Beijing has pursued three policies to attain its objective of absorbing Taiwan. For many years the military option has received the most attention, but it has been effectively blocked by the US. The economic option was ineffective until just recently, when the "China fever" among Taiwan's business community overcame the more security-conscious caution of the past. This change is still in process but it clearly seems to be moving in a favorable direction for Beijing. The option of isolating Taiwan in the international community is now taking on added efforts by China.
Taiwan has looked abroad for its military defense, but got little response except from the US. It pursued its economic growth by turning to international markets. That has worked up to now and may still do so though the window of continuing opportunity has certainly narrowed. Its third lifeline, "becoming a part of the international community," has done well given the circumstances, but has never been strong, and is now facing a much more robust effort by China to block it in any form.
Beijing has often accused the US of trying to "contain" China. While the US can pursue an old-fashioned balance of power strategy (ie, with India or Russia), the effectiveness of that policy compared to the containment achieved against the former USSR is simply not likely in today's world. In any event, containment would require the cooperation of many countries around the world, and at this time, that, too, is unlikely.
The containment policy China is pursuing against Taiwan also needs the cooperation, or at least a non-interference attitude, by a sufficient number of important countries to be effective. The containment policy against the former USSR was supported by the realization among the democracies (and non-communist authoritarian regimes) that it was in their collective interest to prevent the expansion of commu-nism. If one traveled in the Eastern Bloc in the 1950s and for many years thereafter, one could see the devastating effect a real containment had. One can see now how difficult such a strategy would be today.
China's basis for its ability to conduct a containment policy today is economic, however. Most countries consider it in their interest to expand economic relations with China. The incentive to participate in containing the USSR was to protect against communism and it lasted until communism collapsed. The incentive to participate in China's containment policy against Taiwan, however, can fluctuate with the changes in the direction and vigor of the economic relationship. Should growth in China slow down or be interrupted by social or political unrest, interest in pleasing China and participating in its intimidation of Taiwan may waiver.
At a US Congressional hearing about Taiwan some years ago, a member asked a question of the the five panelists who had made a presentation. "What element of sovereignty does Taiwan not have," the member asked. The consensus of the panelists was that recognition by the international community was its weakest link.
Perhaps with that in mind, Beijing is now increasing its efforts to intimidate the international community into supporting its effort to block almost any activity abroad by Taiwan, no matter how inconsequential -- demanding removal of ROC flags or logos at a commercial exhibition in the US, for example. More seriously, there has been a public warning by China to the international community not to negotiate free trade agreements with Taiwan. There has been little if any reaction anywhere, despite its clear challenge to the sovereign right of any country -- something China itself would oppose.
Bilaterally, notarized documents from Taiwan are now being rejected. China has refused to negotiate trade disputes with Taiwan within the WTO framework, a clear requirement for membership. It has blocked essential sub-agreements within the WTO context, on customs and government procurement, a right that every member has. Here too, there has been little public objection to these violations.
Taiwan seems to be pursuing a policy of low-profile complaints about such actions by Beijing and low-profile efforts to solicit support from other countries. Up until the 1990s, this low-profile meant attaining its objectives had always been Taiwan's policy. Then the policy was altered as democracy took hold, both because low-profile and democracy are a contradiction in terms and therefore impossible to control, and because it was felt that Taiwan was being buried under a "one China"
umbrella by both Beijing and Washington. In some cases high-profile actions to raise Taiwan's image in the international community caused some unhappiness in the US and outrage in Beijing.
In some respects, low profile seems to have crept back as a general policy. With the expansion of cross-strait economic ties, there are now more domestic reasons for this stance. External reasons for this change may be the result of an over interpretation of what "provocation" means. Reactions to Beijing's activities that harm Taiwan should not be seen as provocative. However, a soft reaction can be potentially harmful in that the public attention is not drawn to the potential harm to Taiwan of these Chinese actions.
Raising a higher profile on such matters may not always be welcome in the US and Beijing will inevitably be outraged. But if they are clearly seen as responses to specific actions by China, they are more likely to be taken as justifiable. Thanks to international media support the vigorous objection to the Lions Clubs International's move to change the Taiwan chapter's name at the request of two new Chinese chapters brought a temporary compromise with further negotiations to follow. It was the high-profile objection that brought about a backing off from China's demands a good example to follow.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expres-sed in this article are his own.
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