With the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 16th National Congress only two months away, there has been much speculation about how President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) will hand over his posts. The succession issue has attracted great attention, as befits a matter which concerns the future of China and also has a close bearing on the global strategic situation and the triangular relations between the US, China and Taiwan.
Ever since Jiang's anointed successor, Vice President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), visited the US in early May, there have been many rumors about the succession. There are at least five reasons for this.
First, the pro-Jiang faction believes that Hu lacks experience and needs a period of in-service training before he can assume the heavy responsibility of taking over the helm. During the crisis over the EP-3 collision off Hainan island last year, Hu stood in for Jiang -- who was visiting South America -- by chairing the National Security Leading Group (國家安全領導小組) and handling the crisis. But Hu was overly cautious and asked for Jiang's instructions on every trifle. The pro-Jiang faction interpreted his attitude as indicative of a lack of resolution and an inability to handle important issues.
Second, as China's political, social and economic situations are rapidly changing, the pro-Jiang faction believes that Hu is not capable of dealing with the worsening domestic problems. Moreover, Jiang's "Three Represents" dictum (the CCP represents the most advanced forces of production, the greatest culture and the fundamental interests of the people), which has just been implemented, will be directly handed over to Hu without going through a period of transition. The policy could soon be discarded after Jiang steps down.
Third, since US President George W. Bush and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) took office, the international situation and relations across the Taiwan Strait have gradually become dangerous. This is beyond the capability of fourth-generation leaders. Jiang feels it's his duty to personally lead Beijing's Taiwan policy, which centers around his "Eight Points" and its non-confrontational, but independent, policy toward the US.
Fourth, since pro-Jiang mem-bers hold important posts in the government and the party, Jiang's remaining in office naturally serves their interests.
Fifth, like most leaders, Jiang himself believes that staying on at his post or lengthening his tenure is in the nation's interests.
The succession from Jiang to Hu could unfold in a number of ways.
First, Hu serves as a nominal president while Jiang stays on as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the CCP's secretary-general. Apparently controlled by Jiang, Hu can only nod to whatever Jiang says, as evident in a rural study conference held in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, at the end of last month, where Hu repeatedly mentioned the "Three Represents."
It is reasonable to predict, in this scenario, that Jiang will stay in power for at least several years to make sure that Hu makes a reliable successor who will diligently implement his "Three Represents."
As for foreign affairs, Jiang also believes it is necessary for Hu to observe whether he can "run a big country just as he would fry small fish" (治大國如烹小鮮), to borrow a phrase ancient Chinese sage Lao Tzu (老子) wrote in the Tao Te Ching (道德經). What might be most worthwhile for Hu to learn would be how to strike a balance between not confronting the US and protecting developing countries from US attacks.
A second scenario would see Hu, Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) and Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅) serving as president, premier and CCP secretary-general respectively. The three would thus serve to contain one another and Jiang would be an arbitrator in his capacity as CMC chairman. Placed in such a triumvirate, Hu might be tempted to show unnecessary animosity over the Taiwan issue or friendly US gestures toward Taiwan, in order to bolster his power or to win over Jiang's trust, much as Premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) did when he bared his fangs and adopted a menacing demeanor before Taiwan's presidential election in 2000.
On the other hand, power struggles in Zhongnanhai -- whether under the table or aboveboard -- might provide opportunities for Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan independence activists to exploit. Infighting will even further worsen the encirclement China has faced in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the US. Chinese leaders will become even more powerless to act on the promise Jiang made on his visit to Iran in April -- to prevent the arrogant US from attacking developing countries.
Third, even if Hu succeeds in assuming the three key posts -- state president, secretary general of the CCP and chairman of the CMC -- he will still have to obey Jiang's orders as long as Jiang controls the top positions among the four groups that handle foreign affairs, Taiwan affairs, US policy and national security. In that scenario, Jiang will remain the regent and Hu will be the nominal leader. International figures, especially US and Taiwan-ese leaders, will regard Jiang as China's real chief and the person they have to contact.
China's real leader needs no title. But Jiang is no Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and even Deng did not step down until he had held the CMC chairmanship for several years.
The succession issue concerns not just China's development. How Hu implements the empty "Three Represents" dictum will have a bearing on the global strategy of the US and US-China-Taiwan relations.
In the eyes of Zhongnanhai, the succession issue is more a matter of whether Jiang's political, diplomatic and cross-strait policies will be continued or discontinued.
Edward Chen is a director and professor of the Graduate Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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