Christine Tsung (宗才怡) finally stepped down on March 20 as minister of economic affairs. When the TV news reported that Tsung had offered her resignation, I believe many who truly "love Taiwan" breathed a sigh of relief both for Taiwan's economy and for Tsung.
Obviously, Tsung must be a talented, capable and well-educated woman. Being all that, however, does not necessarily mean she is suitable for a government post. Nor do "her outstanding oratorical and English abilities," as characterized by Cabinet Secretary-General Lee Ying-yuan (
Although many were initially surprised by the appointment, more than a few praised the government leaders' choice, given Tsung's glamorous appearance and graceful manners. Nevertheless, after a few rounds of legislative interpellations, we came to realize that she didn't even have the most basic understanding of Taiwan's economy.
I personally was very frightened. How could the appointment of Cabinet members be conducted in such a ridiculous manner?
The administration of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has stumbled and tripped all the way since it came to power. This has made many feel anxious and uneasy. They want to help but don't know how. Even a former DPP chairman such as myself has been repeatedly disappointed. I started by providing suggestions in private, then began firing criticism in public and eventually gave up and sadly walked away. I would rather be down and out than rank among the authorities who share power and interests.
When I was young, I opposed the late Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his dictatorial government, because the "rule of man" that he adopted -- as opposed to the "rule of law" -- had no respect for a governmental system. The rule of man had been unable to build a modern government system in Taiwan. In fact, my major concern about Chen over the past two years has been that his style is very similar to that of Chiang and the late Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos. Tsung's case has worsened my worries even further.
There is a simple and clear standard through which we can determine whether a government is a dictatorial one that adopts the rule of man: Do institutionalized mechanisms for policy-making and personnel appointment exist? These two mechanisms did not exist when the Chiang family was at the helm. In the past, no one dared question why "Reconquering the mainland and vanquishing the Communists" (反攻大陸, 消滅共匪) was national policy. Nor did anyone dare to question how the nation's supreme diplomatic guideline -- "Gentlemen cannot coexist with thugs" (漢賊不兩立) -- was formed. At the time, only the Chiang family had the power to appoint high-ranking officials.
Some have criticized former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) for being dictatorial. But upon close examination and observation, I have found that, when Lee was in power, the government had more institutionalized policy-making and personnel appointment mechanisms. At least, most state policies and personnel appointments did not simply fall down from the sky or Lee's pocket list. This was perhaps related to Lee's background, since he received his higher education in Japan and had a deep understanding of the political philosophy of the Japanese government system after the Meiji Reform.
National policies are the basis of a nation's future direction. There should be a mechanism through which a policy is proposed, discussed and then decided. Although the right to appoint high-ranking officials belongs solely to the president and the premier, all government posts are considered national resources, not private ones. Appointing high-ranking officials according to the president's personal preferences, rather than through an established mechanism, constitutes a rule of man. When there is no such mechanism, naturally, there can't be any respect for political traditions.
In Chinese political traditions, high-ranking officials are typically appointed to two different sectors -- "gong" (宮) and "fu" (府). The word "gong" refers to the imperial palace or today's Presidential Office; the word "fu" refers to the office of an imperial prime minister or today's Executive Yuan. Those who work at an imperial palace or the Presidential Office are responsible for handling the emperor or president's private or secret affairs. Those who work at an imperial prime minister's office or the Executive Yuan are responsible for handling state affairs only.
Traditionally, a palace butler would not be appointed as prime minister and a secretary-general to the president would not be appointed as premier so as to avoid blurring the lines of private and public affairs, although such appointments are not expressly prohibited by law. Even the Chiang family and Lee never appointed any of their secretary-generals as premier.
As someone who has devoted a lifetime to democracy and human rights, my biggest worry and fear concerning Chen's administration is the ambiguity of government structures and the lack of policy-making and personnel appointment mechanisms. No wonder DPP Chairman Frank Hsieh (
From this perspective, perhaps it would be a good thing for Chen to hold the party chairman's post concurrently. At least it would oblige him to brief the DPP Central Standing Committee on state affairs every week. Even if he only briefs the committee on state affairs and does not debate those affairs with them, it will still be better than the current situation, in which the party doesn't know a thing about national policies or personnel appointments.
If such a political tradition can be formed after Chen begins serving concurrently as DPP chairman, it will be the beginning of the establishment of the nation's policy-making and personnel appointment mechanisms. This way, Chen will learn that national affairs are not household affairs and that personnel affairs are not personal affairs either.
If Tsung's resignation can lead Chen, the DPP and the Taiwanese people to realize the importance and urgency of building policy-making and personnel appointment mechanisms, that will be part of her contribution to Taiwan.
Shih Ming-teh is a former DPP chairman.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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