When I discuss Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) with Chinese and foreign friends, nine out of 10 voice the same opinion: he never shows himself. Since he was confirmed as the leader of the fourth generation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, we have rarely seen any statements by him of analytical value. Whatever the occasion, he always expresses himself in the political language of a People's Daily editorial, not letting anyone get a hold on him. We cannot avoid paying attention to his thoughts (or to the lack of them) on the direction of the CCP following its 16th National Congress. An opportunity to assess his current position, however, presents itself today.
Hu begins a two-week European tour today that will take him to Russia, the UK, France, Spain and Germany in his dual capacity as standing member of the Political Bureau of the CCP's Central Committee and vice president of the PRC. According to official reports from Beijing, the goal of the trip is to strengthen the friendly, cooperative relationships China enjoys with these countries. This of course is absolutely meaningless diplomatic-speak. Quite clearly, this is a trip to show Hu off, to market him to the West before he takes political power at the 16th National Congress next year.
Western officials have always felt that Hu is a somewhat mysterious figure and they complain that they don't know how to deal with him. This trip is an obvious declaration that he is already beginning preparations for his accession to power.
The media have no hope of hearing any bold statements during this trip. Given Hu's unerring caution, especially on the eve of his accession, he will only use CCP-approved language. He will probably also focus on international issues, including terrorism and steer clear of Chinese politics. There will, however, be a few details that will be worth observing.
One, his send-off and welcome -home ceremonies are sure to be filled with political symbolism -- as is the case with all high-level CCP officials traveling abroad. Given Hu's current position and future prospects, the treatment he enjoys should be second only to that of President Jiang Zemin (江澤民). Whether this will be the case, and who should be there but doesn't show up, will be worth noting.
Two, Hu's entourage will be another motherlode of information. The customary practice when high-level CCP officials go on foreign visits is for them to take family and confidantes. Hu has no special task to carry out on this trip and it should therefore be relatively easy to see his embryonic inner circle. In particular, there should be current members of the Politburo following him, while provincial level cadres may also be in attendance.
Three, the level of reporting by the official Chinese media of Hu's trip will be a valuable indicator of his position and influence within the CCP, as well as his ability to control the propaganda ministry. Given Hu's status, one possible scenario is that the People's Daily will place detailed daily reports in an important slot on its front page for the duration of the tour. A somewhat lower-profile treatment, however, would not be considered inappropriate.
We can even harbor some small hope that Hu will make some statement that would hint of his personality. It's unlikely that he will be able to perform the political shadow boxing that Chinese officials love so effectively that he will be able to avoid divulging any clues during questioning by journalists. Hu's discussions with his hosts and any comments to the media will be scrutinized for anything that might give an idea of his thoughts regarding the future of China.
Wang Dan was one of the leaders of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 and is currently studying at Harvard University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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