitution. A source familiar with the internal affairs of the Shanghai clique has revealed that Jiang's aides shield him from the reaction of the public and critics overseas toward his reluctance to leave office. They simply comply with his wishes and tell him what he wants to hear, emphasizing how many provincial committees and military regions support him. (At least eastern China has already been secured.)
There are also people waiting to watch the "fireworks." They believe that sooner or later Jiang's plans will fall apart. It will be especially difficult for him to fend off US reaction. Besides, although the common people have no power, there are still opposition forces within the party and the army that can't be lightly dismissed. Thus, once matters come to a head, it is possible that Jiang may be forced to step down.
Hsia Wen-si
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