In 1986 Taiwan's dissidents overcame the restrictions imposed on them by martial law to declare the establishment of the DPP. The party was founded not only to oppose the continuation of the KMT's autocractic rule and human rights violations, but also to pursue the "localization" of Taiwan's politics and, ultimately, independent sovereignty.
The DPP was founded with the ideal of promoting quality demo-cracy. This was because the KMT had declared in 1975 that the survival and development of the ROC in Taiwan required the establishment of a system of government distinguishable from China's communist regime, the continued improvement of democracy and the existence of a social structure based on the free market.
The KMT ruled China for 39 years. After it became a government in exile, it ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu for nearly 50 years. Facing the rise of new "localized" parties, the KMT began to speed up its recruitment of Taiwan's elite.
The KMT amended the Law on People's Organization During the Period of Communist Rebellion (動員戡亂時期人民團體法) in 1989, making the DPP a legal party. The DPP's charter contains a clause that advocates Taiwan's independence from the PRC and an acknowledgement that its sovereignty does not reach China. The KMT found this so-called "Taiwan independence clause" shocking.
In addition to reinforcing surveillance of core DPP officials, the KMT also closely watched the party's popular support. When the DPP gained about a 10 percent share of the vote in the election for the Legislative Yuan, the KMT began to turn a blind eye to all sorts of vote-buying practices in an effort to stop its competitor's growth. The hope was that the KMT would be able to maintain control of the Legislative Yuan.
The DPP declared in its party charter its advocacy for Taiwan's right to self-determination. This is a clause on how independence is to be attained, rather than an outright declaration of Taiwan's independence.
When the DPP first entered the Legislative Yuan, it proposed the granting of pardons to political prisoners, the abolishment of the National Mobilization Law (國家總動員法) and other temporary laws, a return to constitutional government, a total legislative re-election and the opening up of popular elections for mayors and provincial governors. At the next elections, the party garnered about one-third of the seats.
The DPP had indeed ushered in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It made a deep impact on the development of Taiwan's democracy and the establishment of Taiwan's mainstream popular will.
During Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) presidency, the Constitution was amended six times. During this time, the legislature underwent total re-elections, a system for direct presidental elections was installed and the Taiwan Provincial Government was downsized. As a result, the process of Tai-wan's democratization was sped up, seriously widening the gap in democratic development between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
"Taiwan consciousness" blossomed in central and southern Taiwan at an amazing speed. By the time Lee declared the existence of a special state-to-state relationship across the Strait, his support had jumped to 80 percent.
The DPP followed-up Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) election as president in 2000 with victories in last December's legislative elections, setting the stage for it to become the biggest party in the legislature. Therefore, the existence of Taiwan's sovereignty, independent from the PRC, is already an undeniable fact.
The organizational structure of the DPP was modeled after that of the KMT, which utilized a Leninist-style revolutionary model of organization. The organization focuses on mass movements to break through social and political barriers so as to expand the party's support base and promote "localized" political ideologies.
DPP lawmakers are familiar with maneuvering as an opposition party in the legislature. However, they are inexperienced when it comes to acting as a ruling party. The party lacks economic, financial, tax and business management experts and specialists. As a result of its inexperience and the involvement of most of its members with social and political issues, the DPP lacks knowledge and training when its comes to the economy and finance.
Long involved with social movements and often working with environmental, labor and other minority groups to stand up to the business sector, the DPP is seen as having a deep-rooted anti-business sentiment. In the party's early stages, almost every DPP legislative representative was an important figure in grassroots demonstrations. At the time, with less than one-third of the seats in the legislature, the DPP had to resort to physical confrontation and disrupting legislative sessions in order to get its voice heard during the reviews of bills.
Victory arrived for the DPP earlier than expected with the 2000 presidential election. It has had a difficult time adjusting to its new role.
With its political culture and ability to legislate needing improvement, the DPP is still struggling to distinguish between the roles of the party and the government and to align the relationship between the two.
The functions and responsibilities of the party chairman and the members of the central standing committee, the relations between the president and the party and the interplay between the ruling and the opposition parties are still in a period of conflict and cooperation. They have not established functional and permanent comprehensive relationships.
Is the DPP merely an election machine? Or is it a machine specializing in winning popular support? Or is it a policy-making think tank? These issues await clarification and resolution.
By electing Chen, the people of Taiwan declared to the international community that "Taiwan is standing up." In last month's elections, the DPP took 87 seats, gaining the support of 39 percent of voters. The DPP is also "standing up."
Taiwan is not only standing up, it is also moving into the international community. However, it still has a long way to go before winning international acceptance.
Can Chen resolve the "one China" dilemma and put to rest ethnic problems in Taiwan? The people of Taiwan have doubts about Chen in this regard. Can he shape the structure of Taiwan's popular will? Should Taiwan take on a presidential or co-habitation system of government? What kind of economic development strategy should be adopted? Which road should Taiwan take? The people are watching Chen's moves.
The DPP's 87 legislative seats, together with the 13 of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, do not consti-tute a majority. On the other hand, the opposition pan-blue camp has completed a preliminary integration. The "one China" ideal, upon which the pan-blue camp is basing its hopes for a return to power, remains a variable in Taiwan's political stability.
Chen hopes to stabilize the political scene with a presidential system of government. However, the pan-blue opposition continues to disregard the fact that an amendment to the Constitution, under which the president now appoints the premier, has already made the government quasi-presidential. In fact, the pan-blue camp vociferously demands that Chen accept the "one China" principle and a co-habitation form of government.
Chen seeks to install a presidential system of government and organize a "combat Cabinet." This would grant the popularly-elected president the power to preside over the nation's affairs. He would then be able to rely on Lee's think tank, Taiwan Advocates (群策會), to help round up enough support so that the pan-green alliance would be backed by a legislative majority. This would allow for the creation of a finance-and-economy-oriented Cabinet.
The DPP needs to expand its interpersonal relationships and communication skills in order to recruit the support of opposition lawmakers for constitutional amendments.
The key to Chen's efforts to revive the economy is his ability to organize a finance-and-economy-oriented Cabinet to help deal with Taiwan's accession to the WTO. Taiwan experienced negative economic growth of 2 percent last year and the number of unemployed grew to 530,000. To cope with this economic downturn, a capable Cabinet is needed.
Helping with the restructuring of businesses, improving Taiwanese industry's global competitiveness, reorganizing the government for improved efficiency, completing a new wave of constitutional amendments and the safeguarding of Taiwan's sovereignty are all top DPP priorities.
Lee Chang-kuei is the president of the Taipei Times and a professor emeritus at National Taiwan University. This is the first in a series of four articles that examines Taiwan's four major political parties. Part two will appear tomorrow.
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