On May 21, Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, stated that Beijing would not raise the "one China" principle or the "1992 consensus," nor would it describe direct links as a domestic matter. Chen also expressed the hope that Taiwan would authorize non-government entities to negotiate direct links with China as soon as possible. Chen's statements created widespread bewilderment in Taiwan, with some people even commenting that these conditions were "simply too relaxed."
Equally puzzling was the reaction of Taiwan's opposition. In the past, the opposition has repeatedly berated the government for not making progress on direct links, saying that Beijing's offer -- that negotiations on the matter would be possible as long as Taiwan accepted the "one China" principle -- was "full of goodwill." Now, however, the opposition says that Chen's statement that Beijing wouldn't raise the issue of "one China" is likewise full of goodwill.
This is really strange. Some-how, according to the opposition, raising the issue of "one China" -- and not raising the issue -- are both expressions of goodwill. It seems that anytime Beijing brings something up, it becomes a goodwill gesture, regardless of the inconsistency of the message. By contrast, anything brought up by the Taiwan government is "insincere." This is what the opposition said when President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) gave his speech on Tatan island. Perhaps the opposition thinks that the way to warm cross-strait relations, create peace and promote direct links is to accommodate Beijing by every means possible. It appears, however, that this is not the way things really are.
The simplest way to handle the direct-links issue has always been for governments on both sides of the Strait to "separate economics from politics," and base negotiations on economic realities. The problem is that both sides have their fair share of ideological baggage, cluttering the road of already complex trade negotiations with a huge pile of political boulders.
In the past, the KMT was the problem. Beijing originally hoped that official negotiations could be held. At that time, Taiwan was afraid this would be tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of Beijing's authority. It was Taiwan's refusal to come to the table that prompted the creation of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, 海基會), a strange agency that is non-government in name, but official in substance.
Now, however, not only has Beijing changed from its former position, it has also piled up numerous political preconditions that must be met before it will be willing to send officials to the negotiating table. Beijing has even flatly refused to participate in semi-official talks with the SEF, contending that only a "purely non-government" arrangement is acceptable. No wonder it's so difficult to get cross-strait negotiations going.
The principle that "the Taiwan issue must be viewed from the strategic high point" -- which was set by former China president Yang Shangkun (
Strategic configurations do change, however. A February article in the Washington Post pointed out the differences between China's hard-liners and pragmatists. Even if these two factions' objectives are the same, their methods differ. The pragmatists advocate that economics should be divorced from politics as much as possible. For now, the pragmatists clearly have the upper hand. Unfortunately, Taiwan's opposition members seem to think Beijing remains rigid and unyielding. They stubbornly cling to Beijing's past pre-conditions, demanding that the Taiwan government accept these pre-conditions. This has resulted in a string of ridiculous performances.
Last year, when KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) were stressing repeatedly that without the "1992 consensus" and "one China" there would be no cross-strait trade talks, China's Taiwan affairs spokesman Zhang Mingqing (張銘清) suddenly announced that "China has never stated that Taiwan must recognize `one China.' All Taiwan needs to do is to see cross-strait relations as an internal affair." This year, when Lien and Soong emphasized that, as long as political problems were unresolved, it would be impossible to proceed with cross-strait economic and trade negotiations, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) immediately came out and stated that "political conflict across the Strait should not hinder the development of trade."
Later, when Lien and Soong were saying that it would be impossible to resolve the cross-strait issue unless political questions and questions of national status were clearly defined, Wang Zaixi (王在希), deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, came forward and stated, "Only by adopting an ambiguous policy can we overcome the problem."
Then, when the opposition was saying that Chen Shui-bian was insincere in his efforts to promote the direct links, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) commented, "China is aware of the fact that Taiwan has changed a few policies it previously insisted on, such as `no haste, be patient.'" Of course, as Chen's Tatan island speech was being criticized domestically as lacking sincerity, Beijing's Chen Yunlin made a response that Taiwan's opposition called "most friendly."
It really seems as if the opposition parties are applying even stricter standards than Beijing in their demands for Taiwan to yield to China. Why is this so? For ideological reasons? Or do they want Beijing's help to deal with Taiwan's government for their own political reasons?
The most forgiving explanation is probably that they have no understanding of Beijing's res-ponse to the changing international strategic situation.
Whatever the reason is, however, this behavior is detrimental to the development of cross-strait relations and even to the development of direct links, since the hawks in Beijing can claim to have "the support of public opinion in Taiwan" when they oppose adjustments implemented by Beijing's pragmatists. As a result, what was meant to be conducive to establishment of direct links has become an obstacle.
For example, when officials from Chinese shipping companies were asked why Beijing is complicating things by sticking to its "one China" principle, they replied that "Your Wang Yung-ching [王永慶, chairman of Formosa Plastics Group] also supports it!"
Beijing has noted that the trends of public opinion were expressed through Chen Shui-bian's election and last Decem-ber's legislative elections. They have also noted the efforts of Taiwan's government toward the establishment of direct links -- as well as the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the international strategic situation brought on by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. And they need to respond to all these things.
They have of course also noted that, as Chen Yunlin said, "if the cross-strait shipping market continues developing in this manner, it will become monopolized by foreign capital." Indeed, due to China's boycott, Pusan has overtaken Kaohsiung to become the world's third largest container port, and Evergreen Marine Corporation (長榮海運) must register their ships in the UK and Italy. China will probably not be able to avoid similar harm.
If the opposition parties are to make good in the area of cross-strait relations, the biggest job will be to revise the Statute Governing the Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (兩岸人民關係條例). Re-member that because China sees the issue from a strategic vantage point, Taiwan -- goodwill aside -- needs a similar or even better vantage point. If not, Taiwan will find itself moving closer to the hawks in Beijing and falling out of touch with the pragmatists.
As a result, even if they want to help promote the establishment of the direct links, they will actually make matters worse. It goes without saying that harming the in-terests of Taiwan will not be beneficial to improving cross-strait relations.
Lin Cho-shui is a DPP legislator.
Translated by Scudder Smith and Perry Svensson
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS