President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has said that he is considering "entrusting civil society" to negotiate direct links with China. This has been welcomed by the director of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), who immediately named people he thinks should represent Taiwan. Unrestrained media embellishment immediately made this a topic of impassioned debate. Does it really merit such attention?
First, what does "entrust" mean? It means that something that would normally be handled by government is temporarily handed to someone outside government. It is a form of delegation. The delegated powers and responsibilities, however, will be clearly defined.
Under no circumstances will the delegates be permitted to freely judge and decide independently on whether to give or take. Just like state officials sent abroad, the delegates will have to adhere strictly to official supervision and accept control by Taipei before, during and after negotiations; on the matter of the type of suggestions, conditions, concessions and compromises that can be made; and the kinds of agreements that can be signed.
All these matters must be approved by Taipei and official instructions may not be breached. Even when national representatives reach agreements while abroad, international practice says that these agreements must be ratified by relevant national authorities before taking effect (This is true in normal international relations. It is of course a different story if Taiwan is seen as a local government within China).
If, therefore, anyone thinks that someone entrusted with negotiating direct links can simply do as he pleases, they are sorely mistaken.
In his speech, the president also proposed a number of negotiating criteria for unofficial bodies, such as that Taiwan must not, "be belittled, localized or marginalized." These were only preliminary instructions. I believe that more detailed plans will be put forward gradually, since Chen emphasizes that government should "direct, participate and intervene in negotiations."
China says that it would appoint a corresponding organization from "civil society" to participate in negotiations if Taipei were to send a representative from its civil society. But how can there be such a thing as a "civil organization" in a totalitarian system, where the people's lives are completely and totally controlled by the Communist Party and the government?
Second is the choice of personnel. If Taiwan really wants to send "a representative from civil society," the personal opinion, integrity, public credibility and loyalty of this representative are all important issues. The entrusting of someone outside government with the handling of matters of national importance demands that a high priority be given to consideration of each of these issues.
The reason the late US president Richard Nixon dared send Henry Kissinger as his secret envoy to Beijing to engage in discussions on the establishment of diplomatic relations was that Nixon had been known throughout his life for his fervent opposition to communism. He therefore did not have to worry that the American people would fear that he would sell out US interests by ingratiating himself with Beijing. Indeed, even after the event, the American people never doubted Nixon's loyalty.
The reality in Taiwan, however, is that each time someone negotiates with China, people worry that Taiwan might be sold out. Therefore the government must seek someone whose integrity and loyalty are beyond reproach. This is no easy task. If the government follows the "Nixon logic," I fear that it will only have a pool of "anti-unificationists" to choose from. If it sends someone who firmly believes that direct links are a cure-all, however, that would be like sending someone during a war with a white flag in hand, openly advocating surrender in order to negotiate peace.
I don't know what such a representative would have to discuss apart from simply reporting to the enemy that, "We surrender." (When a top-level KMT delegation went to the Chinese Communist Party to negotiate the end of the Chinese civil war, all of them ended up surrendering and no one returned).
Third is the the issue of conflicts of interest. The people of Taiwan have paid a high price for the last dozen years of democratization, but one thing remains out of reach. That is strict adherence to the principle of avoiding conflicts of interest. This means that politicians must avoid situations which could give rise to legitimate concerns of such a conflict of interest.
Whether we can rely on our politicians to do this is related to the question of whether we are truly capable of establishing a genuinely fair and healthy democratic society. Without exception, therefore, all democratic countries are extremely sensitive to this issue and do their utmost to make it a universal principle that is strictly observed, especially by representatives of the people and the media.
Perhaps I can give a few examples. When the US was debating the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), The New York Times published an editorial in support of NAFTA. After the editorial had been published, it was discovered that The New York Times Company held investments in a certain South American country. Once this was discovered, the Times immediately published a statement saying that it should have avoided publishing an opinion on the matter. It apologized to its readers and to society at large.
China's recommendation of specified people as Taiwan's representatives and the subsequent media reports that the named persons hold investments worth billions and even tens of billions of US dollars in China, makes it quite clear that direct links have a substantial bearing on the interests of these parties.
To avoid conflicts of interest, the people involved shouldn't even publish opinions about direct links, much less take positions as representatives of Taiwan to nego-tiate them.
No wonder someone has described Chen Yunlin's suggestion of certain names as "asking the devil to issue a prescription." I'm afraid to say, however, that it is the same when it comes to several other industrial giants.
A leading academic researcher in Taiwan has publicly voiced his support for eight-inch wafer manufacturers to move to China. The media have reported that not only did the man's wife own large amounts of stock in electronics companies, but the organization that he heads has received enormous contributions from eight-inch wafer manufacturers. So even leading intellectuals will not avoid conflicts of interest even when they are fully aware of their existence.
Fourth is the issue of equality and dignity. Most Taiwanese like to say that the relationship with China must be one of equality and dignity. It is therefore startling to hear Chinese officials actually specify in public who should represent Taiwan.
In normal (ie, equal) diplomatic relations, it would be absurd -- not to say humiliating in the extreme -- for one country publicly to specify a person from another country to represent that other country. Not even when the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union was at its most tense did we hear of any of the parties specifying who should represent the other. China's attitude and behavior once again proves what Taiwan really amounts to in Beijing's eyes.
Fifth, China must abandon slogans and adopt substance.
In his speech, Chen Yunlin did not mention "one China," the "1992 consensus" or "the use of military force." The media in Taiwan and politicians jumped with joy, saying that China had changed its policies and adopted a softer stance.
The fact of the matter is, China's fundamental policy that Taiwan is part of China has not changed one whit. All we are seeing is a change in strategy. Rather than formalities and slogans, it now wants substantial benefits and results. It still insists that cross-strait transportation links are a matter of domestic transportation, that air links are a matter of domestic aviation and that cross-strait tourism is a matter of domestic tourism. All other exchanges are seen as domestic exchanges.
Taiwan's politicians and industrialists, striving eagerly for short-term gain, naturally neither mind nor question this. If, however, Taiwan falls into the trap and wide swaths of society accept this reasoning, the people of Taiwan will one day wake up and find that the whole world already believes that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic issue of the PRC.
It will then be too late for regrets, for China will have achieved its goal. Furthermore, listen to what China says now -- "Anyone representing Taiwan must acknowledge that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait constitute one country, and that direct links between the two sides are a domestic affair of that country."
Peng Ming-min is a senior advisor to the president. This is the first part of a two-part article. Part two will appear tomorrow.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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