The media have recently reported that Beijing is halting its experiment with the direct election of local leaders. Academics and others following democratic development in China will likely consider the move a setback that illustrates China is still a long way from democracy.
For some time now, many academics and experts following China's grassroots-level elections and village self-government have optimistically thought that rural village elections would lay the foundation for future elections on the township, county, provincial and even national levels.
They have maintained that such incrementally expansive political development at the grassroots level will provide good preliminary conditions for the development of democracy in the country.
Typically, the traditional political modernization theory says that economic development helps promote the democratization process.
Proponents of the modernization theory will probably hold that increased economic independence for the self-governing grassroots organizations in China's villages would be helpful to their avoiding a role as appendices to China's state political and administrative organizations at the grassroots level. The development of a market economy would in particular be helpful by planting the seeds for building a civic society that protects civic rights.
Looking at it from this angle, China's accession to the WTO will have a stimulating effect on the marketization and urbanization of rural villages and on the mobility of their populations. This will provide an opportunity for extending the construction of grassroots democracy to the township, county, provincial and national levels.
First of all, market reforms will have an impact on existing political power in rural villages. This will help cultivate an independent-leaning electorate and provide peasants with the channels and opportunities for political participation and allow them to get an independent grasp of village affairs.
Barrington Moore writes in his classic work on democratization, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, that peasant society will only be able to have an active influence on democratic development when they become embroiled in commercial activity and no longer remain peasants in the traditional sense, but instead become one of the intermediate layers of modern business within a capitalist society.
If labor mobility among China's peasants and the commoditization of agriculture are increased, and if peasants enter the ranks of the middle-class, it is unavoidable that this will undermine Beijing's one-party dictatorship and may weaken the party's authoritarian functions and role.
The agricultural commodity economy in China is of course still underdeveloped and the changes to social structure are small, so party branches at the grassroots level will in the short term still remain the locus of power. After China's entry into the WTO, however, agricultural commoditization will speed up and offer an even better opportunity for democratic reform.
Second is the urbanization factor. The gradual decrease in the rural village population will cause traditional worldviews and values to gradually become more sophisticated, which is beneficial for developing the seeds of an awareness of modernity. An examination of existing facts shows that peasants in communities where the proportion of the peasant population has decreased more sharply have a higher awareness of modern law. Apart from this, in rural areas with rapidly developing agriculture, higher non-agricultural income and higher aggregate income, peasants' political participation is higher.
This means that the development of non-agricultural business helps promote peasant participation in and care for political issues involving personal interests. It also means that the industrialization of rural villages helps raise the standard and quality of political participation.
Next, there is the mobility of the population. Prior to 1979, the mobility of the rural population in China tended to be a kind of governmental, collective behavior organized and implemented by the state. After the nation began to open up, however, peasant social mobility displayed an emphasis on individual benefits due to the awakening of individual consciousness. Social mobility was no longer considered in the light of national needs, but instead in the light of personal utilitarianism, demonstrating a "secularized" emphasis on the quality of daily life.
The effects of this change are, first, that the main reason for peasant mobility is the pursuit of increased income, which may provide important resources for self-government in rural villages. Second, the new economic elite within the community will stand out and become a political elite, becoming an important supporting force in the creation of rural democracy. Next, the contradictions between officials and people will be manifested in the relationship of economic interests between the collective, officials and the people, and large migrations of village population to find work will soften the conflicting relationship between officials and the people.
Looking at it from this angle, China's accession to the WTO must promote the marketization and urbanization of rural villages and the mobility of the rural population. It can therefore be said that the dissolution of the urban-rural dichotomy and the undoing of the household registration system are premises for the promotion of economic development.
When the rural population of China moves to small towns and large and medium-sized cities, traditional villages will gradually shrink to become residential areas made up of mostly small farms. Looking at it this way suggests the meaning of democratic self-rule in traditional villages will be lost and therefore democratic elections in China's rural villages must be expanded to rural townships, towns or even higher levels.
The halting of elections of local leaders by Beijing confirms a paradoxical relationship between economic development and democratization. The communist party does not intend to reform in response to globalization and is making moves in the opposite direction, therefore ruining the golden opportunity for the development of democracy in China.
Liu Chin-tsai is a PhD candidate in the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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