Transatlantic disputes are multiplying at the very moment that Europe's Constitutional Convention begins to debate a joint EU foreign policy. Ralf Dahrendorf thinks that both sides of the Atlantic need to look beyond the trivial and rediscover the common interests and values of the West.
Hardly a week goes by without some addition to the already long list of European-American gripes and irritants. One week it is the UN Security Council vote about a continued US presence in the Bosnia peacekeeping mission.
Before that the setting up of the International Criminal Court without US participation set both sides on edge, and the question of whether the Palestinians should be told whom not to elect as their leader. Israel and the Palestinians remain a subject of profound Europe-US disagreements, as are issues surrounding the environment and the idea of sustainable development. Add to these US trade sanctions, America's latest farm bill, and of course the whole question of alleged or real US unilateralism.
Fortunately, such spats are not the whole truth. American unilateralism is in fact a form of "multilateralism a la carte." Where it suits American interests, international institutions are happily used, and they usually serve European interests.
Also one must never forget that we are talking about democracies. In the US, as in Europe, there are many different views about Bosnia, about Arafat, even about protecting farmers. After all, not every American voted for President George W. Bush, nor is every European a Eurofederalist.
Still, when representatives of the US and the EU meet for formal consultations, they arrive at the table with different perceptions. US participants represent a country at war in which energies are concentrated on defeating the enemy, "terrorism," whether of the al-Qaeda or Iraqi variety.
EU participants on the other hand represent ... well, what exactly? If the issue is trade, then the answer is clear. Insofar as the EU is a "single market," it is represented by Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy.
If the issue is competition, Commissioner Mario Monti represents Europe, stridently so, as Americans have learned to their surprise. But as soon as we move to wider issues of foreign and defense policy, Xavier Solana, the high representative of the EU Council of Ministers, may be at the telephone number that former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger famously could never find in Brussels when he wanted to "speak to Europe" in his day, but Solana is hardly in a position to speak for "Europe" in important matters today.
European attitudes demonstrate the consequences. Americans are right to point out that Europeans spend an undue amount of time consulting among themselves, and then come up with very little. Most of the time, they agree only to try to put the brakes on firm action.
They are reluctant. "Don't go too fast in welcoming Russia to NATO!" "Don't go too far in supporting Israel and neglecting the Palestinians!" "Don't extend the fight against terrorism to the producers of weapons of mass destruction!"
What should be done instead? "Political solutions" should be found, which really means that the European method of consensus building without firm action should be applied to the world at large.
Sometimes the two methods -- consultation without action in Europe, actions without consultation in the US -- can be turned to mutual advantage.
If Europeans do not want to go to war, and Americans do not want to get involved in protracted processes of institution building in distant places, an obvious potential for an international division of labor emerges. To some extent it is practiced already both in Afghanistan and in the Balkans.
At other times, a dangerous potential for division arises between Europeans and the US. Quite a few in Europe define the EU as an instrument for holding their own against the US. They see even the euro as a weapon against the dollar and rejoice when the euro is "strong" and the dollar is "weak."
The US has found a new "empire of evil" in "terrorist" states and organizations; Europe has found a new adversary who helps it integrate in the US. This is a dangerous state of affairs for those on either side of the Atlantic who believe in the values of the enlightenment and in the constitution of liberty.
In terms of basic values, there is such a thing as the West. After Sept. 11th, it has become more important than ever. Defending the values of the West against anti-enlightenment forces both within and without may well be the most important task ahead for all who believe in liberty.
It is unfortunate that some in the US, and many in Europe, seem to have forgotten, at least temporarily, that this is what our efforts are all about. Europeans do not want to fight, not even for their basic values, and Americans think they are fighting only as patriots of their great country. Neither vision is good enough. Rediscovering the West and the institutions that go with it, and defending them with whatever it takes, is the primary issue on the agenda of liberty today.
Ralf Dahrendorf, the author of numerous acclaimed books, is a member of the British House of Lords, a former rector of the London School of Economics and also a former warden of St. Anthony's College, Oxford.
Copyright: Project Syndicate and Institute for Human Sciences
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