In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks on the US, analysts feared that Taiwan would be used as a bargaining chip by Beijing, to be exchanged for China's support for the US-led war on terrorism. But US President George W. Bush's pledge not to sacrifice Taipei's interests quickly reassured Taiwanese politicians.
Now, some analysts have -- somewhat hastily -- concluded that the impact of the Afghan war on cross-strait relations has been positive. First, the US has strengthened its alliance with Pakistan at the expense of the PRC. Second, it has also enhanced its military cooperation with South Korea, Japan and Australia. Those countries might participate in the Theater Missile Defense program that is in part aimed at communist China. Third, Taiwan and the US signed in November last year a draft judicial pact that will institutionalize mutual cooperation to crack down on crime and maintain social order in both countries.
The reality of the impact on cross-strait relations, however, is not positive. The war in Afghanistan has indeed affected cross-strait relations, but in favor of the PRC. Beijing took the audacious step to endorse the anti-terror campaign, in spite of its unease about US leadership and the presence of US troops on its western border. Although Beijing had no guarantee about the rewards of such a policy, its position in the international system and its leverage on cross-strait relations have both significantly improved.
In the short-term, US President George W. Bush has ended the linkage between annual presidential waivers of the law and Beijing's record on human rights and weapons-proliferation abuses by granting permanent normal trade status to the PRC.
In the medium-term, the concern about low-tech devices used by terrorists could diminish the relevance of the US missile-shield project. That would indirectly hurt Taiwan's security since the missile-defense program was supposed to include Taiwan and contain communist China's growing nuclear arsenal.
In the long-term, the US policy on cross-strait relations might be affected by Beijing's increasing geopolitical weight. The role of China has clearly been upgraded by the war in Afghanistan. First, the global epicenter of instability has shifted from the Balkans and the Persian Gulf to Central Asia. The new strategic importance of Central Asia makes the PRC a key player on the international stage. The US may need Beijing to "control" Pakistan since the PRC remains a significant source of economic aid and military material for that country. Chinese cooperation could help the US to preserve regional stability and undermine both the al-Qaeda network and the dirty work of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.
Secondly, the spillover of the Afghan war to the Kashmir region, and the renewed tensions between India and Pakistan, also give more strategic value to Beijing, since China controls a slice of Kashmir. The PRC has an obvious interest in lowering tensions between India and Pakistan: India remains a regional rival while Pakistan is a key ally. Beijing could conceivably cooperate with the US to contain the Kashmir crisis.
Ironically, Taiwan has lost some leverage on cross-strait relations, though not so much because of the direct impact of the Afghan war. In fact, the indirect impact has hurt Taiwan's interests much more. Beijing gained more from its active diplomacy in the background, when the international community was diverted by the war on terrorism, than from any reward for its support to "Operation Enduring Freedom."
In that respect, Taiwan's room for maneuver has shrunk since the Sept. 11 attacks. Whereas Taipei passively watched the conflict in Afghanistan and counted the diplomatic points, Beijing proved more clever by seizing the initiative.
China took advantage of the ASEAN summit held in November last year in Brunei to advance the causes of its pawns in Southeast Asia. The joint decision by Beijing and ASEAN members to establish a free-trade zone within 10 years potentially paves the way for Chinese leadership in the region. ASEAN members have implicitly accepted the replacement of US leadership in APEC by making China's economic growth the future engine for the development of the region. One dangerous implication is that Beijing's economic alliances with other countries may gradually isolate Taiwan in Southeast Asia.
Another significant strategic gain achieved by Beijing is the US$1 billion contract it recently signed with Russia for the purchase of two new Sovremenny-class destroyers. That deal not only consolidates the Russia-PRC Friendship Treaty of July last year, it also undermines Taiwan's military efforts to deter any attack from China. Russia and ASEAN were Beijing's most publicized initiatives. But Beijing has also more discreetly built an efficient regional network aimed at the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. In December last year, Chinese President Jiang Zemin (
Taiwan should quickly lose the few illusions it has about any potential gain from the Sept. 11 fallout. In strategy, it is only facts that count and Beijing has so far not renounced the use of force against Taiwan to bring about reunification, and is more active than ever to achieve that goal. Beijing still keeps on using threats and modernizing its military forces. That is the reality.
Trung Latieule is a former editorial assistant at the International Herald Tribune in France and is now a freelance reporter based in Taipei.
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