Denied an invitation by China, Taiwan ultimately refused to attend the APEC leaders' summit in Shanghai. The incident not only explains the current deadlock across the Taiwan Strait, but also reflects the blind spots in Beijing's Taiwan policy.
There are three major blind spots in that policy. One, China believes it can view the government and the people of Taiwan as two separate entities. Taiwan's government must be spanked for walking the independence path, while the people and the opposition parties must be wooed. Two, Taiwan won't be able to resist unification as long as China's economic and military strength continues to grow. Three, with China's rising international status, powerful nations will be unwilling to back Taiwan ans so it will then finally accept unification.
First of all, by dealing a blow to Taiwan's government over the APEC summit, China believes it can highlight the impression that the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) government's refusal to recognize "one China" and its pro-independence stance are the causes of cross-strait tensions. Such blows, however, can backfire. Taiwan's absence from the summit has the potential to trigger opposition criticism within Taiwan against the government's lack of dexterity in handling the issue, and criticism that being absent from the summit is not the best option.
Both public opinion and Taiwan's opposition parties, however, have been unanimous in their condemnation of China's brutish behavior. It has certainly hurt Taiwanese feelings and may increase public opposition to unification with China. It may even increase public support for independence. Opinion polls and two presidential elections have consistently shown something very important about public opinion during crises in cross-strait relations: whenever China makes military threats against Taiwan there is a backlash against it from Taiwan's public. By excluding Taiwan from the summit, China has only increased public support for Chen's government. This flies in the face of China's goal of unification and of its desire to attack Chen's government.
Next, changes in the economic and military balance across the Strait may limit Taiwan's international space, but that will not necessarily resolve the cross-strait issue. No matter how hard China tries to develop its military, it cannot possibly catch up with the US or even Japan in the foreseeable future. It is almost impossible for China to apply a military solution to the cross-strait issue because that will destroy the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the fundamental interests of the US and Japan therein.
Also, economic development is inevitably increasing the mutual dependence between China and the rest of the world (including Taiwan). China will cause itself great harm by trying to solve problems through military force. This potential harm will only increase along with the deepening mutual dependence between China and the rest of the world.
A war in the Strait will also cause extensive damage to the global economy. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon has triggered a serious global recession, with losses estimated at US$350 billion (one-third of China's GDP) for the world economy. Bourses across Asia, including China's, fell by 10 to 15 percent within one month. If the two sides of the Strait actually go to war, global disaster will be the inevitable result.
A 1978 speech by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) gives an in-depth explanation of the massive risk involved if China were to try to solve the cross-strait issue by military force. Deng said: "If China undertakes unification through non-peaceful means, there can only be two possible outcomes. One, China will have to pay a considerable price even if it succeeds in conquering Taiwan. The southeastern coast [of China] will be in ruins. Also, what [China] conquers will be a Taiwan in ruins. [It will also have to] face 17 million hostile Taiwanese. Two, China will have to pay an even higher price if it fails to conquer Taiwan. The KMT will still rule Taiwan and 17 million Taiwanese will be pushed into the KMT's fold. The civil war may evolve into an international war and invite interference from imperialists. This will not be conducive to China's interests."
Finally, Taiwan does not need to harbor any illusions about US policy or entertain groundless fears. US policy has long supported "one China," peaceful resolution and dialogue across the Strait. Since last year, the US has even taken the stance that any peaceful resolution to the cross-strait issue must have the consent of the people of Taiwan. Even if the US rebuilds strategic relations with China, it will not look on meekly from the sidelines when China attacks Taiwan. It is definitely in the interests of the US -- not just Taiwan -- to maintain stability, peace, prosperity and development across the Strait.
Also, Taiwan is a democratic country. Any US government that sells out Taiwan will have to pay a considerable moral price. During the Cold War, the US needed China to counter the Soviet Union. Taiwan was then an authoritarian state and yet the US was unwilling to sell it out. The US is even less likely to do so now. Even if the US is no longer willing to give Taiwan's visitng leaders high-level treatment or sell it cutting-edge weapons to Taiwan, that will still not affect the basic US policy on the cross-strait issue.
Tung Chen-yuan is a doctoral candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
Translated by Francis Huang
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